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Abstract 
This Ph.D. thesis focuses on a central question about regulation in the EU and US 
electricity markets: the effects of vertical integration of generation and transmission and 
distribution networks. I focus on the forms of vertical integration where the generation and 
network firms are partly separated, such as in a legal or organizational form. Such form of 
separation is called unbundling. In the first 2 papers, I develop theoretical models to 
analyze the economic effects of vertical integration under legal unbundling (firms are 
legally separated entities and have the same owner) relative to ownership unbundling 
(firms are legally separated entities and have different owners). Both papers have policy 
implications for the regulation of the EU and US electricity markets, and make new 
contributions to auction theory, especially toehold auctions. In the first paper I consider 
the legal unbundling of the network activities; in the second paper I consider the legal 
unbundling of both the network activities and the generation activity. In both papers I find 
theoretical evidence that, in terms of efficiency, legal unbundling gives results inferior to 
ownership unbundling. Furthermore, I find solutions for several cases of toehold auctions 
that have not been solved before and that I believe to be interesting. In the third paper, I 
study the factors that have driven the choice and speed of implementation of different 
forms of unbundling. I find tentative evidence that questionable (corrupt?) practices may 
have played a role in selecting less stringent unbundling regimes. 
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Introduction 
 The electricity supply industries in the US and the EU are being reformed. Production 
in the electricity supply industry, most notably generation, transmission, and distribution,1 
used to be performed by Vertically Integrated Utilities (VIUs) that often were national or 
local monopoly producers. VIUs exist in the form of holding companies that still own 
many of the generation facilities and all, or almost all, of the transmission infrastructure. 
Now, these production activities have been separated and are performed – typically – by 
different companies that compete for inputs and/or customers in decentralized markets. 
 In many such markets, competition is organized by conducting auctions. In theory, 
auctions have features that have been judged highly desirable for electricity markets such 
as non-discrimination (the highest bidder wins regardless its identity), efficiency (the 
bidder with the highest value makes the highest bid and thus wins), and selling at efficient 
prices (prices that reflect the scarcity of a good).2 For example, in the European Union, the 
rights for generators or suppliers to use capacity on cross-border transmission lines is 
often allocated by explicit auction.3 In the US, contracts for electricity supply by 
generators have been awarded by procurement auctions, such as in New Jersey (Loxley 
and Salant 2004; Reitzes, 2007) and Illinois (Illinois Commerce Commission 2006; 
Negrete-Pincetic and Gross 2007). 
 For the liberalization of the electricity supply industries to be successful, it is essential 
that such decentralized markets are competitive. However, national markets are frequently 
dominated by large holding companies, which are often the incumbent VIUs that own 
companies that are involved in different steps of the electricity production process. As a 
result, in a market the seller and one of the buyers are sometimes owned by the same 
holding company; I refer to such a configuration as ownership integration, and to such 
buyers and sellers as integrated buyers and integrated sellers. 
 For example, in the EU, the capacity on cross-border transmission lines (also called 
interconnectors) is mostly sold by auction to generators (ETSO 2006). In many instances, 
one of the generators buying capacity is an integrated buyer; it is owned by a holding 
                                                 
1 I focus on the three main production steps of generation, transmission, and distribution: generation is the 
production of electricity in power plants, transmission is the transport of electricity over long distances, and 
distribution is the transport of electricity over short distances, mostly to the final consumer. 
2 See for example Consentec (2004). 
3 In 2007 explicit auctions were used to allocate capacity for international transmission lines at 21 border 
crossings (Commission of the European Communities, 2008, p.30) 
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company that also owns the interconnector. In 2006, for example, in 12 of the 27 EU 
member states VIUs that were involved in generation and/or distribution also owned the 
transmission and interconnector networks.4 A typical pattern in such EU states is that a 
large dominant electricity generator, in which the state has a majority stake, fully owns the 
transmission networks (see Commission of the European Communities 10.01.2007). 
 The holding company could have incentives to instruct the integrated seller to stifle 
competition by selling only to the integrated buyer. Regulation in EU and US therefore 
aims to prevent integrated sellers from favoring integrated buyers and thus discriminating 
against independent entrants. EU laws mandate that the integrated seller must be legally 
unbundled from the holding company (Directive 2003/54/EC and Regulation 1228/2003). 
While the seller may still be fully owned by the holding company, the seller must be a 
legally independent company with an autonomous management, and the holding company 
is not allowed to give day-to-day instructions to the seller.5 Legal unbundling intends to 
prevent the seller from discriminating against independent buyers in favor of the 
integrated buyer. I refer to this requirement as “partial legal unbundling”. In this 
dissertation I also consider a more stringent requirement which I refer to as “complete 
legal unbundling”; legally separating network activities and generation activities from one 
another and from the holding company. Figure 1 illustrates partial and complete legal 
unbundling of the holding companies. 
 
Figure 1: Unbundling schemes for the VIU. 
1a: Full integration 1b: Partial legal unbundling 1c: Complete legal unbundling 
                                                 
4 VIUs own transmission networks, including the interconnectors, in the following countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, and 
Luxembourg (Commission of the European Communities, 2008, p.38-39). 
5 Recently the European Commission has, in what is referred to as “the third energy package”, proposed new 
laws with stricter requirements on unbundling. However, these laws would also continue to allow VIUs to 
own generation and network activities, provided the network activities are legally unbundled and operated 
by an independent System Operator (Commission of the European Communities, 19.9.2007, p.5). 
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In the first two papers I address whether legal unbundling can be an effective means to 
guarantee non-discrimination of new independent entrants in generation. I compare the 
outcomes under legal unbundling with those under ownership unbundling (ownership 
unbundling requires firms not only to be legally separated entities, but also to have 
different owners).  
I find that a holding company that owns both a buyer and (a share of) the seller has 
incentives to make the integrated buyer bid more aggressively. Under partial legal 
unbundling the holding company can give its integrated buyer direct instructions to bid 
more aggressively. I analyze this case in the first paper and find that, as a consequence of 
the aggressive bidding, the profit of the integrated buyer increases at the expense of 
independent buyers, thus curbing competition and causing efficiency losses. The 
aggressive bidding also drives up the price of the good on auction. 
Under full legal unbundling the holding company cannot directly order its buyers 
to bid more aggressively, as the buyer is a legally independent entity and the holding 
company is not allowed to give day-to-day instructions. However, the way legal 
unbundling has been implemented in the EU energy laws, a holding company is allowed 
to set periodically performance goals and bonus schemes. In the second paper I show that 
the firm could draw a bonus scheme that gives the manager of the legally unbundled buyer 
firm a fraction of a combination of the profit and the revenue. Such a scheme is not illegal 
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as it does not refer to activities outside of the buyer firm. However, the proportion of 
revenues in the bonus scheme gives the manager incentives to bid more aggressively. Like 
in the first paper, the aggressive bidding brings about an increase in the profit of the 
integrated buyer at the expense of independent buyers, thus curbing competition and 
causing efficiency losses. While the outcome is similar to the one in the first paper, it is 
quantitatively smaller by about 50%. 
In the 3rd paper, written together with Andreas Ortmann, we study empirically the 
factors that have driven the choice and speed of implementation of different forms of 
unbundling. In this paper we incorporate all forms of unbundling, so apart from ownership 
and legal unbundling, we also consider (listed from more to less drastically unbundled): 
management and account unbundling, and unified ownership (no unbundling). We find 
tentative evidence that questionable practices may have played a role in selecting less 
stringent unbundling regimes. 
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Paper 1: The effects of vertical integration on auction outcomes in the EU and US 
electricity markets.* 
 
Silvester van Koten** 
CERGE-EI† 
 
Abstract 
 
With the deregulatory reforms in the electricity industry, stages of production have been 
split up and are performed – typically – by different companies that compete for inputs 
and/or customers in decentralized markets. In such markets goods are often sold by 
auction. As the extant EU and US regulatory frameworks allow integrated electricity 
holding companies to have ownership of firms active in generation, distribution, and 
transmission, these holding companies often own both the seller and one of the buyers in 
such decentralized markets. A holding company that owns both a buyer (called the 
integrated buyer) and the seller in an auction has distorted bidding incentives. Specifically, 
the holding company will make the integrated buyer bid more aggressively to increase 
auction revenue. As a result, the integrated buyer is more likely to win the auction and the 
good is sold for a higher price. This results in a decreased efficiency of the auction. 
Moreover, independent companies are less likely to win the auction, and, in any case, pay 
a higher price. 
 
Keywords: asymmetric auctions, bidding behavior, electricity markets, regulation, 
vertical integration. 
JEL classification code: L43, L51, L94, L98, R39. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Liberalization  
 The electricity supply industries in the US and the EU are being reformed. Production 
in the electricity supply industry, most notably generation, transmission, and distribution,6 
used to be performed by Vertically Integrated Utilities (VIUs) that often were national or 
local monopoly producers. Now, these production activities have been separated and are 
performed – typically – by different companies that compete for inputs and/or customers 
in decentralized markets. 
 In many such markets, competition is organized by conducting auctions. In theory, 
auctions have features that have been judged highly desirable for electricity markets such 
as non-discrimination (the highest bidder wins regardless its identity), efficiency (the 
bidder with the highest value makes the highest bid and thus wins), and selling at efficient 
prices (prices that reflect the scarcity of a good).7 For example, in the European Union, the 
rights for generators or suppliers to use capacity on cross-border transmission lines is 
often allocated by explicit auction.8 In the US, contracts for electricity supply by 
generators have been awarded by procurement auctions, such as in New Jersey (Loxley 
and Salant 2004; Reitzes, 2007) and Illinois (Illinois Commerce Commission 2006; 
Negrete-Pincetic and Gross 2007). 
 For the liberalization of the electricity supply industries to be successful, it is essential 
that such decentralized markets are competitive. However, national markets are frequently 
dominated by large holding companies, which are often the incumbent VIUs that own 
companies that are involved in different steps of the electricity production process. As a 
result, in a market the seller and one of the buyers are sometimes owned by the same 
holding company; I refer to such a configuration as ownership integration, and to such 
buyers and sellers as integrated buyers and integrated sellers. 
 For example, in Illinois and New Jersey, distribution firms award contracts for 
electricity delivery to generator companies in procurement auctions. Some of these 
                                                 
6 I focus on the three main production steps of generation, transmission, and distribution: generation is the 
production of electricity in power plants, transmission is the transport of electricity over long distances, and 
distribution is the transport of electricity over short distances, mostly to the final consumer. 
7 See for example Consentec (2004). 
8 In 2007 explicit auctions were used to allocate capacity for international transmission lines at 21 border 
crossings (Commission of the European Communities, 2008, p.30) 
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generators are integrated buyers; they are owned by a holding company that also owns the 
seller of the contracts.9 In the EU, the capacity on cross-border transmission lines (also 
called interconnectors) is mostly sold by auction to generators (ETSO 2006). In many 
instances, one of the generators buying capacity is an integrated buyer; it is owned by a 
holding company that also owns the interconnector. In 2006, for example, in 12 of the 27 
EU member states VIUs that were involved in generation and/or distribution also owned 
the transmission and interconnector networks.10 A typical pattern in such EU states is that 
a large dominant electricity generator, in which the state has a majority stake, fully owns 
the transmission networks (see Commission of the European Communities 10.01.2007). 
 
1.2 Legal unbundling 
 The holding company could have incentives to instruct the integrated seller to stifle 
competition by selling only to the integrated buyer. Regulation in EU and US therefore 
aims to prevent integrated sellers from favoring integrated buyers and thus discriminating 
against independent entrants. EU laws mandate that the integrated seller must be legally 
unbundled from the holding company (Directive 2003/54/EC and Regulation 1228/2003). 
While the seller may still be fully owned by the holding company, the seller must be a 
legally independent company with an autonomous management, and the holding company 
is not allowed to give day-to-day instructions to the seller.11 Legal unbundling intends to 
prevent the seller from discriminating against independent buyers in favor of the 
integrated buyer. In this manuscript I assume that legal unbundling is successful, and thus 
that auctions organized by such an integrated – but legally unbundled – seller are non-
discriminatory in the sense that the highest bidder wins, regardless of the identity or 
affiliation of the buyer. Note that the integrated buyer, the generator, is not regulated and 
does not have to be legally unbundled; the VIU is thus residual claimant to the profits of 
the integrated buyer and can exercise control over it. 
                                                 
9 See, for the case of New Jersey, http://bgs-auction.com, and, for the case of Illinois, Illinois Commerce 
Commission (2006, p.8). 
10 VIUs own transmission networks, including the interconnectors, in the following countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, and 
Luxembourg (Commission of the European Communities, 2008, p.38-39). 
11 Recently the European Commission has, in what is referred to as “the third energy package”, proposed 
new laws with stricter requirements on unbundling. However, these laws would also continue to allow VIUs 
to own generation and network activities, provided the network activities are legally unbundled and operated 
by an independent System Operator (Commission of the European Communities, 19.9.2007, p.5). 
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 US laws mandate a comparable form of separation called “functional unbundling” that 
should guarantee such non-discriminatory outcomes in auctions (FERC Order 888, 
21552). In the procurement auctions in New Jersey and Illinois, for example, distributors 
selling electricity delivery contracts were not allowed to own generators that participate in 
the auction (Loxley and Salant 2004; Illinois Commerce Commission 2006; Negrete-
Pincetic and Gross 2007). However, distributors were allowed to be part of a holding 
company that owned both distributors and generators. This liberty did not go wasted; all 
four distributors in New Jersey and both distributors in Illinois are part of a holding 
company that also owns a generator that participated in the auction. 
 While legal or functional unbundling might accomplish the objective that the seller 
does not discriminate against integrated buyers,12 I will argue that the ownership of the 
seller gives the integrated buyer incentives to bid more aggressively in auctions. The 
rationale is that while the seller is legally unbundled and thus restricted to maximize his 
own profit (the auction revenue), the buyer can be instructed by the holding company not 
to maximize the buyer profit, but the total profit of the holding company. To the holding 
company the price the integrated buyer pays for the good is not a net cost as (a part of) the 
payment returns to the holding company through its ownership of the seller. The holding 
company therefore instruct the integrated buyer to adapt its bidding behavior to account 
for the lower cost of bidding and bid more aggressively. 
 The holding company orders the integrated buyer to bid more aggressively only when 
the integrated seller can keep a part of the profit of the auction and send it on to the 
holding company. This is the case when the holding company is residual claimant of the 
income of the integrated seller; as, for example, with merchant interconnectors (cross-
border transmission lines): The owner can keep the full profits generated by auctions, a 
scenario allowed by new EU laws.13 Even when the income of the seller is regulated, 
under incentive regulation the seller is allowed to keep a part of the increased profit in 
order to provide incentives for innovation and cost reductions. A type of incentive 
                                                 
12 However, there is evidence that a legally unbundled seller can discriminate against independent buyers in 
favor of the integrated seller. For example, the European Commission Competition DG (6.02.2006, p.144-
148) reports several concrete examples of legally unbundled transmission and distributor network owners 
that discriminated against independent generators. 
13 While no merchant line has been built yet, it seems likely they will be built in the future; beginning 2007 
the European Commission had received two announcements of plans to build a merchant line (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2008, part 2, p.117)  
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regulation that has become more commonplace for networks is price cap regulation 
(Joskow 2006; Vogelsang 2005). Even when the regulator doesn’t allow profit retention, it 
might be possible that the seller is able to use part of the profit in a way that benefits the 
seller. For example, regulators in the EU have not been successful in enforcing the 
prescribed use of auction revenues for transmission lines.14 Below I assume that the seller 
can keep a certain proportion of the profits. I refer to this portion as the (effective) 
ownership share and denote this by the symbol γ .15  
 The main question is if legal unbundling (i.e., when a buyer owns even just a part of 
the seller) is a sufficient measure to assure a competitive market with non-discriminatory 
and efficient allocations and prices. This is an important question; if legal unbundling puts 
independent buyers in a disadvantaged position then this makes it less attractive for new, 
independent entrants to enter the energy market. This is highly relevant for the national 
electricity generation markets in the EU, as they are very concentrated.16 So far the 
support for legal unbundling as a sufficient measure has been strong in the EU and the US. 
However, up until now the effect of integrated ownership on bidding behavior and auction 
outcomes in electricity markets has not been studied. I therefore study in this paper the 
effect on auction outcomes of a buyer having an ownership share in the seller under legal 
unbundling. I focus specifically on the question whether auction outcomes in this case are 
still efficient and non-discriminating. 
  To answer these questions I model a very simple set-up with two buyers, each with 
private valuations that are identically, independently, and uniformly distributed.17 I also 
assume that the good on sale is indivisible, and not in many divisible units. This 
                                                 
14 While EU regulations state that auction revenues of international transmission lines (interconnections) 
should be spent on infrastructure projects in full, an energy inquiry by the European Commission that took a 
sample of 10 transmission owners reported that, over the years 2001-2005, a mere 20% of the auction 
revenues were spent on such projects (Commission of the European Communities, 2007, p.179). 
15 It is understood that the “ownership share” might be smaller than the stakes a buyer has in the seller due to 
regulation or profit sharing with other parties. 
16 National markets for generation in the EU are indeed highly concentrated as measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI sums the squares of the market shares in percentages of all relevant firms; 
its value is thus between 0 and 10.000.  In 2006, seven out of 20 EU member states were highly 
concentrated (HHI between 1800 and 5000), and eight, among which are Belgium and France, were very 
highly concentrated (HHI above 5000) (Commission of the European Communities, 2008, p.11). Attracting 
new investment is therefore a major priority. 
17 The buyers might have in addition to their private value a publicly known value component that is 
identical (common) for all of them. As long this common value component is identical and publicly known, 
such a value component does not affect the analysis. In section 3.4 I present a setting with perfect 
information; where the private values of the buyers are publicly known. 
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simplification allows me to derive explicit solutions that enable an estimation of the size 
of the effects of ownership integration. The results from this simplified model give a 
suggestive answer to the effects of unified ownership of buyer and seller in auctions. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next sections I first review 
the relevant literature, focusing on legal separation and toehold auctions, after which I 
describe the setup of my model. 
Then I analyze first-price and second-price formats of the main auction model and present 
the effects of ownership integration. To show the limits and robustness of the effects in 
my model, I also present models that employ the same setting but under different 
assumptions on information. I then present empirical data on procurement auctions in 
Illinois and New Jersey that indicate that one of the effects predicted in the model, 
discrimination of independent buyers, seems to have been present. In the conclusion I 
summarize my findings and present suggestions for improvement. 
 
2. LITERATURE 
2.1 On legal unbundling 
The effects of ownership integration combined with legal separation have been studied in 
three earlier papers: Cremer, Crémer, and De Donder (2006), Höffler and Kranz (2007), 
and Reitzes (2008). Höffler and Kranz (2007) claim that legal unbundling can have 
superior qualities over ownership unbundling. In their model competing generators buy 
transmission capacity for a fixed, regulated rate from a transmission company to transport 
their electricity to consumers. The capacity on the transmission network is unlimited in the 
relevant range. One of the generators, the integrated generator, owns the transmission 
network. Höffler and Kranz (2007) show that under legal unbundling the integrated 
generator will produce more output, and that, as a result, the total generation output is 
weakly higher than under full integration or ownership unbundling. Reitzes (2008) 
analyzes a setup similar to that of Höffler and Kranz (2007) in the more specific setting of 
price competition with a large integrated generator and relatively small independent 
generators. Reitzes (2008) also finds that the integrated generator is more aggressive, and 
that a profit sharing regulatory scheme for the integrated seller can achieve optimal 
pricing.  
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 My model resembles that of Höffler and Kranz (2007) and Reitzes (2008); the 
regulated transmission owner and the integrated generator in their models are the 
integrated seller and the integrated buyer in my model. The main difference is that in their 
models the transmission company has an unlimited capacity and thus a vested interest to 
sell as much capacity as possible. In my model transmission capacity is limited, and thus 
sold in an auction.18 Moreover, I analyze the effect of ownership integration on competing 
independent buyers, something that, remarkably, has not been done by Höffler and Kranz 
(2007) or Reitzes (2008). In this setting, my model leads to conclusions opposite to those 
of Höffler and Kranz (2007) and Reitzes (2008): Auction outcomes under legal 
unbundling are worse in terms of competition and efficiency than under ownership 
unbundling. 
 Cremer et al. (2006) study the effects of legal unbundling of the buyer: In their model 
a downstream firm (a buyer) is restricted to maximize its own profit. This is different from 
my model where the seller is the legally unbundled firm and thus restricted to maximize 
its own profit (the auction revenue), while the buyer can be instructed by the holding 
company to behave in ways that do not maximize the buyer profit (but rather the total 
profit of the holding company). 
 
2.2 On toehold auctions 
 In the model setup, it will become clear that auctions with an integrated seller and an 
integrated buyer are mathematically identical with so-called toehold auctions. Toehold 
auctions have been analyzed mostly in the context of financial takeovers, where two 
buyers compete to buy a company and one or both buyers already own, by holding shares, 
a fraction of the company (Bulow, Huang and Klemperer 1999; Burkart 1995; Ettinger 
2002). The fraction of the company owned by the potential buyer(s) is called a toehold.  
 Burkart (1995) analyzed a second-price private value toehold auction with two buyers 
and finds that the buyer with a toehold bids more aggressively and increasingly so the 
higher his toehold. Burkart (1995) shows that such aggressive bidding is also likely to 
occur in auctions with perfect information. Ettinger (2002) compares first-price and 
                                                 
18 This makes my model also suitable to analyze the auctioning of other essential inputs, such as electricity 
contracts in procurement auctions. 
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second-price private value auctions with symmetrical toeholds and notes that, for strictly 
positive toeholds, the revenue equivalence theorem doesn’t hold. Bulow et al. (1999) 
analyze common value toehold auctions, where both bidders have a toehold (and at least 
one bidder a strictly positive toehold) and show that the bidder with a larger toehold has a 
larger probability of winning the auction. Bulow et al. (1999) also show that the winning 
price is strongly affected by toeholds.  
 As Burkart (1995) uses general assumptions, he cannot give estimates of the size of 
the effects of toeholds on auction outcomes. In addition, he models an auction with only 
two bidders, while in auctions for transmission capacity often more buyers compete. I 
therefore model a setup similar to that of Burkart (1995), but assume that values are 
uniformly distributed which allows me to derive explicit solutions when an arbitrary 
number of independent buyers take part in the auction. First-price toehold auctions have 
not been analyzed before at all, and I present a general result for first-price auctions with 
an integrated buyer that fully owns the integrated seller. Under more restrictive 
assumptions, I numerically solve such first-price auctions with partial integrated 
ownership, and show that the revenue equivalence theorem doesn’t hold in such auctions. 
To assess the robustness of the effects to different assumptions, I apply models of Bulow 
et al. (1999) for unknown common values, Ettinger (2002) for symmetrical ownership 
shares, and I further elaborate the model of Burkart (1995) for the case of perfect 
information. 
 
3. THE MODEL19 
3.1 Assumptions 
 In the main application of my model, a generator competes to obtain a good, service or 
contract, such as capacity on an interconnector or a contract for electricity supply, which it 
needs to perform a profitable transaction. The profitability of the transaction depends thus, 
amongst others, on the costs of generating electricity. I will assume that the cost of 
generating electricity differs among buyers.20 This implies that the buyers value the good 
                                                 
19 See section 8 for a notation overview. 
20 The value of the good to a generator is dependent on the costs of generating electricity. As a generator 
does not know the cost of his competitors, he treats it as a random variable, drawn from a distribution that, 
for sake of simplicity, I will assume to be uniform. The random costs drive the dynamics of the bidding 
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on auction differently. 
 For example, when bidding for transmission capacity on an interconnector, the value 
of the good for sale is the profit that could be earned by selling electricity abroad. This 
profit is equal to the difference between the price abroad and the costs of the generator.21 
When generators compete for an electricity supply contract in procurement auctions, the 
generators actually bid the price they will charge for the electricity supply and the lowest 
price wins (Loxley and Salant 2004). For the model I transform such a procurement 
auction, without loss of generality, into an equivalent “discount auction” where a given 
maximum electricity supply price is set and the generators make bids that represent the 
discount they will offer on the price. In such a discount auction the highest bidder wins. 
For a generator the (private) value of the contract is equal to the set electricity supply price 
minus the (private) cost of electricity generation. For example, a generator with low costs 
of electricity generation has a high value for the contract, and thus will be willing to bid 
high discounts in the discount auction, which corresponds to a low price for which the 
bidder is willing to supply electricity in the procurement auction. 
 I will assume that a buyer knows his own value, but not the value of the competing 
buyer. In my model this implies that a buyer does not know his competitor’s marginal cost 
of producing electricity (except for a common, identical cost factor such as gas or oil 
prices). In older models stemming from the time electricity generator markets were tightly 
regulated (Green and Newbery 1992; von der Fehr and Harbord 1993), it was usual 
practice to assume that marginal costs are common knowledge, however, since the 
electricity industry has become competitive, information on the cost structure of electricity 
generation has strategic value and is therefore carefully guarded (Léautier 2001, 34). 
Parisio and Bosco (2006, 8) add: “generators frequently belong to multi-utilities [VIUs] 
providing similar services often characterized by scope and scale economies (Fraquelli et 
al., 2004, among others). The cost of generation therefore can vary across firms because 
firms can exploit production diversities in ways that are not perfectly observable by 
                                                                                                                                                   
behavior. In electricity generation, there is also a common cost component, mainly gas or oil prices. I 
assume that the size of these common cost components are common knowledge and that they are identical 
for all generators. As shown in footnote 26, these common cost components are therefore inconsequential 
for the bidding behavior; this is determined by the unknown private value factors. 
21 In line with the empirical evidence, I assume that, as transmission capacity is fixed and small relative to 
total demand, buyers cannot influence the final price in distant locations (see e.g. Consentec, 2004). 
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competitors.” In this line of thought, competitors can only make an estimate of each 
others’ marginal costs. However, for completeness I also consider a deterministic 
configuration, where generators know the costs of electricity generation for competitors.22 
 One of the bidders is an integrated buyer; a holding company fully owns the integrated 
buyer and (a part of) the integrated seller. I denote with parameter 1k  the proportion of the 
integrated seller that the holding company owns. I denote with parameter 2k  the 
proportion of the auction revenue which the integrated seller can retain. For example, 
when the integrated seller is unregulated, it can keep all of the auction revenue and 2 1k = . 
When the integrated seller is regulated, it can retain a part of the profit under incentive 
regulation (and possibly by creative accounting), and thus 20 1k< ≤  (Vogelsang 2005). 
The relevant parameter in the model, which I refer to as the (effective) “ownership share,” 
is the proportion of the auction revenue that is received by the holding company, given by 
1 2k kγ = ⋅ . 
 Buyers are risk-neutral and have private values that are independently and uniformly 
distributed on the interval [ ]0,1 . The buyers are thus, at the outset, symmetrical;23 they 
have identical, independent value distributions. I assume that the good on sale is sold as 
one indivisible good.24 As usual in auctions, the highest bidder wins the good, which 
reflects that the integrated seller does not favor the integrated buyer and thus the legal 
separation of the integrated seller is working as intended by the regulators. Given its value 
realization, the integrated buyer Y chooses its optimal bid Yb . In line with the literature, I 
assume that there exists a continuously differentiable, strictly increasing bidding strategy 
[ ]Yb ⋅  that maps the integrated buyer’s realized value [ ]0,1Yv ∈  onto its bid [ ]Y Yb v . The 
bidding strategy [ ]Yb ⋅  has an inverse, [ ]y ⋅ , such that [ ][ ]Y Y Yy b v v= . Analogously, the 
optimal bid of an independent buyer X, Xb , is determined by its bidding strategy [ ]Xb ⋅  
that maps its realized value [ ]0,1Xv ∈  onto its bid [ ]X Xb v . The strategy [ ]Xb ⋅  has an 
                                                 
22 I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
23 This simplification serves to focus the analysis on the effect of an ownership share, and, likely, does not 
affect the qualitative results. See footnote 27 for an example.  
24 While transmission capacity and electricity supply procurement auctions are usually multi-unit auctions, I 
restrict my focus to single-unit auctions to simplify the analysis and focus on the effect of integrated 
ownership. 
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inverse, [ ]x ⋅ , such that [ ][ ]X X Xx b v v= . 
 
3.2 The second-price auction 
In a second-price auction where one integrated buyer has an ownership share, the 
integrated buyer, when it loses, is not indifferent to the price for which the good is sold 
(see also Burkart 1995). In that case it would like the good to be sold for a price as high as 
possible. This gives the integrated buyer an incentive to bid more aggressively. As 
Proposition 1 shows, this effect is relatively strong even when there is more than one 
independent buyer competing. 
 
Proposition 1: For any 1n ≥ , in a second-price auction with n+1 buyers, one integrated 
buyer who receives a share γ  of the auction revenue and n independent buyers, where 
values are distributed independently and uniformly on [0,1], the independent buyers bid 
their values, and the integrated buyer bids 1 1[ ] vYb v v γγ −+= + . As a result, with increasing γ  
for all 1n ≥ : 
a) The expected profit of Y, ( ) [ ]nYπ γ ,increases, 
b) The expected auction revenue, ( ) [ ]nm γ , increases, 
c) The expected profit of iX , 
( ) [ ]
i
n
Xπ γ , decreases for all i, 
d) Efficiency, ( ) [ ]nW γ , decreases, 
e) The profit from optimizing total profits (generator profit and γ  times auction 
revenue) increases relative to optimizing the profit of only the generator 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] [ ] [0] [0]in n n nY strategic Y X mπ γ π γ π γ= − + . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
 The intuition for Proposition is as follows. Independent buyers bidding their own bid 
in a second-price auction is a standard result.25 The profit function for the integrated buyer 
Y is given by26 
                                                 
25 See, for example, Krishna (2002). 
26 An identical, fixed, commonly known value component R in addition to the random private values does 
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1) ( )[ , ] Pr[ wins] ( (1 ) E[highest bid from n buyers | Y wins])nY Y Y Yb v Y vπ γ= ⋅ − − ⋅  
  ndPr[ has 2  highest bid] YYγ+ ⋅ ⋅b  
 
th
2
Pr[ has i  highest bid]
n
i
Yγ
=
+ ⋅ ⋅∑ thE[2ndhighest bid from n -1 buyers | Yhas i  highest bid]
. 
 
The parts in bold in this equation are the expected payments for each case. The first line 
gives the part of the profit in case Y wins, Y then receives its value Yv  minus the money it 
must pay that the integrated seller cannot send on to the holding company; this is equal to 
1 γ−  times the highest expected bid from the n competing independent buyers. The 
expression in the second line gives the part of the auction revenue Y receives in case it has 
the 2nd highest bid. In this case, Y loses the auction and sets the price to be paid by the 
winner of the auction; Y thus receives the ownership share γ  times its bid Yb . The 
expression in the third line gives the expression in case Y has a bid lower than the 2nd 
highest bid and thus Y loses the auction and does not set the price. When Y has the ith 
highest bid (with 2 i n≤ ≤ ), the expected payment by the winner is the 2nd highest bid 
from the (n-i) bidders that have a higher bid than Y. The total expected profit for Y in this 
case is thus its ownership share γ  times the summation of the probability of Y having the 
ith highest bid times the expected 2nd highest bid from the (n-i) bidders. 
 Having more independent buyers participating in the auction has opposing effects on 
the bidding function of the integrated buyer Y. On the one hand, having more buyers 
lowers the risk for the integrated buyer Y to win the auction with a bid higher than his 
value (the first line in the equation), and thus gives Y an incentive to bid more aggressive. 
On the other hand, having more independent buyers lowers the probability that Y will be 
setting the price by having the 2nd highest bid (the second line in the equation), and thus 
gives Y an incentive to bid less aggressive. Interestingly, for values being independent and 
                                                                                                                                                   
not change the bidding behavior of any of the buyers. Imagine that all buyers have an extra identical, fixed, 
commonly known value component R (for example, gas prices fall and lower the cost of generating 
electricity identically for all generators). In that case the profit function of integrated buyer Y, [ , ]Y Yb vπ%  is 
different from the profit function in equation 1; the value of Y, and the bids of all buyers – who bid their 
value – are higher by R. Because R is a constant it can be taken out of the expectations operator and as a 
result [ , ] [ ],Y Y Y Yb v b v Rπ π γ= +% , which implies that [ , ] [ , ]Y Y Y YY Yd b v d b vdb dbπ π=
% .  
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uniformly distributed on [0,1] the two opposite effects cancel out, and the integrated buyer 
Y chooses an identical bidding function for any number of competing independent buyers: 
1
1[ ]
Yv
Y Y Yb v v γγ −+= + . Figure 1 illustrates the bidding by the integrated buyer and the 
independent buyers.27 
 
Figure 1: The bidding function of integrated buyer Y in second-price auctions. 
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As a result of its aggressive bidding, the auction revenue increases (Prop. 1a). 
Notably, for an auction with two buyers (thus with one competing independent buyer) and 
1γ = , the auction revenue is equal to 1124 ,28 which is different from the auction revenue in a 
first-price auction shown below. Also, the total profit of the integrated buyer (the profit of 
its generation activity plus its share of the auction revenue) is higher (Prop. 1b). The profit 
of each independent buyer iX  is now lower, iX  is less likely to win, and if it wins, it pays 
a higher price (Prop. 1c). The auction is now inefficient because there are some cases 
                                                 
27 The assumption of symmetry likely does not affect the qualitative results. For example, assume that the 
integrated buyer Y is a stronger bidder in the sense that its private value Yv  is distributed uniformly over 
[0, 2] . If [1, 2]Yv ∈ , Y would win the auction by bidding any bid larger than 1, and if [0,1]Yv ∈ , bid the 
bidding function above. The analyses above then apply whenever [0,1]Yv ∈ . 
28 This result can be obtained for 1n γ= =  by using the formula in the proof of Proposition 1b on page 44 
in the Appendix. 
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where Y wins without having the highest value. The more aggressively Y bids, the more 
often this happens, and thus efficiency decreases further (Prop. 1d). The last expression 
(Prop. 1e) shows that the strength of the incentive for Y to bid more aggressively increases 
in its ownership share γ .29 The strength of this incentive, which I call the “strategic 
profit”, is the difference in profits between using a strategy of maximizing total profits 
(generator profits and γ  times auction revenue) and of using a strategy (which I call the 
naïve strategy) of maximizing the profit of only the generator. The strategic profit is thus 
given by ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] [ ] [0] [0]n n n nY strategic Y Y mπ γ π γ π γ= − + . The first expression is its profit when 
maximizing total profits and the second part is his profit when maximizing only the profit 
of the generator. 
 
Figure 2: Outcomes in second-price auctions with one independent buyer. 
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Figure 2 shows the effect of ownership share on auction outcomes when the 
integrated buyer competes with one independent buyer. There is a considerable efficiency 
                                                 
29 This is an important indicator for external validity of the model; experimental evidence has shown that the 
strength of incentives is important for theoretical predictions to show in real settings (Hertwig and Ortmann, 
2001, Smith and Walker, 1993). 
Percentage 
γ  
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loss,30 up to 6.25%. The gain for the Vertically Integrated Utility (VIU), given by the 
strategic profit31 is also considerable; a VIU can, by bidding more aggressively, increase 
its profit by up to 16.7%. The price of the good is strongly affected; it can increase by up 
to 37.5%. However, this might also be considered a positive effect in the case of 
transmission line capacity auctions; Joskow and Tirole (2005) claim that, due to the 
“lumpiness” of transmission investment, auction revenues are too low to incite the 
building of an efficient amount of merchant transmission capacity. The increase in profits 
for the transmission owner could thus at least somewhat alleviate this problem. Also in 
procurement auctions this could be seen as a positive effect, as then the price paid reflects 
the discount generators are giving to the distributor that buys electricity. An increase in 
the price means that the generator gives a larger discount than without ownership 
integration; electricity is thus eventually supplied to the distributor at a lower price. 
 However, the strong discrimination against independent generators favoring the VIU 
is a negative effect. As can be seen in Figure 2 ownership integration decreases the 
expected profit of the integrated buyer by up to 75%. Also at low levels of ownership 
integration discrimination is considerable; even with an ownership share of only 10%, the 
independent generator has a profit that is lower by 17%. This violates one of the key 
principles which the EU intends to apply to the electricity markets: creating fair 
competition in electricity generation. Moreover, the fact that ownership integration creates 
strong discrimination against independent generators might discourage investment into 
generation by independent investors, especially since generators, in order to recover 
significant fixed cost, need to make positive profits on their electricity deliveries (see, for 
example, Soft 2002).32 In lowering the profits of independent generators, ownership 
integration – most likely – lowers the number of independent generators in the market 
                                                 
30 The efficiency loss percentage is calculated as [ ] [ ][ ]
0
0
W W
W
γ− , which is equal to ( )
2
2
25
1
γ
γ+ . 
31 The strategic profit percentage is calculated as Y Strategic
Y Naïve
π
π . 
32 The fewer the number of independent buyers, the higher is the profit for each of them. Generally, for n+1 
independent buyers with uniformly distributed values, the expected profit for each buyer is equal to 
1
( 1)( 2)n n+ +  (see, for example, Krishna, 2002). If buyers in the auction receive a profit higher than what is 
needed for fixed cost recovery, new buyers start entering the auction, which decreases the profit of each 
buyer in the auction. New buyers keep entering until the profit is just enough for cost recovery. If the profit 
is too low an outflow of buyers occurs, leaving the market more concentrated. 
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which are able to recover their fixed costs. The dynamic costs of such a suboptimally low 
level of competition are not determined here but are likely to be considerable. 
 
Figure 3: Outcomes in second-price auctions with 1, 2, 3, 4, and ∞ independent buyers. 
a) Discrimination winning 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
10
20
30
40
50
3
2
1
∞
4
 
b) Discrimination profit  
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
3
2
1
∞
4
 
The relative increase in winning 
probability for Y 
The relative loss in profit for each competing 
independent buyer  
  
c) Inefficiency 
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
2
4
6
8
10
3
2
1
∞
4
 
d) Incentive for aggressive bidding 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
2.5
5
7.5
10
12.5
15
17.5
20
3
2
1
∞
4
Loss in efficiency Strength of incentives for Y to bid more 
aggressively as given by the strategic profit as 
a percentage of the naïve profit. 
 
 Figure 3 shows that when the number of competing independent buyers goes to 
infinity all effects disappear, but that with more realistic numbers in the electricity market, 
effects are strong. The discrimination effect of integrated ownership is remarkably strong. 
Graph (a) shows the loss in expected probability of winning for each competing 
independent buyer, which can be as high as 50%. Not only do independent buyers win less 
often, but when they win, they make less profit, as shown in Graph (b). With one 
competing buyer, the loss in profit can be as high as 75%. With two competing 
Percentage Percentage
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γ γ
γ  
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independent buyers, each of them has a decrease in profits of up to 62.5%. Even with as 
many as three competing independent bidders, a rather generous assumption as the 
markets for electricity generation are rather concentrated in the EU,33 each has a decrease 
in profits of up to 52%. Even for a low ownership share the discrimination effect is rather 
strong; for example when 0.15γ = , each independent buyer experiences a decrease in 
expected profits of 10% with three competing independent buyers, and up to 24% with 
one competing independent buyer. Graph (c) shows the loss in efficiency, which 
represents a considerable social loss. Remembering that strategic profit is the extra profit 
over naïve profit derived from ownership, Graph (d) shows the strength of incentives for 
Y to bid more aggressively as given by the strategic profit as a percentage of the naïve 
profit. The incentive is considerable for reasonable values of the ownership share and the 
number of competing independent buyers; when the ownership share is above 0.5, and 
there are no more than 2 independent buyers, then Y can increase its profit by 5.6% or 
more. 
 
3.3 The first price auction 
In this section, I will analyze the effect of ownership integration in first price auctions.34 
When Y fully owns the integrated seller in first price auctions, a general result can be 
established. Remarkably, Proposition 2 shows that Y bids as if taking part in a second-
price auction. 
 
Proposition 2: When the values of X and Y, Xv  and Yv , are independently distributed 
without any further restrictions on the possible distribution, then when the integrated 
buyer Y fully owns the seller such that 1γ = , Y bids its own value in a first-price auction. 
Proof: When 1γ = , Y receives the full amount of any bid paid. Therefore Y does not have 
to take bidding costs into account and, regardless of his bid, earns at least min[ , ]Y Xv b . 
Now an argument similar to that for truthful bidding in second-price auctions applies. 
Suppose Y has value Yv . If Y makes a bid lower than his value Y Yb v< , then with a 
                                                 
33 For example, in a survey by the European Commission, the average share in total generation of the largest 
generator in 2006 was 61% for the 18 countries that reported (Eurostat). 
34 In a first price auction the highest buyer wins and pays his own bid. 
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positive probability X wins with a bid Xb ,which is higher than the bid of Y but lower than 
the value of Y, Y X Yb b v< < . In this case Y can guarantee itself a higher profit at no costs 
by bidding his value, Y Yb v= . A similar argument establishes that Y will not make a bid 
higher than his value. Hence, Y bids Y Yb v=  and earns max[ , ]Y Xv b . 
 
 To further analyze the bidding functions of X and Y, I assume that the values of X and 
Y, ,X Yv v , are independently and uniformly distributed on [0,1]. In first-price auctions, the 
expected profit of Y is given by: 
1) [ ] ( )Pr[Y wins] [ (1 ) | ] Pr[ wins] [ | ]Y Y Y Y Y X X Y Xb E v b b b X E b b bπ γ γ= ⋅ − − > + ⋅ <  
 
The first part in Equation 1 is the probability that Y wins times its expected profit in that 
case; this profit is equal to the value of the good on auction minus its bid plus the part of 
the bid it “pays to itself” through its ownership of the seller, altogether (1 )Y Yv bγ− − . The 
second part is the probability that Y loses times its expected profit in that case; this profit 
is equal to the ownership share times the payment by X, Xbγ . Y wins the auction with bid 
Yb  when the bid of X is lower, [ ]X X Yb v b< . Applying the inverse bidding function 
1[ ] [ ]Xx b
−⋅ ≡ ⋅  on both sides of the equation gives [ ]X Yv x b< . Y thus wins for value 
realizations of X with [ ]X Yv x b< . Equation 1 can then be written as 
2) ( )[ ] 1
0 [ ]
[ ] (1 ) [ ]Y
Y
x b
Y Y Y Y Xx b
b v b dz b z dzπ γ γ= − − +∫ ∫ . 
 
Solving the first integral and substituting [ ]X Yv x b≡  in the second integral and integrating 
by parts results in 
3) ( )( )[ ] [ ] 1 [ ] [ ]
Y
b
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y b
b x b v b b b x b x q dqπ γ γ ⎞⎛= − − + − ⋅ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ , 
where b  is the maximum bid. 
 
To determine the first order condition for profit maximization for Y, differentiate equation 
(3) with respect to Yb , set it equal to zero and substitute 
1[ ] [ ]Y Y Yy b b b
−≡  for Yv : 
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4) ( [ ] ) '[ ] (1 ) [ ]Y Y Y Yy b b x b x bγ− = − . 
 
The profit maximization problem for X is identical to that for Y with the ownership share 
set to zero, i.e. 0γ = , therefore the first order condition for profit maximization for X is: 
5)  ( [ ] ) [ ] [ ]Y Y Y Yx b b y b y b′− ⋅ = . 
 
When 0γ = , the problem is symmetrical for X and Y and both have bidding function 
1
2[ ]b v v= . Under full ownership, when 1γ = , Y bids his value, and thus, using (5), X bids 
following 1
2[ ]Xb v v= . The more aggressive bidding by Y has several interesting effects on 
price, competition, profits and efficiency. Proposition 3 summarizes the main effects. 
 
Proposition 3: In a first-price auction with one competing independent buyer X an 
integrated buyer Y who has full ownership, 1γ = , bids its value, while the independent 
buyer bids 1
2[ ]X X Xb v v= . As a result of the more aggressive bidding of Y,  
a) The expected profit of Y, [ ]Yπ γ ,increases, 
b) The expected auction revenue, [ ]m γ , increases, 
c) The expected profit of iX , [ ]iXπ γ , decreases, 
d) Efficiency, [ ]W γ , decreases. 
e) The strategic profit – the extra profit that can be earned by bidding more 
aggressively – increases. 
Proof: See appendix. 
 
Quantitatively, with Y bidding its value, its profit is equal to the auction revenue. 
Furthermore, the auction revenue increases by 62.5% from 13  to 1324 , the profit of X falls 
by 50% from 16  to 
1
12 , efficiency falls by 4.2% from 23  to 1524 , and the strategic profit 
increases from 0 to 124 . Interestingly, the auction revenue when Y has full ownership is 
different in a first-price auction than in a second-price auction. 
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Corollary 1: Revenue equivalence between first and second-price auctions does not hold.  
Proof: Using the above bidding function the auction revenue is calculated to be equal to 
13
24  in the case of full ownership. In section 3.2, p.25, I found that the auction revenue in a 
second-price auction with two buyers is equal to 1124  for the case of full ownership.  
 
 Outcomes for : 0 1γ γ< <  lie in between the extremes of no ownership, 0γ = , and 
full ownership, 1γ = . Equations (4) and (5) can be solved numerically for [ ]Yx b  and 
[ ]Yy b  for : 0 1γ γ< < .35 Figure 3 shows numerical approximations of the bidding 
functions for 0 1γ< < .36 
 The bidding functions in Figure 4 demonstrate that an increased ownership share in 
the seller results in the integrated buyer Y bidding more aggressively. Y maximizes profits 
given by Pr[ wins | ] ( (1 ) ) Pr[ wins | ] ( )Y Y Y Y XY b v b X b bγ γ⋅ − − + ⋅ . A positive ownership 
share, 0γ > , increases the gain of winning, (1 )Y Yv bγ− − . This gives Y the incentive to 
sacrifice a part of this gain by bidding stronger and increasing its probability of winning. 
This incentive is partly countered by the income Y earns when it loses; the ownership 
share times the bid of X, Xbγ . All in all, Y bids stronger. The stronger bidding by Y 
lowers the profits of X, Pr[ | ] ( )Y X XX wins b v b⋅ − , by lowering the probability of X 
winning the auction. This gives X the incentive to sacrifice a part of its earnings by 
bidding stronger and increasing its probability of winning. 
 
                                                 
35 To my best knowledge there exists no explicit analytical solution for the bidding function in first-price 
auctions with : 0 1γ γ< < . Proposition 4 in the Appendix lays out the necessary restrictions that the 
bidding strategies must fulfill. 
36 Note that there is a discontinuity at 1γ = . If and only if 1γ = , then bidding Y Yb v=  is a weakly 
dominant strategy for Y. Suppose 1γ δ= −  (for small 0δ > ), then if X sticks with its strategy 1
2X X
b v= , Y 
would never bid more than 1
2
ε+  (for small 0ε > ). At 1
2Y
v ε= +  there would be a mass point which in turn 
would create an incentive for X to overbid it whenever its value is larger ( 1
2X
v ε> + ). Therefore, once 
1γ < , bidding Y Yb v=  cannot be an equilibrium strategy for Y. For an equilibrium in pure strategies to 
exists at all, the bidding functions of X and Y must have the same bid for 1Y Xv v= = . This is the case in the 
strategies shown in Figure 3; there are no mass points, and the density of Y’s bids is continuous, excluding 
the possibility for X to improve its profits by deviating from its strategy. 
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Figure 4: the bidding functions for independent buyer X and integrated buyer Y in first-
price auctions. 
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
0.3γ =  
0.542b ≈  
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
0.75γ =  
0.637b ≈  
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
0.97γ =  
0.725b ≈  
— bidding function Y 
- - bidding function X 
— bidding functions X and Y when 1γ =  
 
 
3.4 Alternate models 
 In this section I analyze two alternative cases that might be relevant in electricity 
markets. The cases are very similar to the setup I analyzed before but make different 
assumptions concerning information. In the first case I assume that there is perfect 
information; generators know the value of their competitor. In the second case I assume 
that generators do not have private values for the good on auction, but rather a common 
value which they do not know precisely; they only have an estimate of this value 
available. This case can be modeled as a common value auction. 
 
3.4.1 Perfect information 
 While I assumed that generators have private information about their values (allowing 
for a common value factor that is publicly known), it is useful to look at an idealized 
situation where generators can estimate the exact value of their competitor without error. 
Burkart (1995) analyzes such a setup for second-price auctions and notes that the 
integrated generator mostly still overbids. This analysis is also valid for sealed-bid first-
price auctions. Remarkably, in this case there is no inefficiency and the independent buyer 
has a fair chance to win the auction, but it is possible that all his profits are appropriated 
by the integrated buyer. 
v 
b 
v 
b b 
v 
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 The intuition for this result is as follows: To guarantee the existence of Nash-
equilibria, assume that if both buyers make the same bid, then the auction is won by the 
buyer with the highest value (and in case of equal values the winner is chosen at random). 
When the price for transmission is equal to p, then buyer Y with ownership share γ  and 
value Yv  receives (1 )Y Yv p v p pγ γ− − = − +  on winning, and pγ  on loosing. From the 
relationship Y Yp v v p p pγ γ< ⇔ − + > , it follows that when the price is lower (higher) 
than its value, Y prefers to win (lose) the auction and receive Yv p pγ− +  ( pγ ). Thus 
when X Yv v< , Y and X bid X Yb b p= =  for [ , ]X Yp v v∈ , and Y wins and earns 
(1 )Y Yv pπ γ= − − , while X loses. In case X Yv v>  Y and X bid X Yb b p= =  for 
[ , ]Y Xp v v∈ . Y loses and earns Y pπ γ= , while X wins and earns X Xv pπ = − . 
 There is a continuum of Nash equilibria in all of which the buyer with the highest 
value wins the auction; all Nash equilibria are thus efficient. As the buyer with the highest 
value wins the auction, both buyers have equal probability to win the auction, 50% each, 
which indicates that there is no discrimination against the independent buyer concerning 
winning the auction. The profits of the independent and integrated buyers cannot be 
determined without further assumptions. 
 However, a sealed-bid second-price auction with a trembling-hand refinement 
criterion for equilibria or common English auctions have a unique equilibrium (Burkart 
1995), as the independent buyer bids its value in these auctions. The integrated buyer will 
then always match the bid of the independent buyer, and thus, when its value is the 
highest, win and earn (1 )Y Y Xv vπ γ= − − , and when its value is the lowest, lose and earn 
Y Xvπ γ= .37 The integrated buyer thus makes the highest profit possible in these auctions; 
the independent buyer, on the other hand, makes zero profits. 
 The case of perfect information can therefore lead to an outcome of perfect 
discrimination, where the integrated buyer appropriates all surpluses from the independent 
buyer. This shows that while some of the negative effects of integrated ownership – such 
as inefficiency – disappear, it is possible that the independent buyer is prevented from 
making a profit higher than zero, which is a form of discrimination far stronger than in the 
                                                 
37 Its expected profit is thus equal to 1 1
6 2
γ+  in auctions with one competing independent buyer. 
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previous models. 
 
3.4.2 Unknown common values 
 While my model allowed for an identical common value component in the valuations 
of the bidders, I assumed that this component is common knowledge to both buyers, thus 
preventing this component to affect bidding strategies; these are determined by the 
unknown private value. A setup without a private value factor and where the size of the 
common value component is unknown to both buyers can be modeled as a common value 
auction.38 Bulow et al. (1999) model such common value auctions where both buyers own 
a share of the seller. Both buyers have the same value for the good on auction, but the 
exact value of the good is only known with certainty after a buyer has won the auction. 
Both buyers have private information (called a signal) that allows them to make an 
estimate of the value of the good. Using the results of Bulow et al. (1999) for the case 
where only one buyer, the integrated buyer, has an ownership share, and under additional 
assumptions similar to the ones I use in my model, signals are uniformly distributed on the 
interval [0,1] and the common value component is equal to the average of the signals, 
effects similar to the ones in my model can be determined. 
While efficiency is not an issue in such a common value auction by definition (the 
good has the same value for each buyer), ownership integration has, like in my model, a 
strong discrimination effect against the independent buyer and an upward effect on prices. 
Under the above mentioned additional assumptions the probability of winning of the 
independent buyer is 12
γ
γ
−
−  in first-price, and zero in second-price auctions. The 
discrimination effect is stronger in such common value auctions; the probability of 
winning for the independent buyer – and thus his expected profit – in second-price 
auctions is zero, even if the integrated buyer has only a small ownership share. In first-
                                                 
38 Such an analysis might be relevant for the electricity markets. For example, generators that have the same 
costs in producing electricity might both need transmission capacity to sell electricity in a distant location. 
The exact price the generators will receive in the distant location is not certain, and each generator makes an 
estimate of this price given his private information. The value of transmission capacity to the distant location 
is then the same for both generators, but each has a different estimate of this value. Common values might 
also play a role in procurement auctions. Negrete-Pincetic and Gross (2007) argue that in Illinois in 2006 
there was uncertainty over the value of the contracts on sale. If in addition generators had more or less the 
same cost of producing electricity, then the auction could be modeled by a common value auction as done in 
Bulow et al. (1999). 
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price auctions both go to zero as the ownership share of Y goes to one. The expected price 
of the good on auction when the integrated buyer has a strictly positive – but possibly very 
small – ownership share cannot be compared with the price when the integrated buyer has 
no ownership share; in the latter case such a common value auction has a multiplicity of 
equilibria (Bulow et al. 1999). However, it can be determined that the expected price is 
increasing in the ownership share of the integrated buyer.39  
 The model of Bulow et al. (1999) shows that integrated ownership, as in my 
model, causes strong discrimination against the independent buyer, while the effect on 
expected price cannot be determined due to indeterminacy of the model when the 
integrated buyer has no ownership share. 
 
4. PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS IN NEW JERSEY AND ILLINOIS. 
The procurement auctions held in New Jersey from 2002 untill 2008 and in Illinois 
in 2006 are examples of cases where distributors and generators figured as integrated 
buyers and sellers. In 2002, New Jersey organized its first procurement auction where 
distribution companies sold one-year forward contracts to ensure the electricity needs of 
their default service customers for a period of one year (Loxley and Salant 2004).40 The 
contracts were sold in procurement auctions as fixed percentages of load, called tranches. 
All four distribution companies selling contracts, Public Service Electric and Gas 
Company (PSE&G), Jersey Central Power & Light Company (JCP&L), Atlantic City 
Electricity Company (ACE) and Rockland Electric Company (RECO), were integrated 
sellers; they were owned by holding companies that also owned generation companies. In 
the procurement auction in Illinois in 2006 electricity supply contracts, like those in New 
Jersey, were sold in tranches (Negrete-Pincetic and Gross 2007). Both distributors 
involved, Ameren and ComEd, were integrated sellers, as they were owned by holding 
companies that also owned generators that were bidding in the auction. Error! Reference 
                                                 
39 The expected auction revenue in second-price auctions is equal to 2 14 4[ ]m
γ
γγ γ ++=  (Bulow et al., 1999). 
Using the functions in Bulow et al. (1999) with the additional assumptions mentioned above the expected 
auction revenue in first-price auctions can be shown to be equal to ( )14 2 211 1
1 1
2Gamma[ ]4 1 2
3 2 3 2 Gamma[3 ]Gamma[ ][ ] 1m
γ
γ
γ γγ γ γγ
−
−
− −− − − +
= + − − + . 
40 See also http://bgs-auction.com. 
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source not found. gives an overview of the distributors and their integrated generators in 
New Jersey and Illinois. 
The auctions in New Jersey and Illinois were multi-unit, and therefore more 
complicated than the auctions I modeled in this paper.41 However, it seems likely that the 
logic of the theoretical models in this paper carries over to more complicated settings. 
This would imply that generators are more likely to win auctions when the seller and the 
buyer are owned by the same holding company (they have the same affiliation), then when 
the seller and buyer are owned by different holding companies. In the auctions in New 
Jersey and Illinois, an integrated generator might thus be able to acquire more tranches 
from its “own” integrated distributor. 
 
Table 1: Distributors and their integrated generators in New Jersey and Illinois 
Distribution company Generation company affiliated with the distribution 
company 
New Jersey BGS auctions 2002-2008 
ACE Conectiv Energy Supply, Inc. 
JCP&L FirstEnergy Solutions Corp 
PSE&G PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC 
RECO Consolidated Edison Energy, Inc. 
Illinois electricity auctions 
Ameren Ameren Energy Marketing Company 
ComEd Exelon Generation Cross-ownership., LLC 
 
The raw data suggest that this might be the case. Error! Reference source not 
found. shows the percentages of tranches won by the generator integrated with ACE 
(Connective) in the auctions over 2002-2008, for the different products. As my model 
suggests, the average percentage of tranches Connective won from ACE is higher than 
those won from other distributors. In addition, Connective, from 2004 on, only acquired 
tranches from its integrated distributor ACE, which suggests that Connective learned over 
time about the strategic advantage it has in auctions for ACE tranches. 
To test if bidders with affiliation did indeed have an advantage in the New Jersey 
auctions, I compare the (unweighted) average proportion of tranches won in auctions over 
2002 till 2006 amongst the four integrated generators. If affiliation has no effect, then an 
integrated generator should win, on average, equal proportions from the different 
                                                 
41 Detailed descriptions of the auctions can be found in Negrete-Pincetic and Gross (2007) for the Illinois 
auctions, and in Loxley and Salant (2004) and on http://bgs-auction.com for the New Jersey auctions. 
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distributors. If affiliation brings an advantage, then the average proportion of tranches won 
should be higher for a generator when the distributor has the same affiliation than when 
the distributor has a different affiliation. For example, a generator integrated to ACE 
should have a higher proportion of contracts won to supply ACE than to supply JCP&L, 
PSE&G, or RECO. 
 
Table 2: Tranches won by the generator integrated to ACE (Connective) 
   Distribution company
Year Product  PSE&G JCP&L ACE RECO
2002 No differentiation 0% 0% 0% 25%
2003 34-month 0% 36% 29% 100%
 10-month 5% 17% 0% 0%
2004 BSG-FP, 3-year 4% 0% 14% 0%
 BSG-FP, 1-year  0% 0% 0% 0%
 BSG-CIEP 0% 0% 0% 0%
2005 BGS-FP 0% 0% 13% 0%
 BSG-CIEP 0% 0% 0% 0%
2006 BSG-FP 0% 0% 14% 0%
 BSG-CIEP 0% 0% 0% 0%
2007 BGS-FP 0% 0% 14% 0%
 BSG-CIEP 0% 0% 0% 0%
2008 BSG-FP 0% 0% 38% 0%
 BSG-CIEP 0% 0% 0% 0%
Unweighted average 2002-2008 1% 4% 9% 8%
 
 
Table 3: Results of the New Jersey BGS auctions over 2002-2006 
 1. Percentages of tranches won per 
distributor, averaged over all product 
groups and auctions from 2002 till 2006 
2. Average percentage of 
tranches won at different 
distributors 
 ACE JCP&L PSE&G RECO  
Generator affiliated with      
ACE  
(Connective Energy Supply) 8.1% 3.5% 0.6% 8.3% 4.1% 
JCP&L 
(First Energy Solutions Corp) 2.7% 2.4% 2.5% 0.0% 1.7% 
PSE&G 
(PSEG Energy Resources & Trade) 9.8% 14.9% 21.8% 20.0% 14.9% 
RECO 
(Consolidated Edison Energy) 1.9% 9.7% 1.7% 16.7%** 4.4% 
** Significant at the 5% confidence level 
 
In Table 3, column 1, I have shown the average percentages of the load won in the 
New Jersey auctions from 2002 till 2008 by the generators with the same affiliation as one 
of the distributors. Numbers in bold are the percentages won when the generator and the 
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seller had the same affiliation. In column 2, I have depicted the averages of the 
percentages won of the three distributors that have a different affiliation than the generator 
in the row. For example, the generator affiliated with ACE, won over the auctions from 
2002 till 2008 an average of 8.1% of the tranches of ACE, which is higher than the 
average percentage of tranches it won from any of the other distributors (JCP&L, PSE&G 
and RECO). Table 3 shows that percentages a generator wins from a distributor with the 
same affiliation (the bold numbers in the first column) are higher than the average 
percentages from a distributor with another affiliation (the second column). The 
percentage of tranches won by the generator affiliated with RECO is significant.42  
 
Table 4: Results of the Illinois auctions in 2006 
 
1. Percentages of tranches 
won per distributor, averaged 
over all product groups 
 Ameren ComEd 
Generator affiliated with   
Ameren 
(Ameren Energy Marketing Company) 26.9%*** 0.0% 
ComEd 
(Exelon Generation CO) 12.3 29.4% 
*** Significant at the 1% confidence level 
 
Table 4 shows the average percentages of the tranches won in the Illinois auctions 
by the generators with the same affiliation as one of the distributors. Numbers in bold are 
the percentages won when the generator and the seller had the same affiliation. As in New 
Jersey, the average percentage of tranches won from a distributor is higher when the 
generator has the same affiliation. 
 For a more rigorous test, I estimated, separately for Illinois and New Jersey, the 
regression 1 2Won Integrated Yearα β β ε= + ⋅ + ⋅ + . The variable Won is the proportion of 
tranches won by the integrated generators, as the dependent variable. The indicator 
variable Integrated takes value 1 (0) if the proportion won by the generator was with an 
integrated (non-integrated) distributor. As the auctions in New Jersey took place from 
                                                 
42 I compared the average of tranches of RECO won by the generator affiliated with RECO (Consolidated 
Edison Energy, Inc.) with the average of tranches this generator won from the other distributors using a t-
test with pooled variance. I did the same test for the other generators, but most of them had low significance 
(around 0.2 ~ 0.3). 
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2002 till 2008, I also included the variable Year, indicating the year the auction took 
place. The last term, ε , gives the error, which I assume to have an i.i.d. normal 
distribution. The theory presented in this paper suggests that an integrated buyer will bid 
more aggressively in an auction and thus have a higher probability of winning the auction; 
the variable Integrated should thus have a positive effect on the proportion won. Table 5 
shows that in regressions with the proportion won as a dependent variable, the coefficient 
on Integrated is indeed positive and significant both in Illinois and in New Jersey.43 
 
Table 5: Percentage of tranches won in auctions regressed on Integrated. 
 Illinois New Jersey 
Integrated 0.22** 
(.10) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
Year - 0.003 
(0.006) 
N 20 236 
R2 0.21 0.03 
** Significant at the 5% confidence level 
*   Significant at the 10% confidence level 
()  Standard errors 
 
My analysis in the procurement auctions in Illinois and New Jersey shows that 
generators obtained higher shares of contracts for supply from the distributor with the 
same affiliation than from a distributor with a different affiliation. This conforms to the 
intuitions developed in the theoretical models in this paper. However, an alternative 
explanation would be that there are other advantages for a generator to supply to an 
integrated distributor. For example, a generator might receive information from its 
distributor which enables it to better forecast the needed supply and thus save costs. In 
addition, for the theoretical models in this paper to apply, it must be the case that the 
distributor at least partly benefits from the auction revenues and that a part of the benefit is 
passed on to the owner, the holding company. A more extensive study could control for 
such alternative explanations. 
 
                                                 
43 As a robustness test I included several sets of dummy variables in the regression. I included dummies for 
different products (contracts for different duration and pricing), for years, and for generators, but the 
significance of the variable Affiliated was hardly influenced. See Table A in the Appendix for the regression 
models including the dummies. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 My analyses suggest that the integrated ownership of a buyer and seller has negative 
effects on auction outcomes under imperfect information. A holding company that owns 
both a buyer (the integrated buyer) and (a share of) the seller has incentives to make the 
integrated buyer bid more aggressively. Consequently, the profit of the integrated buyer 
increases at the expense of an independent buyer, thus curbing competition and causing 
efficiency losses. The aggressive bidding also drives up the price of the good on auction. 
This price effect can be interpreted as positive: In transmission auctions the price of 
capacity, which is generally underpriced, is closer to its social value, and in procurement 
auctions the price of electricity is lower. Additional analysis shows that different but 
similar effects arise under perfect information; when the buyers’ valuations for the good 
are common knowledge, the allocations that result from the auction are no longer 
inefficient, but the independent buyer can in some settings be prevented from making any 
profits at all. The independent buyer is also strongly discriminated against when buyers 
have an unknown common value component and no private valuation. 
 The results are relevant for EU electricity markets as transmission capacity on 
international lines are often sold by explicit auction mechanisms. Moreover, the EU 
allows the building of merchant transmission lines where the owner can keep the auction 
revenues in full. As the analysis in this paper shows, this might result in discrimination 
against independent generators under legal unbundling. Such discrimination, while 
undesirable in itself, also makes new entry less attractive. This is a serious concern as 
national electricity generation markets in the EU are very concentrated and thus new 
entrants are needed to make any liberalization reforms successful. Furthermore, the 
holding company owning the integrated seller is advantaged, and because the holding 
company is often the (former monopoly) incumbent, this further consolidates its already 
dominant position in the electricity supply industry.  
 The results are also relevant for the US electricity market as contracts for electricity 
supply are sometimes sold in procurement auctions. Distributors selling in such auctions 
are owned by companies that also own generators that participate in the auction. As my 
analysis shows, such auctions are likely not fair – integrated generators have a higher 
probability to win auctions. Indeed, my empirical analysis shows that integrated 
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generators obtained significantly more contracts from integrated distributors than from 
other ones. This might affect efficiency negatively and discourage new entrants. However, 
a positive static effect is that the aggressive bidding of integrated generators makes the 
electricity cheaper for distributors, from which consumers are likely to benefit. 
 There are a few possible solutions to remedy the negative results found in this 
analysis. Firstly, regulators could aim their efforts at preventing that auction revenues 
benefit the VIU that owns distribution or transmission networks. If successful, this would 
reduce the effective ownership share to zero and thus take away the basis for the 
advantaged position of the integrated generator. Enforcing ownership unbundling would 
effectively achieve this goal. Alternatively, given the strong resistance against ownership 
unbundling both in the EU and the US, regulators could try to achieve this goal by means 
of strict regulation without ownership unbundling, for example by using rate of return 
regulation for transmission and distribution networks. However, rate of return regulation 
has long been known to lead to welfare losses (Averch and Johnson 1962). As the 
electricity industry is being liberalized it is becoming more and more attractive to use a 
form of incentive regulation that gives a network owner incentives to run the network 
efficiently and to add new capacity (Vogelsang 2002, 2005; Joskow 2006). Moreover, 
preventing transmission owners from benefiting from the auction revenue goes against the 
EU policy of allowing the merchant (for-profit) building of new transmission lines. In 
addition, there is evidence that network owners are sometimes able to use the auction 
revenues in other ways than prescribed by regulators (Commission of the European 
Communities 2007, 179). 
 Secondly, a possible remedy is to mandate the VIU to legally separate not only the 
seller, but also the integrated buyer. This is the form of legal unbundling that Cremer et al. 
(2006) consider, and for which Höffler and Kranz (2007) coined the term “reverse 
unbundling”. By implementing the same sort of legal unbundling for the integrated buyer, 
the holding company is no longer able to give the integrated buyer day-to-day instructions. 
Also, the integrated buyer is not allowed to take revenues of the integrated seller or the 
holding company into account; it is usual that in a legally unbundled firm managers are 
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not allowed to receive bonuses contingent on results of the holding company.44 I take up 
this question in Van Koten (2008), and show that auction outcomes are still negatively 
affected on the same dimensions as in this paper, although slightly less pronounced. Legal 
unbundling of the integrated buyer is therefore not a sufficient measure. 
 Thirdly, an independent generator could be awarded or sold an ownership share such 
that both generators end up with equal shares. Ettinger (2002) has analyzed such a setup 
and finds that in this case there is no discrimination and no efficiency loss. Moreover, the 
increase in price, which can be a positive effect, is stronger. Giving equal shares thus 
provides a solution but requires the regulator to have the authority to mandate the VIU to 
sell shares in the transmission line to new independent generators. Moreover, 
implementation of such a measure brings up many practical questions, such as on what 
legal basis should regulators be allowed to take away ownership shares from the 
incumbent and for what compensation? And should ownership shares only be given to 
participating buyers or also to potentially participating buyers? Giving buyers symmetrical 
shares could therefore be complicated in practice. 
 The solution most in line with economic logic suggested by the models in this paper is 
to mandate ownership unbundling for distribution and transmission networks: When 
buyers have no ownership shares in sellers, auctions are efficient and non-discriminatory. 
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7. APPENDIX 
Proposition 1: For any 1n ≥ , in a second-price auction with n+1 buyers, one integrated 
buyer who receives a share γ  of the auction revenue and n independent buyers, where 
values are distributed independently and uniformly on [0,1], the independent buyers bid 
their value, and the integrated buyer bids 1 1[ ] Y
v
Y Y Yb v v γγ −+= + . As a result, with increasing 
γ  for all 1n ≥ : 
a) The expected profit of Y, ( ) [ ]nYπ γ ,increases, 
b) The expected auction revenue, ( ) [ ]nm γ , increases, 
c) The expected profit of iX , 
( ) [ ]
i
n
Xπ γ , decreases, 
d) Efficiency, ( ) [ ]nW γ , decreases. 
e) The profit of optimizing total profits (generator profits and γ  times auction 
revenue) increases relative to optimizing the profit of only the generator.. 
 
Proof: Independent buyers bidding their own bid in a second-price auction is a standard 
result.45 The profit function for the integrated buyer Y is given by 
( ) [ , ] Pr[ wins] ( (1 ) E[highest bid from n buyers | Y wins])nY Y Y Yb v Y vπ γ= ⋅ − − ⋅  
ndPr[ has 2  highest bid]Yγ+ ⋅ ⋅ Yb  
                                                 
45 See, for example, Krishna, 2002. 
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th
2
Pr[ has i  highest bid]
n
i
Yγ
=
+ ⋅ ⋅∑ thE[2ndhighest bid from n - i buyers | Yhas i  highest bid]
. 
 
The parts in bold in this equation are the expected payments for each case. Writing out 
( ) [ , ]nY Y Yb vπ , filling in the probabilities and expected values, taking into account that 
values are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1,] and that independent buyers bid 
their own value, results in the following expression: 
( ) 1
0
1[ , ] (1 ) Y
bn n n
Y Y Y Y Y n
Y
b v b v nz zdz
b
π γ − ⎞⎛= − − ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠∫  
( )1(1 )nY Y Yj nb b b−+ −  
21
2
( 1)(1 )( )! (1 )
( )! ! (1 )Y
i
n n i i Y
Y Y ii b
Y
i i z z bnj b b zdz
n i i b
−
−
=
⎞⎛ − − −+ − ⎟⎜ − −⎝ ⎠∑ ∫ . 
In the first line, the probability of Y winning with bid b is equal to nYb  and the expected 
price is equal to 1
0
1 Yb n
n
Y
nz zdz
b
−∫ , where 1nnz −  is the probability distribution function of the 
highest value of the n independent buyers. In the second line, the probability of Y having 
the 2nd highest bid is equal to 1(1 )nY Ynb b
− − , and the payment by the winner of the auction 
is the bid b of Y. In the third line, the probability of Y having the ith highest bid ( 2 i n≤ ≤ ) 
is equal to ! (1 )
( )! !
n i i
Y Y
n b b
n i i
− −− , and the expected 2
nd highest bid of n-i buyers is equal to 
21 ( 1)(1 )( )
(1 )Y
i
Y
ib
Y
i i z z b zdz
b
−− − −
−∫ , where 2( 1)(1 )( )iYi i z z b −− − −  is the probability distribution 
function of the 2nd highest value of n-i independent buyers. Solving the integrals in the first 
and third line, and collecting the elements multiplied with the ownership share γ  gives the 
following expression:  
1) ( ) 1 1 1 11[ , ] (1 ) (1 ( 1)
1 1 1
n n n n n n n
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
n n nb v b v b b nb b b n b nb
n n n
π γ+ + − +− ⎞⎛= − + + − + − + +⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠ , 
where 1
1
n
Y
n b
n
+
+  is the expected price Y must pay when it wins and 
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11(1 ( 1)
1
n n
Y Y
n n b nb
n
+− − + ++  is the s expected payment when Y has a bid lower than the 2
nd 
highest bid (the third line in the above equation). Differentiating the equation with respect 
to b, setting it equal to zero, and solving for b results in a bidding function given by 
(1 )[ ]
1
Y
Y Y
vb v v γ γ
−= + + . Differentiating 
( ) [ , ]nY Y Yb vπ  twice and substituting Yb  with 
(1 )[ ]
1
Y
Y Y
vb v v γ γ
−= + +  gives 
12 ( )
2
[ , ] (1 ) 0
( ) 1
nn
Y Y Y Y
Y
d b v j vn
db j
π γ
−⎞+⎛= − + <⎟⎜ +⎝ ⎠
, which establishes 
that the found bidding function is a global optimum. The inverse bidding function [ ]y ⋅  
such that [ [ ]]Y Yy b v v=  is given by [ ] (1 )Y Yy b bγ γ= + − . 
 
As a result, with increasing γ , for all 1n ≥ : 
a) The expected profit of Y, ( ) [ ]nYπ γ ,increases. The expected profit of Y,  
( ){ }( ) 21( 1)( 2) 1[ ] 1 ( )n nY n n n n γγπ γ γ γ γ+ + += + + + − , can be found by substituting Yb  with the 
optimal bidding function 1 1[ ] Y
v
Y Y Yb v v γγ −+= +  in equation 1 above, and integrating over the 
value realizations of Y from 0 to 1: 
11( )
0
( ) 1[ ]
( 1)(1 ) 1
n
n
Y n
z n dz
n n
γπ γ γγ
++ −= ++ + +∫ .  
 
b) The expected auction revenue, 
( ) ( ){ }1( ) 1 2 11( 1)( 2)(1 )[ ] (1 ) 2 2 2nn n nn nm n n nγγ γ γ γ γ+ + ++ + += + + + − + + , increases. The expected 
payment by Y, ( ) [ ]nYm γ , is in the same fashion equal to the bolded portion of the first line of 
equation (1) (the case that Y wins the auction, in other words, equal to equation (1) with 
0Yv =  and 0γ = ). This expression is equal to 
( )11( ) 1 2 2( 1)( 2)(1 )0[ ] (1 )1 nn n n nnY Y Y n nnm b dvn γγ γ γ++ + ++ + +⎞⎛= = + −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠∫ .  
The expected payment by all independent buyers together is equal to the second and third 
line of equation (1) (in other words, equal to equation (1) with 0Yv =  and 1γ = ). The 
expected payment by a independent buyer i (1 i n≤ ≤ ), ( ) [ ]
i
n
Xm γ , is thus equal to this 
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expression divided by the number of independent buyers, n, 
1( ) 1 11
0
1[ ] (1 ) (1 ( 1)
1
n n n n
X Y Y Y Y Y Yn
nm nb b b n b nb dv
n
γ − +− ⎞⎛= − + − + +⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠∫ . 
 
The expected auction revenue, ( ) [ ]nm γ ,is equal to these expected payments added for all 
participants, thus ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] [ ] [ ]n n nX Ym n m mγ γ γ= ⋅ + , which is equal to 
( ) ( ){ }1( ) 1 2 11( 1)( 2)(1 )[ ] (1 ) 2 2 2nn n nn nm n n nγγ γ γ γ γ+ + ++ + += + + + − + + . 
 
c) The expected profit of iX , ( ) ( ){ }1( ) 1 11( 1)( 2)(1 )[ ] (1 ) 2 2 2nin n nX n n n n nγπ γ γ γ γ γ+ + ++ + += + − + + + , 
decreases. The expected profit of iX  is equal to its expected value minus its expected 
payment, thus ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] [ ] [ ]
i i i
n n n
X X Xv mπ γ γ γ= − . The expectation of the value an independent 
buyer iX  assigns to the good when it wins, 
( ) [ ]
i
n
Xv γ , is equal to the probability of winning 
times the expected value conditional on winning. The probability of iX  winning requires 
the remaining n-1 independent buyers to have a lower value (the first element in the 
integral below), and the integrated buyer Y to have a lower bid (the second element in the 
integral below). Thus: 
( ) [ ] Pr[ wins] [ | wins]
i
n
X i iv X E v Xγ = ⋅
1
1 1 [ ]j
j
n
Y Y Y Yv y v v dv
+
−= ⋅ ⋅∫ . 
Note that the integration runs from 1
γ
γ+  to 1, as the value of iX  must be higher than the 
lowest bid of Y, given by 1
γ
γ+ . The expected payment of iX , 
( ) [ ]
i
n
Xm γ , was derived in (b). 
The expected profit of iX , is then equal to 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] [ ] [ ]
i i i
n n n
X X Xv mπ γ γ γ= − . 
 
d) Efficiency, ( ) [ ]nW γ , decreases. Efficiency, ( ){ }1( ) ( 1)( 2) 1[ ] 1 1 ( )nn nn nW n nγ γγγ γ+ ++ + += + + − + , 
can be calculated by summing over profits and auction revenues: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
[ ] [ ] (1 ) [ ] [ ]
i
n
n n n n
Y X
i
W mγ π γ γ γ π γ
=
= + − +∑ . This expression is decreasing in γ . 
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e) The profit of optimizing total profits (generator profits and γ  times auction revenue) 
increases relative to optimizing the profit of only the generator. The difference between 
profits when maximizing total profits minus that when maximizing the profit of only the 
generator is what I call the strategic profit and is given by 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] [ ] [0] [0]n n n nY strategic Y Y mπ γ π γ π γ= − + . The first part in the expression is the profit 
when maximizing total profits, as ( ) [ ]nYπ γ  includes the ownership share times the auction 
revenue. The second part is the profit when maximizing only the profit of the generator. In 
that case , the auction revenue is given by ( ) [0]nm , and the profit of Y, which I call the 
naïve profit, is given by ( ) ( )[0] [0]n nY mπ γ+ . Using (a) and (b) for substituting into the 
strategic profit it can be shown to be increasing in γ . 
 
Proposition 3: In a first-price auction with one competing independent buyer X and an 
integrated buyer Y who has full ownership, 1γ = ,who bids its value, while the 
independent buyer bids 1
2X Xb v= . As a result of the more aggressive bidding of Y,  
a) The expected profit of Y, [ ]Yπ γ ,increases, 
b) The expected auction revenue, [ ]m γ , increases, 
c) The expected profit of iX , [ ]iXπ γ , decreases, 
d) Efficiency, [ ]W γ , decreases. 
e) The profit of optimizing total profits (generator profits and γ  times auction 
revenue) increases relative to optimizing the profit of only the generator. 
Proof: Proposition 2 established that Y bids its own value, [ ]Y Y Yb v v= , and the 
independent buyer bids 1
2[ ]X Y Yb v v= . The inverse bidding functions are thus 
1[ ]Y Y Yb b b
− =  and 1[ ] 2X X Xb b b− = . 
a) The expected profit of Y, [ ]Yπ γ ,increases. In the case of no ownership, it is equal 
to 16[ 0]Yπ γ = = . In the case of full ownership, 
[ ]( ) [ ]( ) [ ]( )( )12 1
2
1 1
0 0
[ 1] Y wins Y wins X winsY Y Y Y Y Y Y X Y Yp b v dv p b v dv p b v dvπ γ = = + ⋅ +∫ ∫ ∫  
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( ) ( ) ( )( )12 1
2
1 1
1 1
2 20 0
2 1Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Yv v dv v dv v v dv= + ⋅ +∫ ∫ ∫  
( )12 1
2
1 13 2 32 1 1
3 2 120 0Y Y Y
v v v⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
13
24= . 
 
Where the probability of Y winning with value Yv  is given by 
1[ ] [ ] 2Y wins Y X Y Y Yp v b b v v
−= = ⋅o  when 12Yv ≤  
[ ] 1Y wins Yp v =      when 12Yv >  
Once Y has a value higher than 12  it can be sure of winning as the highest bid of X is 
1
2[1]Xb = . The probability of X winning with value Xv  is given by 
1 1
2[ ] [ ]
X wins
X Y X X Xp v b b v v
−= =o . 
 
b) The expected auction revenue, ( ) [ ]nm γ , increases. As Y pays all its realized value, 
auction revenue is equal to profit of Y plus [ ] 13241 [ 1]Ym γ π γ= = = = . 
 
c) The expected profit of iX , 
( ) [ ]
i
n
Xπ γ , decreases. In the case of no ownership the expected 
profit of X is given by 16[ 0]Xπ γ = = . With full ownership, the profit is equal to 
[ ]( )( )10[ 1] X WINSX X X X XP v b v dvπ γ = = −∫  
( )1 1 1 12 2 120 x x xv v dv= =∫ . 
 
d) Efficiency, ( ) [ ]nW γ , decreases. In the case of no ownership efficiency is equal to the 
expected value of the highest out of two signals which is equal to [ ] 230W γ = = . In the 
case of full ownership, by [ ] 581W γ = = . The efficiency is equal to the profits of X and Y 
together, that is, the full auction revenue is accounted for in the profit of Y, and thus 
[ ] [ ] [ ] 13 5124 12 8X YW γ π γ π γ= + = + = . 
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e) The profit of optimizing total profits (generator profits and γ  times auction revenue) 
increases relative to optimizing the profit of only the generator 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] [ ] [0] [0]in n n nY strategic Y X mπ γ π γ π γ= − + . In the case of no ownership the strategic profit 
is by definition equal to [ ]0 0Y Strategicπ γ = = , and, in the case of full ownership, by 
[ ] 1241Y Strategicπ γ = = . Total profits of Y are equal to 1324[ 1]Yπ γ = = ,and the naïve profit is 
equal to [ ] [ ] [ ] 1 1 16 3 20 0YY Naïve mπ γ π γ= + = + = ,thus the difference is equal to 
[ ] [ ] [ ] 13 1 124 2 241 1 1YY Strategic Y Naïveπ γ π γ π γ= = = − = = − = . 
 
Proposition 4: Given a value of the ownership share, : 0 1γ γ< < , the inverse bidding 
functions [ ]x b  and [ ]y b  and the maximum bid b  for all bids b  can be found by solving 
the following set of equations: 
4) ( [ ] ) '[ ] (1 ) [ ]y b b x b x bγ− ⋅ = − ; 
5)  ( [ ] ) [ ] [ ]x b b y b y b′− ⋅ = ; 
6) [ ] [ ] 1x b y b= = ; 
7) 1
2 0
1 [ ]
b
b x dγ β β ⎞⎛= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ . 
Proof: Equation (4) and (5) are the first order conditions on p. 30. Equation (6) states 
that a buyer only makes the maximum bid b  when it has the highest possible value, which 
is one. This follows from the fact that it is a Nash-equilibrium to bid equal or lower than 
the highest bid. Equation (7) puts a restriction on the maximum bid that can be derived 
from the fact that a buyer with value 0 bids 0, [0] [0] 0x y= = , and the first order 
conditions (4) and (5). Rewriting (4) and (5) gives 
 [ ] ( [ ] ) (1 ) [ ]x b y b b x bγ′ ⋅ − = − ⋅ ⇔  
8) ( [ ] 1) ( [ ] ) (1 ) [ ] [ ]x b y b b x b y b bγ′ − ⋅ − = − ⋅ − + , 
 
 ⇔=−⋅′ ][)][(][ bybbxby  
9) ( [ ] 1) ( [ ] ) [ ] [ ]y b x b b y b x b b′ − ⋅ − = − + . 
Summing up 8) and 9) gives; 
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 ( [ ] 1) ( [ ] ) ( [ ] 1) ( [ ] ) 2 [ ]x b y b b y b x b b b x bγ′ ′− ⋅ − + − ⋅ − = − ⇔  
10) ( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) 2 [ ]x b b y b ab b x b
b
γ∂ − ⋅ − = −∂ . 
Integrating equation (10) over 0 to the maximum bid b  gives 
 2
0
(1 ) (1 ) [ ]
b
b b b x bγ− ⋅ − = − ⇔∫  
7) 1
2 0
1 [ ]
b
b x bγ ⎞⎛= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ . 
 
Table A1 
Won Illinois New Jersey BGS 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Integrated 0.22** 
(.10) 
0.22* 
(0.11)  
0.22* 
(0.11) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.05* 
(0.03)  
0.05** 
(0.03) 
Dummies  
For 
products 
  Product 2 
-0.01 (0.24) 
Product 3 
0.20 (0.24) 
Product 4 
0.47* (0.24) 
Product 5 
0.08 (0.24)  
Product 6 
0.20 (0.24) 
Product 7 
0.20 (0.24)  
Product 8 
0.04 (0.24) 
Product 9 
0.26 (0.24)  
Product 10 
0.20 (0.24)  
Product 2 
-0.01 (0.25) 
Product 3 
0.20 (0.25)  
Product 4  
0.47* (0.25) 
Product 5 
.08 (0.25) 
Product 6 
0.20 (0.25) 
Product 7 
0.20 (0.25) 
Product 8 
0.04 (0.25) 
Product 9 
0.26 (0.25) 
Product 10 
0.20 (0.25)  
 Product 2 
0.12* (0.06) 
Product 3 
0.05 (0.06) 
Product 4 
0.09 (0.07) 
Product 5 
(dropped) 
Product 6 
0.02 (0.06) 
Product 7 
0.03 (0.06) 
Product 8 
(dropped) 
Product 2 
0.12 (0.06) 
Product 3 
0.05 (0.06) 
Product 4 
0.09 (0.07) 
Product 5 
(dropped) 
Product 6 
0.02 (0.06) 
Product 7 
0.03 (0.06) 
Product 8 
(dropped) 
 
For 
generators46 
  ComEd 
.07 (0.11) 
  JCPL 
-0.03 (0.03) 
PSEG 
0.13*** (0.03) 
RECO 
0.02 (0.03) 
For years    Year 2003 
0.05 (0.05) 
Year 2004 
.04 (0.05) 
Year 2005 
0.02 (0.06) 
Year 2006 
0.05 (0.06) 
Year 2003 
-0.00 (0.06) 
Year 2004 
0.02 (0.06) 
Year 2005 
-0.05 (0.09) 
Year 2006 
-0.02 (0.09) 
Year 2003 
-0.00 (0.06) 
Year 2004 
0.02 (0.06) 
Year 2005 
-0.05 (0.08) 
Year 2006 
-0.02 (0.08) 
                                                 
46 I use the name of the affiliated distributor in place of the generator, so for example, the generator affiliated 
to ComEd is Exelon. Ownership is listed in Table 1. 
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Year 2007 
0.08 (0.06 
Year 2008 
0.03 (0.06) 
Year 2007 
0.01 (0.09) 
Year 2008 
-0.03 (0.09) 
Year 2007 
0.01 (0.08) 
Year 2008 
-0.03 (0.08) 
N 20 20 20 236 236 236 
R2 0.21 0.53 0.56 0.03 0.05 0.16 
** Significant at the 5% confidence level 
*   Significant at the 10% confidence level 
()  Standard errors 
 
8. NOTATION 
γ   [ ]0,1γ ∈  is the ownership share that the integrated buyer holds in the 
seller. The integrated buyer therefore receives the portion γ  of the 
revenue of the seller. 
ib   [ ]0, 0,1ib b⎡ ⎤∈ ⊆⎣ ⎦ , with [ ],i X Y∈ , is the officially stated bid offered 
by a buyer. [ ]0,1b ∈  is the maximum bid in the auction. 
[ ]Y Yb v   The optimal bid of the integrated buyer Y given its realized value 
[ ]0,1Yv ∈ . This strategy [ ]Yb ⋅  has the inverse [ ]y ⋅  (such 
that [ ][ ]Y Y Yy b v v= ). 
[ ]X Xb v   [ ]X Xb v  is the optimal bid of the independent buyer X given its realized 
value [ ]0,1Xv ∈ . This strategy [ ]X Xb v  has the inverse [ ]x ⋅  (such that 
[ ][ ]X X Xx b v v= ). 
[ ]m γ  [ ] [ ] [ ]Y Xm m mγ γ γ= +  is the ex-ante expected revenue of the seller 
when the ownership share is γ , where [ ]Ym γ ( [ ]Xm γ ) is the ex-ante 
expected payment of buyer Y (X) when the ownership share of Y is γ .  
iv   [ ]0,1iv ∈ , with [ ],i X Y∈ , is the value of the good on auction for buyer 
i. It is a random variable independently and uniformly distributed on 
[ ]0,1  . 
[ ]W γ  The expected efficiency. 
[ ]Yπ γ  The expected compound profit of the integrated buyer Y. 
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[ ]Y Naïveπ γ  The naïve compound profit of the integrated buyer, 
[ ] [0] [0]Y Naïve Y mπ γ π γ= + , is the compound profit when the integrated 
buyer has an ownership share of γ , but bids as if the ownership share is 
zero (it maximizes its buyer profit ignoring the effect on the auction 
revenue). 
[ ]Y Strategicπ γ  The strategic profit, [ ] [ ] [ ]Y Strategic Y Y Naïveπ γ π γ π γ= − , is the extra profit 
that can be made when the integrated buyer Y maximizes the 
compound profit (buyer plus its ownership share times the auction 
revenue) instead of the naïve profit (only buyer profit). 
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Paper 2: Legally separated joint ownership of buyer and seller in electricity markets† 
 
Silvester van Koten∗ 
CERGE-EI‡ 
 
Abstract 
 
In the EU electricity industry, Vertically Integrated Utilities (VIUs) are mandated to 
legally separate their transmission activities, but are allowed to keep the ownership. VIUs 
typically own also electricity generation activities, and therefore their generators often are 
buyers in auctions for transmission that is owned by the same VIU. In Van Koten (2009) I 
show that in this configuration the VIU can – through increased auction revenue – 
increase its profits, while disadvantaging competitors and lowering efficiency, by having 
its generator bid more aggressively. 
 
Here I analyze the regulatory measure of also legally separating the VIU-owned generator 
from the VIU; this measure effectively transforms the VIU into a holding company and 
prevents the “VIU” from influencing day-to-day decision-making of the “VIU”-owned 
generator and bans cross-subsidization between divisions. I show that such a measure may 
only be partially effective; the holding company can formulate a simple compensation 
scheme that does not violate the restrictions imposed by legal separation but induces the 
manager of the VIU-owned generator to bid more aggressively, thereby increasing the 
profits of the holding company and decreasing efficiency, as in Van Koten (2009).  
Keywords: asymmetric auctions, bidding behavior, electricity markets, strategic 
delegation, regulation, vertical integration. 
JEL classification code: L22, L43, L51, L94, L98. 
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1 Introduction 
The present paper is motivated by the current process of liberalization of the electricity 
market in the European Union (EU).47 The two main activities of the electricity industry 
are generation (the production of electricity) which is done by electricity generators, and 
transmission (the transport of electricity over long distances) which is done by a 
Transmission System Operator (TSO). In the past, both generation and transmission were 
owned by vertically integrated monopolies, also referred to as Vertically Integrated 
Utilities (VIUs) (European Commission Competition DG, 2007). Even though an active 
policy of liberalization has been pursued in the EU, VIUs still exist in the form of holding 
companies that own many of the generation facilities and all, or almost all, of the 
transmission infrastructure (European Commission Competition DG, 2007). 
 
The combined ownership of transmission and generation by holding companies hampers 
the liberalization of the electricity industry. Holding companies have incentives to give 
their own generators (allied generators) preferential access to infrastructure capacity and 
curb competition by allocating minimal infrastructure capacity to competing new 
generators. This problem could be especially significant for competition in electricity 
generation between countries, as transmission lines between countries, called 
interconnectors, suffer from severe shortages of capacity (European Commission 
Competition DG, 2007, p.170).48 
 
To forestall possible abuse of its dominant position, DIRECTIVE 2003/54/EC and 
REGULATION 1228/2003 mandate that in case of congestion on a transmission line, the 
holding company must allocate the access in a non-discriminatory, market-based, and 
efficient way. This is considered to be done best by implicit or explicit auction 
                                                 
47 This part draws on Van Koten (2006), where a more detailed account can be found. 
48 This is partly a leftover from the past, as the transmission network was not intended to facilitate 
international power trade (CONSENTEC, 2004). In addition, Léautier (2001) and Brunekreeft, Neuhoff, 
Newbery (2006) suggest that a holding company might have incentives to underinvest in or even withhold 
transmission capacity. 
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(CONSENTEC, 2004). In this paper I will focus on explicit auctions, which are widely 
used. 
 
However, non-discriminatory access to transmission gives holding companies, in order to 
lower the competitive pressure on their allied generators, incentives to build less than 
sufficient transmission capacity. This problem could be especially significant for 
competition in electricity generation between countries, as transmission lines between 
countries, called interconnectors, suffer from severe shortages of capacity. In order to 
alleviate the shortage in transmission capacity, unregulated for-profit building of 
transmission lines, also referred to as merchant transmission investment, is in principle 
allowed. This is meant to provide incentives to invest in new transmission capacity. A 
possible regulatory regime of particular interest suggested by the European Commission49 
is to allow the transmission owner to keep the profits of a line while still mandating a non-
discriminatory, market-based and efficient method of allocating transmission capacity. I 
will analyze this regulatory regime and refer to it as the Merchant-Non-Discriminatory 
regulatory regime. 
 
To further counter possible abuse of its dominant position, the European DIRECTIVE 
2003/54/EC50 and REGULATION 1228/200351 require, in addition to the above 
measures, the holding companies to legally separate their transmission activities from their 
generation activities. I will refer to this requirement as partial legal unbundling. I will refer 
to legally separating transmission activities and generation activities from one another and 
from the holding company as complete legal unbundling. Figure 1 illustrates partial and 
complete legal unbundling of the holding companies. 
 
                                                 
49 NOTE OF DG ENERGY & TRANSPORT ON DIRECTIVES 2003/54-55 AND REGULATION 1228\03 
IN ELECTRICITY; EXEMPTIONS FROM CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE THIRD PARTY ACCESS 
REGIME, 30.1.2004. 
50 Directive 2003/54/EC of 26 June 2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC (OJ 2003 L 176/37). 
51 Regulation (EEC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Conditions for 
Access to the Network for Cross-Border Exchanges in Electricity (OJ 2003 L 176/1). 
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Figure 1 
1a 
VIU
Transmission
Auctioneer
Allied
Generator
Legal separation
Joint ownership
 
1b 
VIU
Transmission
Auctioneer
Allied
Generator
Legal separation
Joint ownership
1c 
“VIU”
Transmission
Auctioneer
Allied
Generator
Legal separation
Joint ownership
Full integration of the transmission 
auctioneer and the allied generator. 
Partial legal unbundling: legal 
separation of the transmission 
auctioneer (see Van Koten, 2009). 
Complete legal unbundling: legal 
separation of both the 
transmission auctioneer and the 
allied generator (this paper). 
 
Figure 1a gives the initial, fully integrated setup. Figure 1b depicts partial legal 
unbundling as prescribed by DIRECTIVE 2003/54/EC and REGULATION 1228/2003; 
the holding companies have to move their transmission activities into a legally 
independent subsidiary. In Van Koten (2009) I have shown this unbundling regime to be 
insufficient in the Merchant-Non-Discriminatory regulatory regime; when the holding 
company is partially legally unbundled and the holding company receives the revenues 
from the auctioning of transmission capacity, then auctions are no longer non-
discriminatory and efficient. The holding company will drive up the price of merchant 
cross-border transmission lines by aggressive bidding, thus increasing its profits, while 
decreasing welfare. Figure 1c depicts an alternative regulatory measure, complete legal 
unbundling, in which the holding companies have to move their transmission activities 
and their generation activities into legally independent subsidiaries.52 Legal separation of 
the allied generator forces the holding company to delegate decisions to the generator, 
                                                 
52 While ownership unbundling of the transmission activity, selling the transmission activity to an 
independent party, would undo the negative effects found in Van Koten (2006), there is strong resistance in 
the EU to ownership unbundling; many countries have not implemented ownership unbundling and the 
holding companies in different European countries continue to voice strong protests against unbundling 
(Van Koten, 2006). In 2005, ownership unbundling of the transmission activity was implemented in only 12 
of the then 25 EU member countries (Van Koten and Ortmann, in print). 
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without being able to influence the day-to-day decision-making. However, the directives 
allow the holding company to set general performance indicators, compensation schemes 
and the yearly budget for the bidder. I will show that this allowance de facto might 
seriously undermine the effect of legal separation of the allied generator. 
 
Specifically, I will analyze the effects of this regulatory measure on the outcomes of 
transmission auctions. In transmission auctions several generators typically participate as 
bidders. For simplicity I will consider just two bidders. One of them is the allied 
generator, who I will refer to as allied bidder Y and the other one is an independent 
generator, who I will refer to as independent bidder X. 
 
I will show that the holding company can, by means of a simple compensation scheme, 
delegate its decision power strategically and increase its profits when participating in 
transmission auctions. The compensation scheme I consider respects the legal 
independence of holding company, allied generator and transmission auctioneer; 
compensation is based on performance indicators of the allied generator only and 
therefore does not depend on profit indicators of the holding company or the transmission 
auctioneer. However, the compensation scheme distorts bidding incentives and induces 
the allied generator to bid more aggressively, thereby increasing the profits of the holding 
company. I consider one specific functional form, which I call the Own-Bid-Kickback 
scheme53 (OBK scheme). This compensation scheme – to offer the manager a linear 
combination of profit and sales – was originally proposed by Vickers (1985), Fershtman 
and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) and is here modified for application in an auctions 
setting. Use of this compensation scheme also upsets the revenue equivalence between 
first- and second-price auctions. 
 
                                                 
53 It is possible to consider more general forms of compensation schemes, e.g. non-linear ones, but the 
compensation scheme under consideration is a simple scheme that suffices to show that the holding 
company can increase its profits this way. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I analyze the 
effects of compensation schemes on the outcomes of transmission auctions. I first sketch 
the general setup, then determine the equilibrium bidding functions of bidders and the 
equilibrium compensation scheme in second-price auctions, and show the effects on 
profits and welfare. I then determine the equilibrium bidding functions of bidders and the 
equilibrium compensation scheme in first-price auctions and show the effects on profits 
and welfare. Having obtained these results, I relate my findings to the existing literature. I 
conclude by discussing the implications of my results for the EU electricity market policy. 
 
2 Effects of the Own-Bid-Kickback scheme 
2.1 Setup 
In my model figure two generators that could profitably sell electricity in a distant 
location. 54 However, the transmission line to this distant location does not have enough 
capacity for both of them and the right to use the transmission capacity is sold in an 
auction to the highest bidding generator. Allied generator Y, here also referred to as allied 
bidder Y, is owned by a holding company that also owns a share γ  ( : 0 1γ γ≤ ≤ ) of the 
transmission capacity. The bidding function of allied bidder Y is determined by the 
manager of allied bidder Y, referred to as manager Ym. Manager Ym receives 
remuneration according to a compensation scheme set by the holding company. The other 
generator, X, is independent and its manager (“Xm”) receives remuneration proportional to 
the profits of generator X55. As the bidding incentives of manager “Xm” and independent 
generator X are identical, I will not distinguish between the two and refer to the 
independent generator as independent bidder X. The value of transmission is the profit 
that could be made by selling electricity in the distant location. This profit is equal to the 
difference between the price in the distant location and the costs of the generator. The 
generators cannot influence the final price in the distant location, because the transmission 
capacity is fixed and small relative to the total demand (see e.g. CONSENTEC, 2004).  
 
                                                 
54 See section 7 for a notation overview. 
55 This is without loss of generality. We will see shortly that the best credible strategy for the independent 
bidder X is to induce its manager (“X”) to maximize profits. 
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The value of transmission to a bidder (generator) is drawn from a uniform distribution 
[ ]0,1iv ∈  where { },i X Y∈ . Values are private and independent. 56 At the outset, the 
bidders are therefore symmetrical. I assume that the auctioneer auctions off the 
transmission capacity as one indivisible good. 57  
 
In line with the literature, I assume that there exists a differentiable, strictly increasing 
bidding strategy [ ]Yb ⋅  ( [ ]Xb ⋅ ), that maps the allied bidder’s realized value [ ]0,1Yv ∈  
( [ ]0,1Xv ∈ ) into his bid [ ]Y Yb v  ( [ ]Xb ⋅ ).58 Then the bidding strategy [ ]Yb ⋅  has an inverse 
[ ]y ⋅  such that [ ][ ]Yy b v v= . Analogously, the optimal bid of the independent bidder X, 
Xb , is determined by her bidding strategy [ ]Xb ⋅  that maps her realized value [ ]0,1Xv ∈  
into her bid [ ]X Xb v . The strategy [ ]Xb ⋅  has an inverse [ ]x ⋅ , such that [ ][ ]Xx b v v= . 
 
The holding company strives for the highest attainable profit from allied generator Y and 
the transmission auctioneer together. Because of legal separation, the holding company 
cannot influence the day-to-day decision-making of the bidder or the auctioneer. The 
holding company therefore offers the manager of allied bidder Y, Ym, a compensation 
scheme that serves the interests of the holding company, while respecting the legal 
independence of the holding company, the allied bidder and the auctioneer.59 
 
                                                 
56 The above assumption is motivated by the fact that there exist price differences between countries that can 
be profitably exploited. For ease of exposure, the price in the distant location is set equal to one. The size of 
the profit then depends on the costs of generating electricity. As a generator does not know the cost of his 
competitors (see e.g. Parisio and Bosco, 2003 and Léautier, 2001), he treats it as a random variable. The 
costs, , [0,1]X Yc c ∈ , are private and independent. 
57 While transmission capacity is usually auctioned in many units of 1 GW, I restrict my focus to single-unit 
auctions. Excluding multi-unit auctions simplifies the analysis of OBK-schemes in auctions. Multi-unit 
auctions mostly do not have efficient outcomes and mostly cannot be analytically solved, which complicates 
the task of demonstrating the effects of OBK schemes. 
58 The strategies [ ]Yb ⋅  and [ ]Xb ⋅  (and their respective inverses [ ]x ⋅  and [ ]y ⋅ ) are dependent on the 
ownership share γ . For notational convenience I will not include the variable “γ ” in the derivation to 
follow. I allow for a bidding function [ ]b ⋅  to be strictly increasing on an interval [0, ]v with : 0 1v v< <  
and then to be flat on [ ,1]v . In this case the inverse is only defined on [0, ]v . 
59 For a compensation scheme not to violate the legal independence of holding company, allied bidder, and 
auctioneer, the compensation for the allied bidder ought to be based on performance indicators of the allied 
bidder only, and not on profit indicators of the holding company or the auctioneer. 
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The holding company can choose to give the manager compensation equal to a proportion 
i  of a linear combination of profits and revenue as considered by Vickers (1985),  
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987).60 Sklivas (1987) shows that such a 
compensation is equal to a proportion of the revenues minus costs, where the costs are 
weighted by factor a . 
( (1 ) )w i a a Rπ= ⋅ + − ,  
(where π  is the profit, R  is the revenue, and a  is the linear weight), 
( ( ) (1 ) )i a R c a R= ⋅ − + − , 
( )i R ac= ⋅ − . 
From here on, I will refer to factor a  as the cost weight. From this perspective, normal 
profit maximization is the special case where the cost weight is set equal to unity: 1a = . 
Proportion i  is determined endogenously in the model, as the expected compensation for 
manager Ym must equal his reservation wage, 0w : 
0
E[ ]=E[ ( )]w i R ac w⋅ − = . 
 
How does such a scheme affect the bidding behavior of a manager who takes part in an 
auction? In an auction, the costs and returns are expected values that are endogenously 
determined by the bids b  that the bidders submit. In this case, the expected compensation 
for the manager is: 
( )E[ ] [ ]Y Y Yw i x b v ab= ⋅ − . 
                                                 
60 Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) considered the effect of such compensation schemes in the 
context of two competing firms who each have a manager that makes the crucial output and pricing 
decisions. They found that due to an interactive effect the optimal compensation scheme has a cost weight a 
such that a >1 (a <1) for Bertrand competition (Cournot competition); the optimal compensation scheme 
exaggerates (understates) a part of the costs and makes the firms competing weaker (stronger). The firms 
become “fat cats” (“top dogs”) in the sense of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). 
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The expected value of the transmission, [ ]Y Yx b v , corresponds to the revenue.
61 The 
expected bid payment of the auction, [ ]Y Yx b ab , is the expected cost of realizing the 
“revenue”. I will call this the Own-Bid-Kickback (OBK) compensation scheme, as 
manager Ym does not take the full bidding costs into account when 1a < . In that case, 
manager Ym receives a kickback of 1 a−  times his bid if he wins.  
 
In this setup the owner of the allied bidder Y, the holding company, offers manager Ym a 
specific compensation scheme, while the owner of independent bidder X does not offer its 
manager (“Xm”) such a scheme. We will see shortly that the owner of allied bidder Y, the 
holding company, has incentives to implement a compensation scheme with 1a <  in both 
first-  and second-price auctions because of its position of residual claimant of the auction. 
The owner of independent bidder X does not have comparable incentives in second-price 
auctions. In first-price auctions, it might seem that the owner of independent bidder X has 
incentives to implement a compensation scheme with 1a >  for strategic reasons, but I will 
argue that the actual implementation of any compensation scheme with 1a ≠  cannot be 
part of a Nash equilibrium. 
  
2.2 The second-price auction 
It is a well-known result that in second-price auctions, bidders have a weakly dominant 
strategy to set their bids equal to their values, regardless of the bidding functions of other 
bidders. Therefore, independent bidder X has a weakly dominant strategy to bid her own 
value, regardless of the type of compensation scheme manager Ym is offered. As manager 
Y pays only the proportion a of his bid, it is a weakly dominant strategy for him to set a 
times his bid equal to his value: Y Yab v= . 
 
The bidding functions for X and Y are therefore 
[ ]X X Xb v v=  
                                                 
61 We will see shortly that [ ]Yx b  is the probability of winning the auction. 
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[ ] YY Y
v
b v
a
=   if Yv a<  
[ ] 1Y Yb v =   if Yv a≥ . 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the bidding functions of Y and X for 12a = . The lower dashed curve is 
the bidding curve of the independent bidder X who bids her true valuation. Allied bidder 
Y overbids his value, and has a higher probability of winning than before. 
 
Figure 2 
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Setting the cost weight a  smaller than one induces manager Ym to set a more aggressive 
bidding strategy for allied bidder Y. This bidding strategy has several noteworthy effects 
on the ex-ante expected auction outcomes.62 
a. Allied bidder Y is more likely to win the auction than before, because manager Ym 
now sets more aggressive bids than X. 
b. Allied bidder Y earns lower profits than before, because manager Ym now disregards 
part of the bidding costs and therefore does not maximize profits. 
                                                 
62 Detailed proofs can be found in proposition 1 in the Appendix. 
allied bidder Y 
independent bidder X 
a 
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c. The compensation of manager Ym is higher than before, because when the cost weight 
is lower, Ym pays a smaller part of the bidding cost. 
d. The revenue of the auctioneer (or revenue from the auction), [ ] 3
6
am a −= , is higher 
than before. When Y loses, the losing bid of Y is higher, and hence X pays more for 
transmission. When Y wins, Y either pays the same (Y would have won with or 
without the compensation scheme) or Y pays more (Y would have lost without the 
compensation scheme). 
e. The profit of the holding company (i.e., the profit of both the auctioneer and the allied 
bidder), 03 (1 )[ ]
6
Y
Holding Company
a aa wπ + −= − , reaches an optimum at II 12*a =  of 
II 0 013[ *] 0,5417
24
Y
Holding Company a w wπ = − ≈ − . Decreasing the cost weight a  has two 
opposing effects on the profit of the holding company. Both effects are the result of 
the holding company owning a part of the transmission auctioneer; I therefore refer to 
these effects as the “ownership effects”. The first ownership effect is that the 
aggressive bidding of Ym drives up the expected auction revenue, thereby increasing 
the profit of the holding company. The second ownership effect is that Y is more 
likely to win when the payment of X would have been larger than the value of 
transmission for Y, thereby decreasing the profit of the holding company.  
f. Independent bidder X earns lesser profits than before, [ ]
6
X aaπ = , because X is less 
likely to win the auction and when X wins, she pays a higher price. 
g. The strategic profit63 of the holding company, [ ] (1 )
6
Y
Strategic
a aaπ −=  is positive and 
reaches an optimum at II 12*a =  of II 1[ *] 0.041724
Y
Strategic aπ = ≈ . 
h. Welfare, (3 )(1 )[ ]
6
a aW a − += , is lower than before because the auction has become 
less efficient. While Y has the same value distribution as X, Y now wins in some cases 
                                                 
63 The strategic profit is the extra profit the holding company earns by using a compensation scheme. It is 
the marginal addition to the profit that results from manager Ym changing his bidding schedule. The holding 
company can maximize the strategic profit by setting the appropriate compensation scheme for manager Ym. 
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when he does not have the highest value for transmission. When the holding company 
chooses the optimum cost weight II 12*a = , total welfare is II 15[ *] 0.62524W a = = , 
which is 124  lower than maximum welfare. 
 
Partial ownership 
In the more general case the holding company does not fully own the auctioneer, but a 
share [0,1]γ ∈ . The profit of the holding company is then 
[ , ] [ ] [ ]Y YHolding Company Generatora a m aπ γ π γ= +  
  (2 ) 3
6 6
a a aγ− −= + . 
Maximizing this expression with respect to a  gives the optimal cost weight as a function 
of the ownership share γ  
 II (2 ) 3[ ] 1
6 6 2
a a aa ArgMaxα
γγ γ− −⎡ ⎤= + = −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
Note that II [0] 1a = ; a holding company that has no ownership share in transmission 
prefers its bidder to maximize profits in second-price auctions. The effect on bidding of 
allied bidder Y is purely driven by the share of ownership: the ownership effect. This 
result explains why the owner of independent bidder X has no incentive to offer its 
manager “Xm” a similar compensation scheme; he has no ownership share in transmission.  
 
Figure 3 
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Figure 3 illustrates the strategic profit,64 
2
II [ ]
24
Y
Strategic a
γπ γ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ , and the welfare loss, 
2
II 2[ ]
3 24
W a γγ⎡ ⎤ − =⎣ ⎦ , for all possible ownership shares γ  between zero and one65. The 
strategic profit and the welfare loss are strictly increasing in γ .  
2.3 The first-price auction 
While in second-price auctions the implementation of a compensation scheme for manager 
Ym does not affect the bidding of manager X, this is not so in first-price auctions. Bidding 
schedule X depends on the compensation scheme for manager Ym, a fact the holding 
company can use to strategically influence the bidding schedule of X. 
 
Figure 4 depicts the timeline of events in the auction. At time 1, the holding company 
implements a compensation scheme for manager Ym with cost weight a . I make two 
assumptions. Firstly, that X is perfectly informed about the value of the cost weight. 
Secondly, that the rules on legal separation forbid the holding company from spreading 
false information about the compensation scheme. As a result the holding company can be 
sure that the compensation scheme it announces is known and believed by independent 
bidder X; this gives the holding company a first mover’s advantage. Below, I will relax 
these two assumptions. At time 2, manager Ym and X, anticipating each other’s reactions, 
simultaneously determine the bidding functions [ ]Y Yb v  and [ ]X Xb v , respectively. At time 
                                                 
64 The ownership share γ  has a direct and a strategic effect on the profit of the holding company. The direct 
effect translates into what I will refer to as the “passive” profit and is due to the fact that the holding 
company receives proportion γ  of the auction revenue. The “passive” profit is the profit that the holding 
company would receive were it to own proportion γ  but not to offer manager Ym a compensation scheme. 
The strategic effect translates into the strategic profit. 
65 The strategic profit percentage is calculated as 
Y
Strategic
Y
Passive
π
π . The welfare loss percentage is calculated as 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]0 320 1W WW Wγ γ− = − . 
Welfare loss [ ]II[ ]W a γ  
Strategic profit [ ]II[ , ]YStrategic aπ γ γ  
Welfare loss [ ]II[ ]W a γ  
Strategic profit [ ]II[ , ]YStrategic aπ γ γ  
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3, plugging in their respective values, Y and X determine their bids in the auction and the 
highest bidder wins. 
 
Figure 4 
The holding company 
implements a compensation 
scheme with cost weight a  
Bidding functions are 
determined 
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weight a  (or deduces it) 
Manager Ym and X 
simultaneously determine 
the bidding functions [ ]Y Yb v  
and [ ]X Xb v  respectively 
Y and X reveal their private 
values for transmission ( Yv  
and Xv ) and determine their 
bids. The highest bid wins 
the auction 
 
Given the bidding strategy of X, [ ]X Xb v , Y wins the auction when bid Yb  is larger than 
the bid of the independent bidder, [ ]X Xb v : 
[ ]X X Yb v b< ⇔  
1
X X Y Yv b b x b− ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦< ≡ . 
The probability of Y winning the auction is therefore [ [ ]]YF x b , which is equal to [ ]Yx b  as 
the values are drawn from the uniform distribution on [0,1]. The expected profit of allied 
bidder Y with value realization Yv  , bidding Yb , is therefore 
1)  ( ) 0[ ]Y Y Y YGenerator x b v b wπ = − − . 
 
Likewise, the expected profit of independent bidder X with value realization Xv  , 
bidding Xb , is 
2) ( )[ ]X X X XGenerator y b v bπ = − . 
 
When the compensation scheme of manager Ym sets cost weight a , then the expected 
compensation for manager Ym is  
3)  ( )[ ]YManager Y Y Yi x b v abπ = ⋅ − . 
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Without a compensation scheme, X and Ym maximize the profits given by equations 1 and 
2 respectively, with a symmetrical outcome for the bidding function 
0
1 1[ ]
2
z
b v zdz v
v
= =∫  
(e.g. Krishna, 2002).66 Offering manager Ym a compensation scheme with cost weight a  
makes him maximize equation 3. To calculate the reaction function of manager Ym, 
differentiate equation 3 with respect to Yb , set it equal to zero and solve for '[ ]x b : 
4) [ ] [ ][ ]
[ ]Y
a x b a x bx b
v ab y b ab
⋅ ⋅′ = =− − . 
 
To calculate the reaction function of independent bidder X, differentiate equation 2 with 
respect to Xb , set it equal to zero and solve for '[ ]y b :  
5) [ ] [ ][ ]
[ ]X
y b y by b
v b x b b
′ = =− − . 
 
Equations 4 and 5 form a system of differential equations that can be solved for [ ]x b  and 
[ ]y b  with the conditions that [ ] [ ] 1x b y b= =  (a bidder makes the highest bid, b , when he 
has the highest value, 1) and [0] [0] 0x y= =  (a bidder makes the lowest bid, 0, when he 
has the lowest, 0).67 After taking inverses, this gives us the bidding functions of X and Y 
for 0 , 1Y Xv v< ≤ : 
6) 
2 2 2
2
(1 )
[ ]
(1 )
Y Y
Y Y
Y
v a v a
b v
a v
+ − −= −  with inverse 2 2 2
2[ ]
1
aby b
b a b
= − +  
7) 
2 2 2
2
1 (1 )
[ ]
(1 )
X X
X X
X
a v v
b v
a v
− + −= −  with inverse 2 2 2
2[ ]
1
bx b
b a b
= + − . 
The maximum bid b  is equal to 
)1(
1
a
b += . 
 
                                                 
66 More generally, the auction has for any symmetrical differentiable cumulative distribution of values [ ]F ⋅  
the solution 1
0[ ]
[ ] [ ]
v
F vb v zf z dz= ∫  (e.g. Krishna, 2002). 
67 A proof can be found in proposition 2 in the appendix. 
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Setting cost weight a  smaller than unity makes Y bid more aggressively. In reaction to 
this, independent bidder X also bids more aggressively; an effect I will refer to as the 
interactive effect. Figure 5 shows the bidding functions for different 1a < . 
 
Figure 5 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 value
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
bid
 
0.8a =  
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 value
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
bid
 
0.5a =  
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
value
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
bid
 
0.1a =   
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
value
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
bid
 
lim 0a ↓  
 
The more aggressive bidding strategies of X and Y have several noteworthy effects on the 
ex-ante expected auction outcomes:68 
a. Allied bidder Y is more likely than before to win the auction. 
b. Allied bidder Y earns lower profits than before. 
                                                 
68 The formula and proofs can be found in proposition 3 in the appendix. I do not report the formula here as 
they do not add insightful information. 
Allied bidder Y 
Independent bidder X 
1a =
 (both X and Y) 
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c. The compensation of manager Ym is higher than before. 
d. The revenue of the auctioneer (or revenue from the auction) is higher than before 
and the revenue equivalence between first-price auctions and second-price auctions 
does not hold. Revenue equivalence is upset by the interactive effect - the 
independent bidder reacting to the more aggressive bidding of the allied bidder by 
also bidding more aggressively, because this effect only occurs in first-price 
auctions. Once the interaction effect is eliminated, revenue equivalence is restored. 
 
A way to eliminate the interaction effect is by relaxing the first assumption (X is 
informed of the compensation scheme) and supposing that X is ignorant (or 
skeptical) of the existence of the compensation scheme for manager Ym; X 
believes manager Ym to maximize the generation profits instead. Assume that Ym 
is aware of the ignorance of X, so that Ym knows that X bids as in a symmetrical 
first-price auction. The bidding functions determined by X and Ym are in that case 
2
X
X
vb =  and 
2
Y
Y
vb
a
=  and the expected auction revenue and profits are the same as 
those in the second-price auction.69 The ignorance (or skepticism) of bidder X, by 
eliminating the interactive effect, has reinstated revenue equivalence. 
 
e. The profit of the holding company (i.e., the profit of both the auctioneer and the 
allied bidder) reaches a maximum at I * 0.319a ≈  of I 0[ *] 0.560YHolding Company a wπ ≈ − . 
Decreasing cost weight a  has three effects on the profit of the holding company. 
The first two effects are, like in second-price auctions, ownership effects. The third 
effect is an interaction effect that is unique to first-price auctions. Firstly, the 
aggressive bidding of Y makes Y win more auctions, thereby increasing the profit 
of the holding company. Secondly, for a < 0.5, Y overbids his value for all Yv  such 
                                                 
69 A proof can be found in proposition 4 in the appendix. 
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that 
2
1 2
0
1Y
a
v
a
−< < −
70. This makes it more likely for Y to win the auction when the 
payment of X would have been larger than the value of transmission for Y, thereby 
decreasing the profit of the holding company. Thirdly, the interactive effect, X 
reacting to the more aggressive bidding of Y by also bidding more aggressively, 
tempers the first two effects.71 Due to the interactive effect the optimum cost 
weight is lower than in second-price auctions; I II* 0.319 0.5 *a a≈ < = , and the 
maximum profit of the holding company is higher than in second-price auctions 
I 0 0 II[ *] 0.560- 0.542 [ *]COMPOUND COMPOUNDa w w aπ π≈ > − ≈ . 
 
f. Independent bidder X earns lesser profits than before and at I * 0.319a ≈  
I 1
6[ *] 0.065 [ 1]
X X
Generator Generatora aπ π≈ < = = . 
 
g. The strategic profit of the holding company is positive and reaches a maximum of 
I[ *] 0.060YStrategic aπ ≈ , which is about 12% of total profits without a compensation 
scheme. 
 
h. Welfare is lower than before; a welfare loss of the size of IWL[ *] 0.0413a ≈  
occurs. This is a loss equal to about 6% of the optimum welfare (without a 
compensation scheme). Compared to the second-price auctions, the interaction 
effect (the independent bidder also bidding more aggressively), makes the auction 
relatively less asymmetric, thereby tempering the negative welfare effects. As a 
result the welfare loss is slightly lower for first-price auctions than for second-
price auctions: I IIWL[ *] 0.0413 0.0417 WL[ *]a a≈ < = . 
                                                 
70 Given 0.5a < , solving 
0 2 2 0 2
0 0 0
2 0
0 [ ]
( (1 ( )
(1 )
) )Y Y
Y Y Y Y
Y
v b v
v a v a
v
a v
= − =
+ − −− −  for 
0
Yv  results in 2
0 1 2
1
Y
a
a
v
−
−
=  
and at this point the derivative 
( [ ])Y Y Y
Y
d v b v
dv
−
 is positive. 
71 This interactive effect is the effect that Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) found and denote 
as the “strategic effect”. The strategic effect I report for first-price auctions encompasses both the interaction 
effect and the ownership effect. 
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First mover’s advantage 
In first-price auctions there is, in addition to the ownership effect we found in second-
price auctions, also an interactive effect in operation. The interactive effect is caused by 
the fact that bidders in first-price auctions, unlike those in second-price auctions, react to 
the strategies of the other bidder. In the analysis above the holding company is able to 
manipulate, by setting cost weight a extra small, the interactive effect to its own benefit 
thanks to its first mover’s advantage. The first mover’s advantage of the holding company 
only exists when the holding company can commit to its choice of compensation scheme. 
In the above case, this is guaranteed by the second assumption: “the rules on legal 
separation forbid the holding company to spread false information about the compensation 
scheme”. Once the holding company has announced a particular compensation scheme, it 
is committed to it; any compensation scheme can therefore be part of a Nash equilibrium. 
A ban on providing false information gives the holding company in this way a first 
mover’s advantage. 
 
Without first mover’s advantage 
Once the second assumption is relaxed and the holding company is allowed, or otherwise 
able, to provide false information about the compensation scheme, then the holding 
company cannot credibly commit to just any compensation scheme. The first two steps in 
the timeline in Figure 4, t1 and t2 have now become a single step; the setting of the cost 
weight and the determination of the bidding functions is now done simultaneously and 
endogenously. The loss of its first mover’s advantage results in less favorable auction 
outcomes for the holding company. 
 
I calculate the Nash equilibrium cost weight by first supposing that the holding company 
announces a compensation scheme with cost weight a , and then, assuming that 
independent bidder X believes the announcement, maximizes its profits with a (possibly 
different) cost weight q. A Nash equilibrium exists if and only if the holding company 
announces a compensation scheme with cost weight NEa  for which 
( )ARGMAX [ , ]Y NE NEq Holding Companyq a q aπ= = .  
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For any announced compensation scheme with cost weight a  that is believed by 
independent bidder X, the bidding function of X is: 
2 2 2
2
1 (1 )
[ ; ]
(1 )
X X
X X
X
a v v
b v a
a v
− + −= − .  
Manager Y then maximizes his profit given the bidding function of X, [ ; ]X Xb v a , and q, 
which results in 
2 2 2 2
2
)
[ ; , ]
(1 )
Y Y
Y Y
Y
v q a v q
b v a q
a v
+ − −= − . 
The holding company then sets q to maximize its compound profit: 
ARGMAX ( [ , ])Yq Holding Companyq a qπ= .  
Numerical approximation for NEa  such that NEq a=  gives 0.361 0.319 *NE Ia a≈ > ≈ 72. 
Total profit is slightly lower, 
0 0[ ] 0.5598- 0.5603-  [ *]Y NE YHolding Company Holding Companya w w aπ π≈ < ≈  and so is the welfare loss, 
IWL[ ] 0.034 0.041 WL[ *]NEa a≈ < ≈ . While the results are slightly less pronounced, the 
qualitative results reported above remain. 
 
A first mover’s advantage for the independent bidder? 
Just as a holding company, the owner of independent bidder X (owner X) can only 
implement a compensation scheme for its manager (manager X) that constitutes a Nash 
equilibrium. It is generally true that whatever the strategies of the other players are, the 
best action for owner X is to have his profits maximized. Therefore, without means to 
credibly commit to a cost weight larger than unity (which implies not maximizing profits), 
the only Nash equilibrium strategy is for owner X to provide a compensation scheme with 
cost weight 1s =  (see Dewatripont, 1988 and Katz, 1991). 
 
                                                 
72 I used a Mathematica program for approximation. The precise code  (with comments) can be downloaded 
as a Mathematica file from http://home.cerge-ei.cz/svk/Legally_separated. For easy reference it has been 
included in the appendix. 
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For an illustration of this general principle, suppose that both the holding company and 
owner X had the opportunity to offer their managers compensation schemes and commit 
to it. The optimal choices of cost weights for both managers are then determined 
simultaneously; owner X would offer cost weight * 1.431s ≈ , which makes both bidders 
bid less aggressively, and the holding company would offer cost weight 
I0.308 0.319 *a a≈ < ≈% , which makes both bidders bid more aggressively. The bidding 
functions of independent bidder X and allied bidder Y would be: 
2 2 2 2
2 2
* (1 ) *
[ ; , *]
( * )
X X
X X
X
s v a v s
b v a s
a s v
− + −= −
%%
% , 
2 2 2 2
2 2
(1 ) *
[ ; , *]
( * )
Y Y
Y Y
Y
a v s v a
b v a s
s a v
− + −= −
% %%
% .
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The maximum bid  would be 0.575b ≈ . In this case, the profits of X would increase to 
I[ , *] 0.071 0.065 [ *, 1]X XGenerator Generatora s a sπ π= > = =% .74 
 
However, owner X cannot credibly commit to this particular compensation scheme; he has 
the possibility to provide a (secret) side contract that sets 1s =  (maximizing profits). 
Independent bidder X then finds his bidding function by maximizing his profits, given the 
above bidding function of Y; [ ; , *]Y Yb v a s% . While Y would believe that X chooses the 
bidding function [ ; , *]X Xb v a s%  as described above, X chooses instead the bidding function: 
 
2 2 2
2 2
1 * 1
( * * )
X X
X
v a v
a s v
− + −
−
%
%   for <0.699Xv  
0.575      for >0.699Xv .  
X then earns a profit of [ , 1] 0.105 0.071 [ , *]X XGenerator Generatora s a sπ π= ≈ > ≈% % . As this 
deviation is profitable for owner X, him setting * 1s >  cannot be part of a Nash 
equilibrium. 
 
                                                 
73 These formulas are obtained by solving 4) and a likewise equation for the manager of allied bidder X with 
cost weight s. 
74 Other interesting auction outcomes would be that the profits of the holding company would fall, 
0[ ] 0.530YHolding Company a wπ ≈ −% 00.560 w< − I[ *]YHolding Company aπ≈ , and that, as the auction would be 
more asymmetric, the welfare loss would increase, IWL[ , *] 0.065 0.041 WL[ *, 1]a s a s≈ > ≈ =% . 
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Partial ownership 
When the holding company does not fully own the auctioneer, but holds ownership share 
γ  in the auctioneer, then the holding company’s profit is 
[ , ] [ ] [ ]Y YHolding Company Generatora a m aπ γ π γ= + .  
Maximizing the holding company’s profit with respect to a  gives the optimal cost weight 
as a function of ownership share γ ; 
 [ ] [ , ]YHolding Companya ArgMaxαγ π α γ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦ .  
 
Figure 5 shows the optimal cost weight, [ ]a γ  for ownership shares γ  between zero and 
one75 for first-price (both with and without a first movers’ advantage) and second-price 
auctions. 
 
Figure 5: Optimal cost weight, [ ]a γ  
[ ]a γ  
 
 
 
                                                 
75 The values for [ ]a γ  in first-price auctions have been obtained by numerical approximation. 
first-price auction (first mover’s advantage) 
second-price auction 
first-price auction (without first mover’s advantage) 
Ownership share γ  
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When the ownership share of the auctioneer is small, 0.3γ < , the holding company with a 
first mover’s advantage in first-price auctions sets the cost weight higher than unity to 
make Y bid less aggressively and to lower the auction revenue. This is profitable because 
of the interaction effect in first-price auctions; by making Y a “fat cat” by overstating the 
costs of bidding (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984), the competing independent bidder reacts 
by also bidding less aggressively which lowers the bidding costs for both bidders76. The 
negative effect this has through lower auction revenues is of little importance as the 
holding company has a low ownership share 0.3γ < . The less aggressive bidding 
increases both the strategic profit and the welfare loss when the ownership share goes to 
zero. 
 
When the ownership share of the auctioneer is large or medium, 0.3γ > , the holding 
company sets the cost weight lower than unity to make Y bid more aggressively and to 
increase the auction revenue. For large ownership shares, 0.6γ > , the holding company 
sets a lower cost weight in first-price auctions than in second-price auctions. Due to the 
interaction effect in first-price auctions, the independent bidder also bids more 
aggressively which decreases the asymmetry of the auction and thereby makes lowering 
the cost weight less costly for the holding company. 
 
The holding company without a first mover’s advantage cannot strategically use the 
interaction effect in first-price auctions and in second-price auctions, no interaction effect 
exists. Therefore, in these cases, the cost weight is equal to unity for no ownership, 0γ = , 
and for 0 1γ≤ ≤  a strictly decreasing function of the ownership share γ . Figure 6 
illustrates the effects on strategic profits and welfare losses. 
 
Note that a holding company without a first mover’s advantage receives negative strategic 
profits. Legal separation of the generator from the VIU without a ban on spreading false 
information about the compensation scheme becomes a burden for a holding company that 
                                                 
76 This effect is comparable to the “fat cat” effect in Bertrand competition found in Fershtman and Judd 
(1987) and Sklivas (1987). 
80 
 
owns less than 40% of transmission. After that the strategic profit fairly resembles the 
first-price auction with a first movers’ advantage. 
 
When the holding company has no first mover’s advantage, then the first-price auction is 
to be preferred above the second-price auction – the welfare loss is smaller than in the 
second-price auction. When the holding company has a first mover’s advantage, then the 
first-price auction is still to be preferred as long as the holding company owns more than 
17% of the transmission. When the holding company owns less than 17% of the 
transmission, the second-price auction is to be preferred. 
 
Figure 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[ [ ], ]YStrategic aπ γ γ  [ [ ]]W a γ  
 
first-price auction (first movers’ advantage) 
second-price auction 
first-price auction (without first movers’ 
advantage) 
first-price auction (first movers’ advantage) 
second-price auction 
first-price auction (without first movers’ 
advantage) 
Strategic profits (% of profits without compensation scheme) Welfare losses (% of welfare without compensation scheme) 
Ownership share γ  Ownership share γ  
second-price auction (total holding company 
profit maximizing) 
second-price auction (total holding company 
profit maximizing) 
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For comparison I have also included the results from Van Koten (2009) when the holding 
company can order its allied generator to maximize the total holding profits. It shows that 
the legal separation of the generator tempers both the size of the strategic profit and the 
welfare loss. However, from the above analysis of legally separating the generator two 
points can be made. Firstly, the OBK scheme is likely to be used as it either results in a 
positive strategic profit (in the case of second-price auctions and first-price auctions with 
first mover's advantage) or it is the only Nash equilibrium (in the case of first-price 
auctions without first mover's advantage).  Secondly, using the OBK scheme generally 
incurs a considerable welfare loss.77 
 
3 Discussion 
In an earlier paper, Van Koten (2009), I showed that a holding company that owns an 
unregulated transmission line could increase its profits by having its bidder follow the 
Any-Bid-Kickback scheme (ABK scheme). The ABK scheme consists of the bidder 
taking into account the full effect of his bidding on the transmission auction revenue and 
makes the bidder bid more aggressively. In turn, this increases the price of transmission, 
increases the profits of the holding company, and lowers welfare.  
 
In the present paper, I explore in a similar setup to which extent the legal separation of the 
bidder from the holding company could improve welfare. When the bidder is legally 
separated, the holding company cannot implement a compensation scheme to maximize 
the profits of the overall holding company.78 This rules out application of the ABK 
scheme. However, the OBK scheme analyzed in this paper respects the legal separation; 
the OBK compensation scheme is based on performance indicators of the bidder only. 
By implementing the OBK kickback scheme, the holding company is able to mimic the 
workings of the ABK scheme to a considerable degree. 
 
                                                 
77 except when the holding company owns about 30% of transmission in a first-price auction with first 
mover's advantage 
78 I assume here that legal separation is effective. In cases where it is likely that violations of the restrictions 
imposed by legal separation go unpunished, the holding company can freely instruct the allied bidder to 
maximize the profits of the holding company. I show in Van Koten (2006) that the qualitative outcomes 
remain unchanged (the holding company profits, welfare suffers). 
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For illustration I make a rough estimate of the welfare cost in the scenario where a holding 
company who fully owns a generator in Germany builds a merchant transmission line 
connecting Germany and the Netherlands. I assume that the total auction revenue, 123.4 
million Euro (CONSENTEC, 2004, p.A3) on the existing line between Germany and the 
Netherlands in 2003 is a representative number and that the new merchant transmission 
line extends the existing capacity by 20%. I estimate that the economic size of the 
transmission line is then about 25 million Euro a year (20% of 123.4 million Euro). By 
using the OBK scheme, the holding company would then be able to earn a strategic profit 
of 2 million Euro a year (8%) and incur a welfare loss of 1.5 million Euro a year (6%).  As 
the EU has 29 more border crossings and as the need for more interconnection is growing, 
this scenario could become a reality on a larger scale, implying even higher welfare losses. 
 
4 Conclusions 
My analysis suggests that, for two prominent auction formats, a holding company that is 
legally unbundled (but ownership integrated) can nonetheless provide the manager of its 
legally unbundled generator with incentives to bid more aggressively by means of a 
simple but well-chosen OBK compensation scheme. The OBK scheme does not refer to 
performance indicators outside of the generator and therefore fully respects the legal 
separation between the allied generator, the holding company, and the transmission 
auctioneer.  
 
The OBK compensation scheme, which can be used with a legally unbundled generator, 
can trigger an aggressiveness of bidding that increases the profit of the holding company 
and causes a welfare loss. While the increase of the profit and the welfare loss are 
considerable, they are less than under the ABK scheme which can be used with a legally 
integrated generator. Legal separation of the generator therefore does improve welfare, 
but not to the same extent as ownership unbundling. This suggests that the regulatory 
measure of legal unbundling of the generator is unsatisfactory.  
 
This result should be of interest to regulators of the EU electricity industry, as they might 
consider applying legal unbundling of the generator to remedy problems of abuse of 
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market power by holding companies. The result is especially relevant when unregulated 
for-profit building of transmission lines is allowed to address the issue of underinvestment 
in interconnector capacity. My model shows that legal unbundling of the generator is not 
likely to bring much improvement. In this setting, auctions lose their favorable features 
(non-discriminatory, market-based and efficient) and holding companies are therefore 
likely not to allocate transmission capacity in a non-discriminatory and efficient manner.  
 
My model does suggest that ownership unbundling provides a remedy. Once the holding 
company is not a residual claimant of the auction revenue any more, it loses the incentive 
to have its allied generator bid excessively aggressively. 
 
5 Appendix 
Proposition 1: In second-price auctions, … 
a. The probability of winning for allied bidder Y, [ ] 2
2
Y wins aP a −= , is strictly 
decreasing in cost weight a . 
b. The profit of allied bidder Y, 0(2 )[ ]
6
Y
Generator
a aa wπ −= − , is strictly increasing in 
cost weight a  for 1a < . 
c. The compensation of manager Ym, 
2 3 3[ ]
6
Y
Manager
a aa iπ − += ⋅ , is strictly decreasing 
in a  for 1a <  and given i. 
d. The auction revenue, [ ] 3
6
am a −= , is strictly decreasing in cost weight a . 
e. The profit of the holding company, 03 (1 )[ ]
6
Y
Holding Company
a aa wπ + −= − , reaches an 
optimum for II 12*a = . 
f. The profit of independent bidder X, [ ]
6
X aaπ = , is strictly increasing in cost weight 
a . 
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g. The strategic profit of Y, [ ] (1 )
6
Y
Strategic
a aaπ −= , reaches an optimum for II 12*a = . 
h. The welfare, (3 )(1 )[ ]
6
a aW a − += , is strictly increasing in cost weight a  for 1a < . 
Proofs: 
a. The probability of winning for allied bidder Y, [ ] 2
2
Y wins aP a −= , is strictly 
decreasing in cost weight a . 
Proof:  
The probability that Y wins is as follows, 
; 1Y wins y yP v a if v a⎡ ⎤ = ≥⎣ ⎦  
y
y
v
if v a
a
= < . 
The ex-ante expected probability of winning, [ ]Y winsP a , is ;Y wins yP v a⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ integrated 
over all possible realizations of yv ; 
[ ] [ ] [ ]1
0
; | ; |
aY wins Y wins Y wins
Y Y y Y Y Ya
P a P v a v a dv P v a v a dv= < ⋅ + ≥∫ ∫  
1
0
1
a Y
Y Ya
v
dv dv
a
= +∫ ∫  
[ ]2 1
0
2
a
Y
Y a
v v
a
⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
(1 )
2
a a= + −  
2
2
a−= . 
b. The profit of allied bidder Y, 0(2 )[ ]
6
Y
Generator
a aa wπ −= − , is strictly increasing in 
cost weight a  for 1a < . 
Proof:  
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( ) 1 0
0
1 0
0
1 0
0
12 0
20
[ ] [ | ] ( [ ])
[ | ] ( [ ])
1
2 2
2 1 1
2 2
aY Y
Generator Y X X Y Y Y X Ya
a Y Y
Y X X Y Y X Ya
a Y Y
Y Y Y Ya
a
Y Y Y Ya
Y
va v E b b b dv v E b dv w
a
v vv E v v dv v E v dv w
a a
v vv dv v dv w
a a
av dv v dv w
a
v
π = − < + − −
⎛ ⎞= − < + − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
=
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
12
3 0
2
0
2
0
2 1
6 2 2
(2 1)
6 2 2
a
Y Y
a
v va w
a
a a a a w
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤−⎛ ⎞ + − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
−= + − −
 
0(2 )
6
a a w−= − . 
c. The compensation of manager Ym, 
2 3 3[ ]
6
Y
Manager
a aa iπ − += ⋅ , is strictly decreasing 
in a  for 1a <  and given i. 
Proof:  
( ) 1
0
[ ]
[ | ] ( [ ])
Y
aManager Y
Y X X Y Y Y X Ya
a v v aE b b b dv v aE b dv
i a
π = − < + −∫ ∫  
1
0
[ | ] ( [ ])
a Y Y
Y X X Y Y X Ya
v vv aE v v dv v aE v dv
a a
⎛ ⎞= − < + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫  
1
0 2 2
a Y Y
Y Y Y Ya
v v av a dv v dv
a a
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∫ ∫  
2 1
0 2 2
a Y
Y Y Ya
v adv v dv
a
⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫  
13 2
06 2 2
a
Y Y Y
a
v v av
a
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
3 1
6 2 2
a a
a
= + −  
2 3 3
6
a a− += . 
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d. The auction revenue, [ ] 3
6
am a −= , is strictly decreasing in cost weight a . 
Proof: The ex-ante net expected revenue of the auctioneer is 
[ ] [ ] [ ]( )X Ym a m a m a= +  
1 1
0 0
[ | ]) [ | ] 1 [ ]
a
Y
X Y Y X X X X Y Y X Ya
vav E b b b dv E b b b dv E b dv
a
⎛ ⎞= ⋅ < + ⋅ < + ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ ∫  
1 1
0 0
[ | ]) [ | ] 1 [ ]
a
Y Y Y
X Y X X X X Y X Ya
v v vav E v av dv E v v dv E v dv
a a a
⎛ ⎞= ⋅ < + ⋅ < + ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ ∫  
1 1
0 0
1
2 2 2
a
X Y Y
X X Y Ya
av v vav dv dv dv
a a a
⎛ ⎞= ⋅ + ⋅ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ ∫  
2 21 1
20 0
1
2 2 2
a
X Y
X Y Ya
av vdv dv dv
a
⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ ∫  
1 13 3
2
0 06 6 2
a
X Y Y
a
av v v
a
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟= + +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 
3 2
6 6
a a−⎛ ⎞= + ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
3
6
a−= . 
e. The profit of the holding company, 03 (1 )[ ]
6
Y
Holding Company
a aa wπ + −= − , reaches an 
optimum for II 12*a = . 
Proof: 
0
[ ] [ ] [ ]
3 (2 )
6 6
Y Y
Holding Company Generatora m a a
a a a w
π π= +
− −= + −  
03 (1 )
6
a a w+ −= − . 
f. The profit of the independent bidder X, [ ]
6
X aaπ = , is strictly increasing in cost 
weight a  
87 
 
Proof : 
The ex-ante expected profit of X is equal to: 
1
0
[ ] ( [ | ])XGenerator X X Y Y X Xa av v E b b b dvπ = − <∫  
1
0
( [ | ])YX X Y X X
vav v E v av dv
a
= − <∫  
1
0 2
X
X X X
avav v dv
a
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫  
21
0 2
X
X
av dv= ∫  
13
06
Xav⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
6
a= . 
 
g. The strategic profit of Y, [ ] (1 )
6
Y
Strategic
a aaπ −= , reaches an optimum for II 12*a = . 
Proof: 
[ ] [ ] [ ][ ] ( [1] 1 )Y Y YStrategic Generator Generatora a m a mπ π π= + − +  
0 0(2 ) 3 1 2
6 6 6 6
a a aw w− − ⎛ ⎞= − + − − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
(1 )
6
a a−= . 
Which is maximized for 12a = . 
 
h. The welfare, (3 )(1 )[ ]
6
a aW a − += , is strictly increasing in cost weight a  for 1a < . 
Proof: 
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[ ] 0
0 0
[ ] [ ] [ ]
(2 ) 1
6 6 2 6
3 (2 )
6
Y X
GeneratorW a a a m a w
a a a aw w
a a
π π= + + + =
−= − + + − +
+ −=
 
(3 )(1 )
6
a a− += . 
[ ] 1 0
3
dW a a
da
−= > . 
 
 
Proposition 2 
The bidding functions of X and Y are 
6) 
2 2 2
2
(1 )
[ ]
(1 )
Y Y
Y Y
Y
v a v a
b v
a v
+ − −= −  with inverse 2 2 2
2[ ]
1
aby b
b a b
= − +  
7) 
2 2 2
2
1 (1 )
[ ]
(1 )
X X
X X
X
a v v
b v
a v
− + −= −  with inverse 2 2 2
2[ ]
1
bx b
b a b
= + − . 
The maximum bid b  is equal to 
)1(
1
a
b += . 
Proofs: 
Solving 4) and 5), we will use the constraints 
 0]0[]0[ == yx   (a bidder with value zero bids zero). 
 1][][ == bybx , where b  is the maximum bid 10 << b   
        (a bidder with value 1 bids a unique maximal bid). 
 
Rewriting 4) and 5) gives 
 ⇔=−⋅′ ][)][(][ baxabbybx  
9) abbybaxabbybx +−=−⋅−′ ][][)][()1][(  
 
 ⇔=−⋅′ ][)][(][ bybbxby  
10) abbaxbybbxaby +−=−⋅−′ ][][)][()][( . 
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Adding up 9) and 10) gives 
 ( [ ] 1) ( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) 2x b y b ab x b b y b a ab′ ′− ⋅ − + − ⋅ − = ⇔  
11)  ( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) 2x b b y b ab ab
b
∂ − ⋅ − =∂ . 
 
Integrating equation c) over 0 until the maximum bid b  using 0]0[]0[ == yx  gives 
 ⇔=−⋅− 2)1()1( babab  
 2 21 (1 )ab a b ab+ − + = . 
 
Therefore the maximum bid b  is given by 
12) 
)1(
1
a
b += . 
 
Integrating equation 11) over 0 until b  using 0]0[]0[ == yx gives 
13) 2( [ ] ) ( [ ] )x b b y b ab ab− ⋅ − = . 
 
Applying 13) to 5) and 6) gives 
14) 
2
)][]([][
b
bbxbxbx −=′  
15) 2
)][]([][
ab
abbybyby −=′ . 
 
Using 12) substituted into the condition 1][][ == bybx , 14) and 15) can be shown to have 
the solutions 16) and 17) 
16) 2 2 2
2[ ]
1
bx b
b a b
= + −  
17)  
2 2 2
2[ ]
1
aby b
b a b
= − + . 
Taking inverses gives us the optimal pure bidding strategies 6) and 7):  
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6)  
2 2 2 2
2[ ]
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y
a v a v a
b v
v a v
+ − −= −   
7) 
2 2 2
2
1 1
[ ] X XX X
X X
v a v
b v
v a v
− − += −  . 
 
Proposition 3 
a. The probability of winning for allied bidder Y, 1[ ]
1
Y winsp a
a
= + , is strictly 
decreasing in cost weight a . 
b. The profit of allied bidder Y, 
( )
2
2
0
3
2 2
(2 ) 1
1[ ]
2 1
Y
Generator
aa ArcCsch a
aa w
a
π
⎛ ⎞− − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠= −
−
, is strictly increasing in cost 
weight a  for 1a < . 
c. The compensation of manager Ym, 
2
2
2 2
1 1[ ] 1 2
2 2 1
Y
Manager
aa ArcCsch
aa i a
a a
π
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= ⋅ − +⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, is strictly decreasing in cost 
weight a  for 1a < . 
 
d. The auction revenue, 
( )
( )22
3 32 2
2 22 2
ArcCsch ArcSinh 11 11-[ ]  -
(1 ) 11 ( 1)
aa aam a a
a aa a
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, is strictly 
decreasing in cost weight a  for 1a < . 
 
e. The profit of the holding company, 
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( )
2
2
0
3
2 2
1 (2 )
1[ ]
2 1
Y
Holding Company
aa a a ArcCsch
aa w
a
π
⎛ ⎞− − − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠= −
−
 
( )
( )22
3 32 2
2 22 2
ArcCsch ArcSinh 11 11- -
(1 ) 11 ( 1)
aa aa a
a aa a
γ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⋅⎜ ⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠+ − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, 
03 (1 )[ ]
6
Y
Holding Company
a aa wπ + −= − , reaches an optimum for I * 0.319404a ≈ . The 
profit is then I 0[ *] 0.560315COMPOUND a wπ ≈ − . 
 
f. The profit of independent bidder X, 
( )
( )
2 2
3
2 2
( 2) 1 ( 1)
[ ]
2 1
X
Generator
a a a ArcSinh a
a
a
π − − + + −=
− +
, is strictly increasing in cost 
weight a  for 1a < . 
 
g. The strategic profit of the holding company is positive and reaches a maximum of 
I[ *] 0.060YStrategic aπ ≈ . 
 
h. The welfare, 
( )
( )2 22
3 3
2 22 2
ArcCsch ArcSinh 11 1-[ ] 1  
2
1 ( 1)
aa a aaW a
a a
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, is 
strictly increasing in cost weight a  for 1a < . 
Proofs: 
a. The probability of winning for allied bidder Y, 1[ ]
1
Y winsp a
a
= + , is strictly 
decreasing in cost weight a . 
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Proof:  
Using propositions 1 and 4, it follows that allied bidder Y with a realized value of yv  
wins with probability  
2 2 2
[ ; ]
(1 )
Y
Y Y
Y Y
vx b v a
v a v
=
+ −
o  . 
The expected proportion of auctions that is won by allied bidder Y is then  
1
0
1
2 2 2
0
[ ] [ ; ]
(1 )
Y wins
Y Y Y
Y
Y
Y Y
p a x b v a dv
v dv
v a v
=
=
+ −
∫
∫
o
 
1
1 a
= + .  
 
b. The profit of allied bidder Y, 
( )
2
2
0
3
2 2
(2 ) 1
1[ ]
2 1
Y
Generator
aa ArcCsch a
aa w
a
π
⎛ ⎞− − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠= −
−
, is strictly increasing in cost 
weight a  for 1a < . 
Proof: 
The profit of allied bidder Y is  
( )1 0
0
2 2 2 2
1 0
20 2 2 2
[ ] [ ; ] [ ; ]
 
(1 )
Y
Generator Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y YY
Y Y
Y YY Y
a x b v a v b v a dv w
a v a v av v dv w
v a vv a v
π = ⋅ − −
⎛ ⎞+ − −⎜ ⎟= ⋅ − −⎜ ⎟−+ − ⎝ ⎠
∫
∫
o
 
( )
2
2
0
3
2 2
(2 ) 1
1
2 1
aa ArcCsch a
a w
a
⎛ ⎞− − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠= −
−
. 
This expression is increasing in cost weight a  for  
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[ ] 0
Y
Generatord a
da
π >  has been determined numerically. 
 
c. The compensation of manager Ym, 
2
2
2 2
1 1[ ] 1 2
2 2 1
Y
Manager
aa ArcCsch
aa i a
a a
π
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= ⋅ − +⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, is strictly decreasing in cost 
weight a  for 1a < . 
Proof: 
( )1
0
[ ]
[ ; ] [ ; ]
Y
Manager
Y Y Y Y Y Y
a
x b v a v ab v a dv
i
π = ⋅ −∫ o  
2 2 2 2
1
22 2 20
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2
2
2 2
1 11 2
2 2 1
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a a
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= − +⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
.  
[ ]
0
Y
Managerd a
da
π <  has been determined numerically. 
d. The auction revenue, 
( )
( )22
3 32 2
2 22 2
ArcCsch ArcSinh 11 11-[ ]  -
(1 ) 11 ( 1)
aa aam a a
a aa a
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, is strictly 
decreasing in cost weight a  for 1a < . 
 
Proof 
[ ] [ ] [ ]Y Xm a m a m a= +  
( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1
0 0
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]Y Y Y Y Y X X X X Xx b v b v dv y b v b v dv= ⋅ + ⋅∫ ∫o o  
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⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⋅⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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This expression is strictly decreasing in a ; [ ] 0dm a
da
>  has been determined 
numerically. 
 
e. The profit of the holding company, 
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0
3
2 2
1 (2 )
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Y
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aa a a ArcCsch
aa w
a
π
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, reaches an optimum for I * 0.319404a ≈ . The profit is then 
I 0[ *] 0.560315COMPOUND a wπ ≈ − . 
Proof: 
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( )
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0
3
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(2 ) 1
1
2 1
aa ArcCsch a
a w
a
⎛ ⎞− − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠+ −
−
. 
The optimal cost weight, I * 0.319404a ≈ , has been approximated numerically. 
 
f. The profit of independent bidder X, 
( )
( )
2 2
3
2 2
( 2) 1 ( 1)
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2 1
X
Generator
a a a ArcSinh a
a
a
π − − + + −=
− +
, is strictly increasing in cost 
weight a  for 1a < . 
Proof: 
The profit of independent bidder X is  
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[ ] 0
X
Generatord a
da
π >  has been determined numerically. 
 
g. The strategic profit of the holding company is equal to the profit of the holding 
company, [ ]YHolding Company aπ , minus the passive profit 1[ 1] 6 3
Y
Holding Company a
γπ = = + , 
and therefore reaches its maximum of I[ *] 0.060YStrategic aπ ≈ at I * 0.319404a ≈  just as 
[ ]YHolding Company aπ . 
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h. The welfare, 
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( )
( )2 22
3 3
2 22 2
ArcCsch ArcSinh 11 1-1  
2
1 ( 1)
aa a aa
a a
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
This expression is decreasing in cost weight a . 
[ ] 0dW a
da
>  has been determined numerically. 
 
 
Proposition 4 
When independent bidder X believes allied bidder Y to maximize profits then the 
outcomes in a first-price auction are identical to those in a second-price auction. 
Proof: 
Independent bidder X believing allied bidder Y to maximize profits is equal to X 
believing the allied bidder maximizes a compensation scheme with a cost weight set 
equal to one. X then bids, as in the symmetrical model, 
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2
X
X
vb =  and [ ] 2x b b= .  
 
Let us assume that Y is aware of the ignorance (or skepticism) of X. This makes it 
possible for Y to logically deduce that [ ] 2x b b= . Substituting for [ ]x b  into equation 4 
gives: 
 
[ ] 2
[ ] 2
Y Y
Y Y Y
Y
a x b a bv ab ab
x b
⋅ ⋅− = = =′  
2
Y
Y
vb
a
= , implying [ ] 2y b ab= . 
 
With the above bidding functions, it follows that: 
a) The auction revenue is equal to 3[ ]
6
am a −=  
b) The profit of allied bidder Y is given by 0(2 )[ ]
6
Y
Generator
a aa wπ −= −  
c) The profit of allied bidder X is given by [ ]
6
X
Generator
aaπ = . 
The above outcomes are identical with the outcomes of second-price auctions. As the 
profit of the holding company and welfare is computed from the three outcomes above, 
these are also identical. As a result, revenue equivalence has been restored.  Moreover, 
the effect of ownership share γ  on the holding company’s choice of cost weight will be 
the same; hence the same cost weight will be maximizing. 
 
a) Proof of 3[ ]
6
am a −= . 
( )[ ] [ ] [ ]X Ym a m a m a= +  
( ) ( )1 1
0 0
1
2
a Y
X X X Y Y Ya
v
av b dv b dv dv
a
⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ ∫  
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7. Notation 
a  [ ]0,1a∈  is the cost weight the holding company sets on the bidding costs 
of allied bidder Y when computing the bonus of manager Ym. When 
manager Ym wins the auction with bid b , his bonus increases on the margin 
with the value of transmission minus a  times the bid. 
b  [ ]0, 0,1b b⎡ ⎤∈ ⊆⎣ ⎦  is the officially stated bid offered by a bidder. [ ]0,1b ∈  
is the highest bid in the auction. 
[ ]Yb v   The optimal bid of allied bidder Y given his realized value [ ]0,1v∈ . This 
strategy [ ]Yb ⋅  has the inverse [ ]y ⋅  (such that [ ][ ]Yy b v v= ). 
[ ]Xb v   [ ]Xb v  is the optimal bid of independent generator X given her realized 
value [ ]0,1v∈ . This strategy [ ]Xb v  has the inverse [ ]x ⋅  (such that 
[ ][ ]Xx b v v= ). 
γ  [ ]0,1γ ∈  is the ownership share that the holding company holds in the 
auctioneer. The holding company therefore receives portion γ  of the 
revenue of the auctioneer. 
[ ]Y WINSp a  The ex-ante expected probability that allied bidder Y wins when using (his 
optimal) strategy [ ]Yb ⋅ , given cost weight a . 
[ ]YGenerator aπ  The ex-ante expected private profit of allied bidder Y. 
[ , ]YHolding Company aπ γ The expected profit of the holding company when it sets the cost weight 
equal to a  when the holding company has an ownership share of γ . When 
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setting the optimal cost weight, the expected profit of the holding company 
is equal to [ ] [ [ ], ]Y YHolding Company Holding Company aπ γ π γ γ= . 
[ ]YPassiveπ γ  [ ] [ 1, ] [ 1]Y YPassive Holding Company a m aπ γ π γ γ= = + =  is the ex-ante expected 
passive profit of the holding company. It is the profit when the holding 
company has an ownership share of γ , but sets the cost weight in the 
compensation scheme equal to one. 
[ ]YStrategicπ γ  [ ] [ ][ ]Y Y YStrategic Holding Company Passiveπ γ π γ π γ= −  is the ex-ante expected strategic 
profit. It is the extra profit that can be made by giving manager Ym a 
compensation scheme. 
[ ]Ym γ  The ex-ante expected payment of allied bidder Y when the allied bidder has 
a realized value of Yv  and the ownership share is γ . 
[ ]m γ  [ ] [ ] [ ]Y Xm m mγ γ γ= +  is the ex-ante expected revenue of the auctioneer, 
when the ownership share is γ .  
v  [ ]0,1v∈  is the value of transmission in the auction. It is a random variable 
uniformly distributed on [ ]0,1  . 
[ ]W γ  The ex-ante expected welfare. It is the value of transmission in use by the 
bidder that won the auction. 
[ ]x ⋅  The inverse of strategy [ ]Xb v  (such that [ ][ ]Xx b v v= ). 
[ ]y ⋅  The inverse of strategy [ ]Yb ⋅  (such that [ ][ ]Yy b v v= ). 
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The Unbundling Regime for Electricity Utilities in the EU: 
A Case of Legislative and Regulatory Capture? 
 
Abstract 
Theory and empirics suggest that by curbing competition, incumbent electricity 
companies which used to be, and here are referred to as, Vertically Integrated Utilities 
(VIUs), can maintain a high profitability through combined ownership of generation and 
transmission and/or distribution networks. Because curbing competition is generally 
believed to be welfare-reducing, EU law requires unbundling (separation) of the VIU 
networks. However, the EU allows its member states the choice between incomplete 
(legal) and complete (ownership) unbundling. There is tantalizing anecdotal evidence that 
VIUs have tried to influence this choice through questionable means of persuasion. Such 
means of persuasion should be more readily available in countries with a more corrupted 
political culture. This paper shows that among the old EU member states, countries which 
are perceived as more corrupt are indeed more likely to apply weaker forms of 
unbundling. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not obtain a similar finding for the EU 
member states that acceded in 2004. We provide a conjecture for this observation.  
 
Keywords: electricity markets; regulation; vertical integration; corruption 
 
JEL classification code: K49, L43, L51, L94, L98. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The European electricity market is undergoing major changes. Prompted by EU legislation 
(most notably DIRECTIVE 2003/54/EC79 and REGULATION 1228/200380), the EU 
                                                 
79 “Directive 2003/54/EC of 26 June 2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC” (OJ 2003 L 176/37). 
80 “Regulation (EEC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Conditions for 
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member states are restructuring their electricity industry to allow for more competition 
which is widely believed to be welfare-enhancing. A major complication is that, at the 
outset, the electricity markets were almost completely controlled by large, Vertically 
Integrated Utilities (VIUs) that used to be regulated state monopolies. These VIUs 
typically still own almost all generators, as well as transmission and/or the distribution 
networks.81 Such an ownership pattern is believed to be an obstacle for free competition 
(e.g., European Commission Competition DG, 2007, p.169). 
 
To prevent VIUs from using their influence to reduce competition, the EU has required its 
member states to unbundle (separate) their generation and network activities. Many 
members, however, have been slow in implementing these directives and many have 
chosen the weaker (but permitted) form of unbundling. These developments, and the fact 
that weaker forms of unbundling are allowed at all, are widely believed to be welfare-
reducing (e.g. European Commission Competition DG, 2007, pp.151-169). These 
observations suggest that the pertinent political, legislative, and regulatory processes 
might have unduly been influenced. 
 
Motivated by tantalizing anecdotal evidence and a well-established literature on legislative 
and regulatory capture, we conjecture that a significant part of the timing of the 
implementation of unbundling regimes and the choice of weaker forms of unbundling 
regimes, as well as the fact that this choice is possible in the first place, can be explained 
by questionable (and possibly illegal) influence activities by VIUs. We conjecture 
specifically that such influence activities are more effective in countries where the policy 
and regulatory process is more susceptible to manipulations. Our data analysis supports 
our hypothesis for the old EU member states (the EU-15 countries82), but not for the EU 
                                                                                                                                                   
Access to the Network for Cross-Border Exchanges in Electricity (OJ 2003 L 176/1)”. 
81 Generators produce electricity. The transmission network is operated by a Transmission System Operator 
(TSO) and is used for the transport of electricity over long distances. The distribution network is operated by 
a Distribution System Operator (DSO) and is used for the transport of electricity over short distances, mostly 
to the final consumer. 
82 EU-15: Austria (A), Belgium (B), England (UK), Germany (D), Denmark (DK), Spain (E), France (F), 
Finland (FIN), Greece (GR), Italy (I), Ireland (IRL), Luxembourg (L), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (P), 
Sweden (S). 
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member states that acceded in 2004 (from here on, the new member states, or the NMS-
1083). 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give examples 
of the welfare-reducing effects of having a fully integrated VIU and then discuss types of 
unbundling. We also formulate our key conjecture that countries with higher CPI score 
(less corruption) have more complete unbundling regimes and present a summary of the 
data that we use. In section 3, we explain the sources of our data, describe our strategy for 
analyzing the data, and state our hypothesis. In section 4, we report our results. We 
conclude with a discussion in section 5.  
 
2. Motivation 
Arguably, the major obstacle in both creating a single market in energy and allowing more 
competition is the dominance of large, formerly regulated VIUs that were typically state 
monopolies. The fact that VIUs own both generators and (transmission/distribution) 
networks is especially problematic as it allows VIUs to use their network ownership to 
increase their profits and hinder competition. 
 
For example, VIUs can cross-subsidize their generation activities and recover their 
generation losses with high transmission fees. Apart from blunt refusal, VIUs have several 
additional tactics available to hinder access of competing generators to the network such 
as imposing discriminating requirements84 or charging unreasonably high access and 
service fees.85 Furthermore, VIUs have little incentive to invest in new transmission 
                                                 
83 NMS-10: Cyprus (CY), the Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EST), Hungary (H), Lithuania (LT), Latvia 
(LV), Malta (M), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK), and Slovenia (SLO). 
84 An inquiry by the European Commission finds that many market participants are “highly critical of the 
efficiency of existing unbundling obligations, believing that discrimination in favor of affiliates continues, 
and calling for stricter measures.” European Commission Competition DG (2006, executive summary, p.4). 
85 For example, the Commission of the European Communities (2005, technical annex, p.14) claims that in 
2005 in 16 out of 25 EU members, the fees for balancing services were set so as to hinder competition. 
Balancing is the real-time equalization of electricity supply and demand by the TSO; failure of balancing 
leads to electricity outages. Imbalances are caused by generators who cannot supply the exact amount they 
contracted for. The TSO has to make up for the shortage or excess in electricity supply and charges out-of-
balance generators fees for balancing services. A TSO that is owned by a VIU can curb competition by 
charging excessive fees for its balancing services. This effect is aggravated by the fact that new and small 
entrant generators are more likely to cause imbalances than large incumbent generators (Commission of the 
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capacity86 as more transmission capacity makes it more likely that generators from 
neighboring countries or distant areas can compete with the VIU-owned generators 
(European Commission Competition DG, 2007; Léautier, 2001; Brunekreeft, Neuhoff and 
Newbery, 2004). In addition, the European Commission Competition DG (2007, p.165) 
reported cases of VIUs having given commercially valuable inside information to their 
affiliated generators. This puts independent generators at a disadvantage and thereby 
decreases competition. 
 
To prevent VIUs from using control over their networks to reduce competition, the EU 
requires member states to unbundle (separate) their transmission and distribution networks 
from generation. The EU distinguishes five types of such unbundling: 
0) Unified ownership requires no unbundling; both network and generation activities 
continue to be owned and managed by the same company. 
1) Accounting unbundling is the least drastic form of unbundling; separate accounts must 
be kept for the network activities and generation activities to prevent cross 
subsidization.  
2) Functional unbundling (also called management unbundling) requires, in addition to 
keeping separate accounts, that the operational activities and management are 
separated for transmission and generation activities.  
3) Legal unbundling requires that transmission and generation be put in separate legal 
entities. 
4) Ownership unbundling is the most drastic form of unbundling. Generation and 
transmission have to be owned by independent entities. These entities are not allowed 
to hold shares in both activities. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
European Communities, 2005, technical annex, p.13). See Newbery, van Damme, and von der Fehr (2003), 
p.16, for an example of how the balancing system in Belgium (where in 2003 the VIU owned all networks 
and practically all generation) impedes electricity imports from the Netherlands. 
86 There is a pressing shortage of transmission capacity between countries (European Commission 
Competition DG, 16.02.2006, p.152). This is a serious issue since it obstructs the creation of one single 
market in electricity (Directive 96/92/EC). 
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Table 1: Unbundling regimes in EU member states.87 
EU-15 countries 
Unbundling 
regime 2001 2002 
88 2003 88 2004  2005 2006 
0) None 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1) Account 0 0 1 
(L) 
0 0 0 
2) Functional 3 
(D, F, GR) 
2 
(F, L89) 
1 
(F) 
1 
(L) 
0 0 
3) Legal 8 
(A, B, DK, 
E, I, IRL89, 
NL, P) 
5 
(A, B, D, 
DK, P) 
4 
(A, B, D, 
DK) 
7 
(A, B, D, 
DK, F, GR, 
IRL) 
7 
(A, B, D, F, 
GR, IRL, L) 
7 
(A, B, D, F, 
GR, IRL, L) 
4) 
Ownership 
3 
(FIN, S, UK) 
5 
(E, FIN, NL, 
S, UK) 
6 
(E, FIN, NL, 
P, S, UK) 
7 
(E, FIN, I, 
NL, P, S, 
UK) 
8 
(DK, E, FIN, 
I, NL, P, S, 
UK) 
8 
(DK, E, FIN, 
I, NL, P, S, 
UK) 
       
NMS-10 
Unbundling 
regime 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
0) None  0 0 0 0 0 
1) Account  1 
(H) 
2 
(EST, H) 
1 
(LV) 
0 0 
2) Functional  2 
(CY, EST89) 
2 
(CY, PL) 
1 
(CY) 
1 
(CY) 
0 
3) Legal  6 
(CZ, LT, 
LV89, PL89, 
SK, SLO) 
5 
(CZ, LT, 
LV89, SK, 
SLO) 
7 
(CZ, EST, H, 
LT, PL, SK, 
SLO) 
4 
(EST, LV, 
PL, SK) 
5 
(CY, EST, 
LV, PL, H) 
4) 
Ownership 
 0 0 0 4 
(CZ, H89, LT, 
SLO ) 
4 
(CZ, LT, 
SLO, SK ) 
 
Interestingly, the EU allows its member states the choice of an unbundling regime (legal 
or ownership) and the time path of implementation (quick or slow90) although there seems 
                                                 
87 Malta has no transmission network and is therefore not listed in Table 1. 
88 Greece and Ireland in 2002 and 2003 have been categorized as having implemented a combination of 
functional (3) and legal (4) unbundling. Italy in 2002 and 2003 has been categorized as having implemented 
a combination of legal (4) and ownership (5) unbundling. We leave these observations out in the main 
analysis but we ran several robustness tests including these observations. It turns out that inclusion does not 
change the results in any significant manner. For our treatment of these observations see section A.1 in the 
Appendix 
89 In the one of the following years the unbundling regime becomes less rigorous. While leaving these 
observations in the main analysis for consistency, we ran robustness tests excluding these observations. 
Again, this inclusion had no significant impact. 
90 For transmission, legal or ownership unbundling had to be implemented by July 2004; for distribution, 
legal or ownership unbundling had to be implemented by July 2007. However, some countries have adopted 
such a slow pace of implementation that it borders on noncompliance. In 2005, while 18 EU member 
countries reported to have implemented legal unbundling, in 8 of these it has not been done effectively in 
that the network activities of the VIU are not overseen by a separate board of directors (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2005, p.80). 
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to be wide agreement that the quick implementation of ownership unbundling would be 
welfare-enhancing (e.g., OECD, 2001; Pittman, 2003; European Commission Competition 
DG, 2007, p.168). Legal unbundling leaves intact the incentives for curbing competition.91 
Not surprisingly, in many countries VIUs opposed ownership unbundling in favor of legal 
unbundling.92 It is therefore an interesting question (to which our results below provide a 
suggestive answer) whether VIUs were able to manipulate the legislative and regulatory 
process in favor of the weaker form of unbundling, and whether these manipulations were 
a function of the integrity of legislative and regulatory processes.  
 
Table 1 documents the considerable variation in the unbundling regimes implemented in 
EU member states, and the distribution of regimes over time,93 both for the old (EU-15 
countries) and the new member states that acceded the EU in 2004 (NMS-10). 
 
Remarkably, but perhaps not surprisingly given the available choices, many countries did 
not choose to implement ownership unbundling. The fact that legal unbundling is the 
modal choice for the NMS-10 and the EU-15 countries set in 2001-2 (and a close 
contender even in 2003-5) is one indication that VIUs may be able to exert influence over 
the transmission company.94 We therefore conjecture that part of the variation in the 
unbundling regime choice and the speed of implementation can be explained by influence 
activities of VIUs. These activities may be legal (e.g., transparent lobbying activities) or 
may include questionable (and possibly illegal) strategies such as under-the-table 
payments to allegedly independent lobbyists to effect public opinion and the legislative 
and regulatory process. Of course, it may also be possible that outright bribes were paid. 
 
                                                 
91 There are several concrete examples of legally unbundled VIUs that curb competition through their 
combined ownership of generation and transmission or distribution networks, see European Commission 
Competition DG (6.02.2006, p.144-148). 
92 For example, see Mulder, Shestalova, and Lijesen (2005) for the debate in the Netherlands. 
93 The sources of the data are described in section 3. 
94 The Dutch branch of the energy company Essent provides an example of the incumbents’ rhetoric against 
ownership unbundling. Suggesting that unified ownership of the network provides protection against 
possible foreign take-over, Essent says: “We are now being chopped up, ready for swallowing by large 
foreign groups with headquarters in Munich or Paris” (http://www.essent-finance.nl/pressroom/ 
release36.jsp).  
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A recent scandal in the Netherlands illustrates one questionable strategy. In January 2006, 
it became known that energy companies Nuon, Eneco, Essent, and Delta had secretly 
promised, contingent on the Netherlands’ government deciding against ownership 
unbundling of the distribution network, a “success fee” of EURO 1,7 million to IMSA, an 
environmentally oriented consultancy company that presents itself as independent and 
idealistic.95 IMSA had forcefully argued against ownership unbundling of energy 
networks in the Dutch media and in an IMSA consultancy report (Van Dieren, Tuininga, 
and van Soest, 2006). This example is suggestive of the value of weaker unbundling for 
energy companies, but it begs the question whether the Dutch scandal was an isolated 
incident or unique only in that it had been exposed. 
 
The effect of such questionable influence activities depends on the integrity of legislative 
and regulatory processes. Data that directly measure the integrity of such processes do not 
exist. We therefore use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency 
International as a proxy. The CPI is a widely used and well-established corruption 
assessment instrument (e.g., Mauro, 1995; Treisman, 2000) that reflects the (perception 
of) corruption of a country, it assigns countries a score between 1 (very corrupt) and 10 
(hardly corrupt at all). The score is based on a number (up to 18) of sources, not all of 
them just about perception. In some sense the name of the CPI has become an 
anachronism. The CPI of 2006 was based on 12 sources from 9 independent institutions 
(Lambsdorff, 2006). 
 
We can now formulate our conjecture as follows: 
Countries with higher CPI score (less corruption) have more complete unbundling 
regimes. 
Figure 1 illustrates the relations between concepts and variables.  
 
                                                 
95 See http://www.imsa.nl/ for the idealistically flavored mission statements of IMSA. The director of IMSA 
and benefactor of the success fee, Mr. van Dieren, keeps a public appearance as an independent 
environmental activist. He is a member of the Club of Rome and the founder of a Dutch militant 
environmental organization called Friends of the Earth Netherlands. 
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Figure 1: Relations between concepts and variables. 
 
Our study relates to an established literature on rent-seeking and corruption (Mauro, 1995, 
1997; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000; Treisman, 2000). Mauro (1997) reviews studies that 
show how government policies (e.g. trade, price, and industrial policies) create rents 
which invite influence activities and corruption. In our view, the unbundling policy is such 
a source of government-induced rents since the implementation of unbundling regimes 
less stringent than ownership unbundling are likely to bring about higher profits for VIUs. 
In line with the literature on rent-seeking and corruption, we expect VIUs to attempt to 
appropriate these rents by persuading politicians to allow the less stringent unbundling 
regime. We expect that VIUs will be more successful in these attempts at persuasion in 
more corrupt countries. 
 
3. Data description and analysis 
We collected the data on unbundling regimes and market share of the (three) largest 
electricity generator(s) from EU Commission (2002, 2003, 2004, 05.01.2005, 15.11.2005, 
2006, and 2008) reports on the implementation of DIRECTIVE 2003/54/EC and 
REGULATION 1228/2003. For consistency we use these official data for our main 
analysis.96 
 
                                                 
96 The sources used to determine the transmission unbundling regime are summarized in section A.4 in the 
Appendix. 
VIU 
Politicians, 
“Independent”
experts 
Choice of 
weak form of
transmission
separation 
Influence 
activities  
CPI
Proxy
Variables
Mediating
variable
Integrity of 
processes 
Concepts
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Malta and Cyprus both have a small and isolated electricity system.97 Moreover, Malta has 
no transmission network. We therefore have no observations on Malta and excluded those 
on Cyprus. We ran a robustness check by including the data for Cyprus together with a 
dummy variable, Small_Isolated.98 As expected, Small_Isolated had a negative sign, 
indicating that a small and isolated system has less rigorous unbundling. Also, the 
categorization of the transmission unbundling regime in Latvia in the report of the Latvian 
regulator (The [Latvian] Public Utilities Regulation Commission, 2005) is in conflict with 
the categorization in the DG Tren reports. While we stick to the official EU data (the DG 
Tren reports) for consistency, we did a robustness test using the categorization of the 
Latvian regulator; this did not affect the significance of the coefficient of CPI in the 
regression for the NMS-10. 
 
Bulgaria and Romania acceded the EU in January 2007. These countries joined 3 years 
later than the NMS-10 and therefore had a different time schedule for implementing EU 
directives. We conjectured that including Bulgaria and Romania together with the NMS-
10 would not be appropriate; robustness tests including Bulgaria and Romania confirmed 
our conjecture (see footnote 110). 
 
The DG Tren reports do not indicate when exactly a particular unbundling regime was in 
place. We therefore used the following decision rule: If the report said that the data were, 
say, collected in 2001, then we report them in the column “2001” even if the report itself 
was published in 2002. Likewise, it does not matter whether a legislative or regulatory 
change was enacted in January or December. We can not think of any reason why our 
(strong) results reported below should be significantly affected by these caveats. 
                                                 
97 Countries that operate a small isolated system (Cyprus and Malta) have little to gain from unbundling as 
the low demand for electricity and the absence of interconnectors leave no room for effective competition 
(The Ministry for Resources and Infrastructure of Malta, 2006, p.42). In Malta the total installed capacity is 
550 MW and in Cyprus the total installed capacity is 988 MW (Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority, 2005, 
p. 17). The European Commission has indeed granted Cyprus derogation on the unbundling requirements; 
Cyprus is exempted from the obligation to implement transmission unbundling before July 2004. These facts 
seem substantial enough to affect the choice of unbundling regime. 
98 Malta is such a small country that it makes do without a transmission network; electricity is transported 
through the distribution network. One typically does not find an assessment of the transmission and 
distribution unbundling regimes in Malta or Cyprus in the DG Tren reports. Therefore, we draw on 
information from the Malta Resources Authority (2005); the Ministry for Resources and Infrastructure of 
Malta (2006); and the Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (2005). 
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The CPI data were obtained from Transparency International.99 The data on per capita 
GDP in thousands of Euros (fixed series at 1995 prices and exchange rates), GDP in 
billions of Euros (fixed series at 1995 prices and exchange rates), electricity prices (per 
kWh in Euro without taxes) and net electricity import relative to total available production 
were obtained from Eurostat.100 
 
To test our hypothesis, we ran ordered logit regressions with transmission unbundling 
regime and quality of implementation, respectively, as the dependent variable and CPI and 
various controlling variables as regressors. 
 
As controlling variables, we use a time trend, TimeTrend, the per capita gross domestic 
product at 1995 prices and exchange rates, GDP_pc, the gross domestic product at 1995 
prices and exchange rates, GDP, the net import of electricity relative to the total net 
generation of electricity101, NetElecIMP, and an approximation of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index102 concentration of generation, HHI_med.  
 
We expect the time trend to have a positive effect (more unbundling) because over time, 
the European Commission has required more stringent unbundling. We included the per 
capita gross domestic product and the gross domestic product because we suspect that 
wealth and economic size of a country influence the choice of the transmission 
unbundling regime. We expect the new member countries (NMS-10) to have less 
unbundling, as they joined the reform process at a later stage. On the other hand, the 
                                                 
99 Available on http://www.transparency.org/ 
100 Eurostat website for energy. 
101 Net imports (Eurostat code: 100600) divided by total net electricity generation (Eurostat code:107100), 
from the Eurostat website for energy. 
102 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for the suggestion to include this indicator which turned out to 
have a significant impact. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) sums the squares of the market shares in 
percentages of all relevant firms. The value of the HHI is thus between 0 and 10.000. Surprisingly, the HHI 
is not readily available. We constructed therefore a proxy that we call HHI_med and in which we use data on 
the market share of the largest (MSLG) and the largest three generators (MSL3G). The proxy is equal to a 
generalized average of HHI_high and HHI_low; respectively the upper and the lower bound of the true HHI. 
We obtained qualitatively the same results running our regressions with HHI_high or HHI_low instead of 
with HHI_med. See our website http://home.cerge-ei.cz/svk/Unbundling&Corruption for details on the 
construction of this proxy. 
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NMS-10 experienced much stronger pressure for implementation of the EU directives on 
unbundling than the EU-15 countries; implementation of the EU directives was one of the 
conditions for accession in 2004.103 These differences seem substantial enough to run 
separate regressions for the NMS-10 and the EU-15 countries. 
 
We have no prior about the effect of NetElecIMP, the net import of electricity.104 On the 
one hand, we expect a VIU that is a net exporter to gain more from owning the network. 
On the other hand, a VIU that is a net importer can hamper competing imports from 
abroad and thereby increase its profit. 
 
We estimate the following equation: 
1 1 2 3 4
5 6
Pr( _ ) Pr( _
_ )
i
j i
T unbund  i CPI TimeTrend GDP pc GDP
 NetElecIMP+ HHI med u  
κ α β β β β
β β κ
−= = < + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ + <  
 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
• T_unbund stands for the transmission unbundling regime implemented and can 
take the categorical values i∈ {Unified ownership, Accounting unbundling, 
Functional unbundling, Legal unbundling, and Ownership unbundling}. 
• CPI stands for the Corruption Perception Index. 
• TimeTrend stands for time trend. 
• GDP_pc stands for the per capita Gross Domestic Product in thousands of Euros 
(fixed series at 1995 prices and exchange rates).  
• GDP stands for Gross Domestic Product in billions of Euros (fixed series at 1995 
prices and exchange rates). 
• NetElecIMP stands for the net import of electricity relative to the total electricity 
consumption.in a country. 
• HHI_med is an approximation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of electricity 
generation in a country. 
                                                 
103 For the obligation of transmission network unbundling no country was granted derogation. Slovenia, 
Cyprus, and Estonia were granted derogations for implementing parts of the energy directive 2003/54/EC, 
but not with regard to chapter 4, the unbundling regime. 
104 We included this variable in response to a referee’s suggestion. 
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Our main hypothesis is: 
H0: 1β  and 2β , the coefficient on CPI is equal to zero.  
HA: 1β  and 2β , the coefficient on CPI is greater than zero.  
 
We assume that the variables that we control for are clustered by country, and we 
therefore use the robust Huber/White/sandwich estimator clustered by country for the 
variance (Froot, 1989). 
 
4. Results 
Table 2 shows the results for the EU-15 countries and the NMS-10.105 For the EU-15 
countries, Model 1 shows the regression with significant and insignificant control 
variables while Model 2 shows the regression with only the significant control variables 
(HHI_med becomes insignificant after excluding GDP). Both models show that for the 
EU-15 countries, the effect of the CPI is highly significant and positive. This supports our 
hypothesis: The less corrupt of the EU-15 countries (a high CPI score) tend to implement 
more rigorous transmission unbundling. The significant effect of the CPI is robust to the 
method of data analysis, the particular specification of controls, in- or exclusion of most of 
the control variables and varying our treatment of problematic observations.106  
                                                 
105 At the suggestion of an anonymous referee we also ran regressions using as control variables gross 
electricity generation — as an indicator of the size of the market, and working days lost in strikes per 
thousand workers — as an indicator of unionization. The variable gross electricity generation correlates 
highly with GDP (p=0.97), using it instead of GDP therefore makes no significant difference for the results. 
The control variable working days lost in strikes was not significant for either the EU-15 countries or the 
NMS-10 and did not significantly change the results for the EU-15 countries. For the NMS-10 the inclusion 
of this control variable made the effect of the CPI insignificant, largely because the missing observations in 
this control variable diminished the number of available observations from 40 to 22. 
106 We obtained essentially the same results using survival analysis, an alternative methods of data analysis. 
We used the Cox proportional-hazards regression model (Cox, 1972) and used ownership unbundling as the 
survival criteria. We categorized a country as being “alive” as long as it has not implemented ownership 
unbundling, a country “fails” at the moment it implements ownership unbundling. In the analysis of EU-15 
countries, variables CPI and GDP_pc showed up in the same direction and highly significant (p<0.01). The 
survival analysis of the NMS-10 was inconclusive as the model could not be reliable fitted due to the low 
number of degrees of freedom (eight observations and four independent variables). We obtained basically 
the same result running, as a further robustness test, linear regressions. Using ordered probit regression, a 
method of data analysis that uses the same technique but assumes a different distribution than ordered 
logistic regression, resulted in almost identical quantitative results. 
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To further illustrate the importance of the variable CPI we use our regressions to predict 
the binary choice between ownership unbundling and less binding unbundling regimes 
(legal, functional, account and none) for the EU-15 countries.107 Inclusion of the variable 
CPI, in addition to the significant control variables, adds 30% to the percentage of correct 
predictions for the EU-15 countries.  
 
Not surprisingly, given that the EU directives require legal unbundling by 2004, the time 
trend variable TimeTrend shows that in later years it is more likely for any country to have 
more unbundling. Furthermore, the regression results show that the wealthier of the EU-15 
countries (as measured by per capita GDP) are less likely to implement rigorous 
transmission unbundling. This is not straightforward result. We conjecture that for a given 
level of corruption, a wealthier country has more resources and might thus invite more 
                                                                                                                                                   
 It takes time to decide on and implement an unbundling regime. It could therefore be argued that 
the unbundling regime should be regressed on the lagged CPI. However, the CPI indeces are moving 
averages; the CPI of any year during the period 2001-2005 is based on numerous indexes and reports over a 
time period including the two previous years (Lambsdorf, 2005) and in 2006 including the previous year 
(Lambsdorf, 2006). For example, the CPI of 2005 is based on information over the period 2003-2005 and 
the CPI of 2006 is based on information over the period 2005-2006. Performing a regression on the CPI 
lagged by one year gave coefficients and significance levels that were virtually identical to the ones in 
model 1 and 2. 
 As a robustness test we used data on the per capita Gross Domestic Product and on the Gross 
Domestic Product not as fixed series at 1995 prices and exchange rates, but corrected for purchasing power 
parity. As a result in the regression for the EU-15 countries in model 1 the significance of CPI slightly 
increased and, in model 2, the significance of CPI (p<0. 012) and netimp_gen (p<0.234) slightly decreased, 
while the significance of all other variables remained unaffected. The significance of the variables in the 
regression for the NMS-10 was virtually unaffected. The data on per capita Gross Domestic Product and on 
the Gross Domestic Product corrected for purchasing power parity we obtained from Eurostat, section 
“Economy and finance”. 
 Inclusion or exclusion of control variables did not greatly affect the significance of the CPI; the 
only critical control variable is GDP_pc, the per capita GDP. Without this variable the significance of the 
CPI fell to p<0.200. Exclusion of the other control variables left the CPI always significant at the 5% 
confidence level and mostly at the 1% confidence level. 
 In addition we ran a pooled, seemingly unrelated regression (Greene, 2003, p. 340) with the 
observations on the EU-15 countries and the NMS-10 together. We allowed a variable to have different 
effects for the EU-15 countries and the NMS-10 by using interaction variables. We thus created two sets of 
interaction variables: one set of variables multiplied with EU15, a dummy for the EU-15 countries, and one 
set multiplying with NMS10, a dummy for the NMS-10. For example the effect of the CPI was measured for 
the EU-15 countries by the variable CPI*EU15 (which was created by multiplying CPI with EU15) and for 
the NMS-10 by the variable CPI*NMS10 (which was created by multiplying CPI with NMS10). As a result 
the effect of CPI strengthened for the EU-15 countries (p<0.001), and weakened for the NMS-10 (p<0.088). 
All control variables had the same signs and their significance was largely the same as those reported in 
Table 2. 
 For our treatment of problematic observations see section A.1 in the Appendix. 
107 We thank Jan Hanousek for suggesting this analysis. 
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rent-seeking activities.108 As wealth of a country has a strong negative correlation with 
corruption in our dataset as well as in general (Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000; Treismann, 
2000), this effect can only be found when controlling for corruption. The effect of 
NetImportElec is positive and significant (p<0.05) but not very large.109 
 
Table 2: Regression models. 
 EU-15 countries (old member states) NMS-10 (new member states) 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
(Only significant 
variables) 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
(Only significant 
variables) 
CPI 2.83*** 
(1.03) 
2.55*** 
(0.74) 
-1.14** 
(0.45) 
-1.63*** 
(0.43) 
TimeTrend 1.35** 
(0.52) 
1.04*** 
(0.26) 
1.18** 
(.46) 
1.55*** 
(.50) 
GDP_pc (in 
thousands) 
-0.56*** 
(.20) 
-0.53*** 
(0.11) 
0.43*** 
(.12) 
0.53*** 
(.13) 
GDP (in millions) -0.56 
(0.79) 
 -28.2** 
(13.0) 
-24.4*** 
(6.22) 
HHI_med -0.00048*** 
(0.00017) 
 -0.00019 
(0.00024) 
 
NetImport_Gen 19.3*** 
(5.2) 
8.38*** 
(2.76) 
-4.42*** 
(1.47) 
-3.79*** 
(1.15) 
N 58 
(14 clusters) 
83 
(15 clusters) 
29 
(8 clusters) 
40 
(8 clusters) 
  ***  Significant at the 1% confidence level 
    ** Significant at the 5% confidence level 
      *  Significant at the 10% confidence level 
       () Robust standard errors within parentheses 
 
 
Interestingly, the effect of the CPI on the NMS-10 (model 3 and 4) is opposite to the effect 
in EU-15 countries (model 1 and 2); more corrupt countries in the NMS-10 sample tend to 
implement more rigorous transmission unbundling.110 Also the effect of wealth is 
                                                 
108 See for example Svensson (2000) for a model where an increase in rents increases rent dissipating 
activities. 
109 While the effect is significant, the variable does probably not exert a large influence. When we used our 
regressions to predict the binary choice between ownership and less binding unbundling regimes (legal, 
functional, account and unified ownership) for EU-15 countries, the exclusion of NetImportElec from the 
regression lowered the percentage of correct predictions by 6% (from 76% to 70%). 
110 Including Cyprus together with a dummy variable Small_Isolated in model 3 did not change coefficients 
and significance levels. The coefficient on the dummy Small_Isolated was negative (less unbundling for 
small and isolated systems) and significant (p<0.01), as expected. Including the newest EU member states 
Bulgaria and Romania did not affect the significance of the CPI, but lowered the significance of GDP and 
NetImport_Gen. Artificially shifting the time trend of Bulgaria and Romania 3 years back, in order to align 
their accession date with the NMS-10, resulted in high significance of all variables in model 3 (p<0.01). This 
confirms our conjecture that the later accession date of Bulgaria and Romania sets these countries apart from 
the NMS-10. 
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reversed; richer NMS-10 (as measured by GDP_pc, the per capita GDP) are more likely to 
implement rigorous transmission unbundling. The effect of being a net importer, captured 
by NetImportElec, is also reversed; countries that are a net importer are less likely to 
choose a stricter unbundling regime. The effect of NetimportElec is however not very 
large.111 The economic size of a country (as measured by GDP) has a strongly significant 
effect; economically larger countries are less likely to implements rigorous transmission 
unbundling. This later result is in step with the results for the EU-15 countries. 
 
A possible explanation is that the reverse CPI effect is spurious; the effect is significant 
but not as robust as the CPI effect we found for EU-15 countries and effectively it is very 
small.112 Moreover, we have reasons to suspect that the transmission unbundling regime 
has not always been reported accurately for the NMS-10. For example, in four out of the 
eight countries in our NMS-10 sample the unbundling regime becomes less rigorous in 
time over certain periods. The occurrence of such “backwards progression” could be an 
indication of misreporting.113 
 
It seems likely that the occurrence of misreporting is related to the level of corruption in 
the NMS-10. After all, in the pre-accession stage the European Commission has exerted 
strong pressure on the NMS-10 to show clear signs of reform to be eligible for EU 
membership in 2004. Compliance with the unbundling requirements is a step towards 
creating a liberal market-economy and a way for an accession country to signal its 
                                                 
111 When we used our regressions to predict the binary choice between ownership and less binding 
unbundling regimes (legal, functional, account and unified ownership) for the NMS-10, the exclusion of 
NetImportElec from the regression lowered the percentage of correct predictions by only 2% (from 62% to 
60%). 
112 The effect of the CPI became insignificant if one of the control variables in model 4 was left out of the 
regression. This could indicate overfitting; the regression in model 4 in Table 2 includes five independent 
variables for a sample that consists of only 8 truly independent groups of observations (NMS-10). 
 Furthermore, using our regressions to predict the binary choice between ownership unbundling and 
less binding unbundling regimes (legal, functional, account and none) for the NMS-10, inclusion of the 
variable CPI, in addition to the significant control variables, added only a mere 2% to the percentage of 
correct predictions for the NMS-10. 
113 The countries that reported a “backwards progression” in unbundling regime are Estonia (2002 to 2003; 
Functional to Account unbundling), Hungary (2005 to 2006; Ownership to Legal unbundling), Ireland (2001 
to 2002 and 2003; Legal to a mixed regime of Functional and Legal), Latvia (2002 and 2003 to 2004; Legal 
to Account unbundling), Luxemburg (2002 to 2003; Functional to Account unbundling), Poland (2002 to 
2003; Legal to Account unbundling). Running a regression with these observations excluded did not change 
the results significantly. 
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commitment for reform to the EU.114 Especially for very corrupt countries such formal 
compliance is a cheap signal relative to actually curbing anticompetitive practices and 
governmental corruption. This might explain why more corrupt countries choose (at least 
formally) more rigorous unbundling. As the rationale for misreporting was eliminated 
once the NMS-10 had acceded the EU in 2004, we expect to observe variance in the effect 
of CPI over time. Indeed, additional analysis showed that the effect of CPI differs 
significantly over time (p<0.0003); the negative effect of the CPI on the unbundling 
regime was most pronounced in the period 2002 - 2004, but less so in 2005 and 2006.115 
Furthermore, the pressure to show clear signs of reform was most likely more intense for 
economically smaller countries, as they had less bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU. This 
would explain that economically large countries in the NMS-10 sample (as measured by 
the GDP) are less likely to implement rigorous transmission unbundling. 
 
The case of Latvia illustrates our conjecture. The unbundling regime in Latvia was 
reported in the evaluating DG Tren reports of the EC on 2002 and 2003 (published timely 
before accession) as Legal. This report allowed Latvia to fulfill the accession criteria in 
this respect. However the unbundling regime in Latvia was reported in the DG Tren 
reports on 2004 (published after accession) as Accounting, having Latvia practically fail 
the accession criteria in this respect. In addition, the unbundling regime in Latvia in 2002 
and 2003 are now being reported by the Latvian regulator as Accounting, which indicates 
that the reported Legal unbundling in 2002 and 2003 were misreports. Interestingly, 
Latvia was indicated by the CPI as the most corrupt country in 2001 and 2002 in our 
                                                 
114 Prior to the accession of a selected group of candidate countries in 2004, these candidate countries were 
evaluated by the European Commission, see for example the European Economy Enlargement Papers. As 
can be seen in the European Economy Enlargement Papers, one of the criteria on which the candidate 
countries were evaluated was the state of liberalization and regulation of the energy sector. The European 
Economy Enlargement Papers are available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/ 
enlargementpapers_en.htm 
115 At the suggestion of an anonymous referee, we tested for an interaction effect between CPI and time by 
inspecting the effect of CPI for individual years. We found that for the NMS-10 the effect of the interaction 
variables CPI* ti (2≤ i ≤ 5) are negative in all years, and strongly significant (p<0.01) in for the years 2002 – 
2004, weakly significant (p<0.10) in 2005 and not significant (p<0.21) in 2006. In contrast, for the EU-15 
countries the effect of CPI is positive and highly significant for all years. 
An LR test ((Long and Freese, 2001, p.146), showed that in the NMS-10 the effect of CPI differs 
significantly over time (p<0.0003). In contrast, in the EU-15 countries the effect of CPI is not significantly 
different over time (p<0.5795). A more extensive analysis of the interaction effect between CPI and time 
can be found in section A.3 in the Appendix. 
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sample of EU-25 countries, and one of the smallest economies in our sample of the NMS-
10 (its GDP is about 20% of the average).116 As such, Latvia is a prototypical example for 
the relationships we found between the variables in our regression. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We ran tests to determine the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of specific 
countries and influential observations. First we applied a jackknife technique: we 
repeatedly ran ordered logistic regressions of the transmission unbundling regime on the 
CPI and significant control variables, while excluding one specific country.117 For EU-15 
countries, the significance of CPI (p<0.001) was virtually unaffected, the largest 
weakening was caused by the exclusion of France (p<0.003). France is a country that 
lacks rigorous unbundling and scores relatively poorly on the CPI (relatively corrupt). 
 
To identify potentially influential observations, we approximated our model by simple 
linear regression and then drew plots of leverage against normalized squared residuals. 
Influential observations can be identified as outliers in such plots. Eight potentially 
influential observations were found, one on Denmark (42:2006), one on Greece (72: 
2001), three on Italy (96: 2004, 97: 2005, 98: 2006), and three on Luxemburg (116:2003, 
118:2005, 119:2006). Running our equation excluding these observations did not affect 
the significance of the CPI (p<0.004). 
 
For countries in the NMS-10 sample the effect of the CPI on unbundling regime was less 
robust to the exclusion of countries. The significance of the CPI (p<0.009) was weakened 
most by the exclusion of Estonia (p<0.468). Interestingly, the inclusion of the 
observations on Bulgaria and Romania — artificially shifted three years back to align their 
accession date with that of the NMS-10 — into our sample strengthened the statistical 
relationship considerably. As a result the exclusion of Estonia from this regression 
lowered the significance of the CPI less drastically (p< 0.031). 
 
                                                 
116 However, running the ordered logit regression for the NMS-10 excluding Latvia does not affect the 
significance of the coefficients much. See the sensitivity analysis below.  
117 We thank Jan Hanousek for suggesting this analysis. 
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Approximating our model by simple linear regression we identified three potentially 
influential observations in the sample of NMS-10, all of which are instances of the 
backwards progression explained in footnote 113; two on Latvia (101, 102: the misreports 
in 2002 and 2003), and one on Poland (136: 2002). Running the regression excluding 
these three observations did not chance the results qualitatively. 
  
Marginal effects for EU-15 countries and the NMS-10 
To explore the size of the effect of the CPI on the transmission unbundling regime,118 we 
calculate the marginal effect of the CPI on the probability of choosing an unbundling 
regime.  
 
Table 3: Marginal effects (in percentages) for EU-15 countries. 
 Account Functional Legal Ownership 
CPI - 0.1% 
(0.00) 
-1.0% 
(0.01) 
-56.0%*** 
(0.14) 
57.0%*** 
(0.14) 
TimeTrend -0.0% 
(0.00) 
-0.4% 
(0.00) 
-22.8%*** 
(0.07) 
23.2%*** 
(0.07) 
GDP_pc 0.0% 
(0.00) 
0.2% 
(0.00) 
11.6%*** 
(0.03) 
-11.8%*** 
(0.03) 
NetImportElec -0.2% 
(0.00) 
-3.1% 
(0.03) 
-184.2%*** 
(0.71) 
187.5%*** 
(0.72) 
  ***  Significant at the 1% confidence level 
    ** Significant at the 5% confidence level 
      *  Significant at the 10% confidence level 
       () Robust standard errors within parentheses 
 
 
Table 3 shows that an increase in the CPI with one point (the country is less corrupt) 
increases the likelihood of the average EU-15 country to choose ownership unbundling for 
transmission by 57%. Likewise, a decrease in the CPI (the country is more corrupt) 
increases the probability to have legal, functional or accounting unbundling.  
 
                                                 
118 We expected that the same effect could be found for the unbundling regime for distribution. Running an 
ordered logit regression of the distribution unbundling regime of EU-15 countries on the CPI and controlling 
variables resulted in a positive (0.67) but insignificant (P<0.207) coefficient. In a regression of the 
distribution unbundling regime of the NMS-10 the coefficient on the CPI was negative (-1.42) and not 
significant (p< 0.136). A possible explanation is that distribution unbundling was scheduled to be 
implemented later (July 2007) than transmission unbundling (July 2004), and that the effect of the CPI will 
show up significantly once data over 2007-2008 are available. 
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Table 4: Marginal effects for the NMS-10. 
 Account Functional Legal Ownership 
CPI 3.1% 
(0.03) 
2.5% 
(0.02) 
5.8% 
(0.04) 
-11.3%** 
(0.04) 
TimeTrend -2.9% 
(0.02) 
-2.4% 
(0.02) 
-5.4% 
(0.04) 
10.8%*** 
(0.03) 
GDP_cp -1.0% 
(0.00) 
-0.8% 
(0.01) 
-1.9% 
(0.01) 
3.6%*** 
(0.01) 
GDP 45.9%** 
(0.34) 
37.6%* 
(0.26) 
86.4% 
(0.68) 
-169.9%*** 
(0.65) 
NetImportElec 7.1%** 
(0.05) 
5.8% 
(.04) 
13.4% 
(.11) 
-26.3%*** 
(0.10) 
  ***  Significant at the 1% confidence level 
    ** Significant at the 5% confidence level 
      *  Significant at the 10% confidence level 
       () Robust standard errors within parentheses 
 
Table 4 shows that an increase in the CPI by one point (the country is less corrupt) lowers 
the likelihood for the average country in the NMS-10 sample to chose ownership 
unbundling for transmission with 11.3%, while increasing the probability to have legal, 
functional or accounting unbundling. 
 
Legal origin and unbundling regimes 
In a series of papers (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002; Djankov, 
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997, 1998, 1999; and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches, and 
Shleifer, 2004) the authors suggest that legal origin has an important, unambiguous, 
significant and unidirectional influence on a collection of institutional performance 
indicators such as quality of government, judiciary and regulation; corruption; and 
availability of external finance. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999 and 2004) found that 
common law countries have governments of higher quality, have less corruption, are less 
regulated and have more external finance available for firms than countries with other law 
origins. Countries of French legal origin have the worst score, while countries of German 
and Scandinavian legal origin are in the middle group. In line with these findings, we 
expect that common law countries have the most progressive unbundling regimes, that 
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French law countries have the least progressive unbundling regimes, and that 
Scandinavian and German law countries are in between.  
 
By and far, our data seem to contradict the findings of La Porta et al. (1998). While 
countries of French and German legal origin — in line with the findings of La Porta et al. 
(1998) — show less unbundling than countries of common law origin in a regressions, the 
differences are not statistically significant. Moreover, countries of Scandinavian legal 
origin show — in contrast with the findings by La Porta et al. (1998) — significantly (p< 
0.10) more unbundling than countries of common law origin. We conclude that legal 
origin does not play an important role in explaining the variation in unbundling regimes. 
 
5. Discussion 
For the EU-15 countries, we found a significant and robust effect of a well-established 
corruption measure on the realized unbundling regime: countries that are more corrupt are 
more likely to have chosen weaker unbundling regimes than seems desirable. The fact that 
politicians that are likely to be more corrupt allow less unbundling is an indication that 
less unbundling is indeed a way to grant VIUs higher rents.119 It also suggests that the 
choice EU law provides – a choice not suggested by economic theory – might be the result 
of a legislative process that has been compromised through questionable means of 
persuasion.  
 
Our result adds empirical evidence to a literature that casts doubt on the wisdom of 
allowing a weak unbundling regime which facilitates the continuing existence of large 
utilities that are effectively still integrated. Our result suggests specifically that the 
questionable practices of persuasion that were uncovered in the Netherlands (and that we 
discussed in section 2) may be systemic; our result also suggests that VIUs in countries 
that are more corrupt might use -- apart from legal lobbying channels and questionable 
(but not illegal) practices -- illegal means to further their interests.  
 
                                                 
119 Indeed, as we document in section A.2 in the Appendix, less unbundling seems to lead to more rents 
available to VIUs, both for EU-15 countries and the NMS-10. 
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The analysis which focused only on the NMS-10 shows a weaker but statistically 
significant effect in the opposite direction. We conjecture that countries in the NMS-10 
sample reported early adoption of formal EU requirements as a cheap means to increase 
their chances to be judged eligible for accession into the EU. This strategy should be 
especially attractive for corrupt countries, for which it is costly to implement other EU 
requirements such as curbing anticompetitive practices and governmental corruption. The 
case of Latvia seems to provide a good illustration. 
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7. Appendix 
A.1 Robustness tests (see footnotes 106 and 44) 
In this section, we report on a variety of tests we performed to understand the robustness 
of our results. We performed robustness tests for the observations that reported a mixed 
transmission unbundling regime and for contradictory data on Latvia. All tests supported 
the results reported in the body of the text. 
 
1. Mixed transmission unbundling regime 
To assess whether the removal of observations that report a mixed transmission 
unbundling regime - Legal/Management (L/M) for Ireland and Greece and 
Ownership/Legal (O/L) for Italy – affects the results in model 1, we did three robustness 
tests. 121 In the first test, we included the mixed regimes as ordered categories; for 
example L/M is more unbundled than Management unbundling, but less than Legal 
unbundling. This resulted in seven categories. The second test assigned the lower 
unbundling regime to each combination e.g. L/M becomes Management unbundling. The 
third test assigned the higher unbundling regime to each combination e.g. L/M became 
Legal unbundling. In all tests the significance of the coefficient of CPI was virtually 
unaffected (p<0.001). 
 
Our regressions in Table 2 did not include observations for which a mixed transmission 
unbundling regime was reported - Legal/Management (L/M) for Ireland and Greece and 
Ownership/Legal (O/L) for Italy (six observations in total). As a robustness test we 
included the mixed regimes as ordered categories; for example L/M is more unbundled 
than Management unbundling, but less than Legal unbundling. The significance of CPI 
increased strongly to p<0.000. Also, the effect on the significance of the jackknife test, 
                                                 
120 At the time of writing the authors, most likely because of the turmoil caused by their compromised 
independence, did not allow the final version of the report to be downloaded anymore. The paper is 
available at our website http://home.cerge-ei.cz/svk/Unbundling&Corruption. 
121 As Ireland and Greece belong to EU-15, the results for the NMS-10 are unaffected. 
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excluding a specific country, diminished drastically; the significance of CPI was never 
higher than p<0.001. 
 
2. Contradictory data on Latvia 
In the DG Tren reports the unbundling regime of Latvia is classified as accounting 
unbundling in 2003, and as legal unbundling before 2002 and after 2004 and 2005 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005). The (Latvian) 
Public Utilities Regulation Commission (2005) indicates that Latvia implemented legal 
unbundling only in 2005 and had accounting unbundling up to 2004. For consistency, we 
use the classification officially reported by the Commission of the European 
Communities. However, we ran a robustness check with the data from the (Latvian) 
Public Utilities Regulation Commission (2005). In this check, the significance of the 
coefficients of CPI was essentially unaffected. 
 
A.2 Rents from unbundling (see footnote 119) 
In this section, we report an additional test we performed to verify our results. 
Specifically, we tested for the effect of unbundling on rents available to VIUs. We 
conjectured that less unbundling leads to more rents available to VIUs. Our conjecture 
was confirmed both for the EU-15 countries and the NMS-10. 
 
To measure the rent from less unbundling,122 we considered the industrial electricity price 
relative to the domestic electricity price. We expected this indicator to be lower for 
countries with more rigorously unbundled transmission networks, both for EU-15 
countries and the NMS-10. Industrial consumers have more bargaining power than 
domestic consumers and therefore profit more from rigorous unbundling, which lowers 
the value of the indicator.123 A higher indicator value therefore reflects the stronger 
bargaining position of VIUs thanks to their control over transmission and can be used as a 
proxy for rents captured by the VIU. We therefore expected the regression of the indicator 
on the unbundling system (and controlling variables) to show a negative effect. Indeed for 
                                                 
122 We thank Libor Dusek for his suggestion. 
123 Steiner (2001) states that industrial consumers are larger – they have the scale to contract their own 
generator or access spot markets – and therefore have more elastic demand. 
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the EU-15 countries and the NMS-10 together the regression showed as expected a robust 
negative and significant effect (p<0.01). When running separate regressions for the EU-15 
countries and the NMS-10 the effects are, as expected, for both sets of countries negative, 
but — probably due to a lower number of observations — not significant (p< 0.148 for 
EU-15 countries and p<0.268 for the NMS-10). 
 
A.3 Effect of the CPI by year (see footnote 115) 
In our analysis we found that the effect of CPI on unbundling is opposite to the effect in 
EU-15 countries; more corrupt countries in the NMS-10 sample tend to implement (or at 
least report) more rigorous transmission unbundling. Our conjecture was that the strong 
pressure on the NMS-10 to show clear signs of reform in order to be eligible for EU 
membership motivated the more corrupt countries in the NMS-10 group to misreport, 
thereby reversing the effect of CPI on unbundling regime. As the rationale for 
misreporting was eliminated once the NMS-10 had acceded the EU in 2004, we 
hypothesized that, for the NMS-10, the effect of the CPI is not constant over time. In 
contrast, we hypothesized that the effect of the CPI is constant over time for the EU-15 
countries. Our hypotheses were confirmed. 
 
In order to understand the effect of the CPI for each individual year we created interaction 
variables CPI* ti (1≤ i ≤ 6) by multiplying the variable CPI with a dummy for each year. 
Model 1 in Table A1 shows that for the EU-15 countries all interaction variables CPI* ti 
(1≤ i ≤ 6) are positive and highly significant. Model 3 shows that for the NMS-10 the 
effect of the interaction variables CPI* ti (2≤ i ≤ 5) are negative in all years, and highly 
significant in the period 2002-2004, weakly significant in 2005, and insignificant in 2006. 
 
To test whether the effect of CPI varies significantly with time, we ran a regression in 
which we restricted the effect to be the same in every year by collapsing the interaction 
variables CPI* ti (1≤ i ≤ 6) into the single variable CPI. The resulting coefficients for CPI 
and T are reported in model 2 and model 4 for the EU-15 countries and the NMS-10, 
respectively. We found, by performing LR-tests (Long and Freese, 2001, p.146) that this 
restriction does not significantly (p<0.5795) decrease the log likelihood of the regression 
131 
 
for the EU-15 countries. This is not true for the NMS-10; such a restriction significantly 
(p<0.0059) decreases the log likelihood of the regression. We conclude that while the 
effect of the CPI is the same in every year for the EU-15 countries, it is different over time 
for the NMS-10, thus confirming our hypotheses. 
 
Table A1: regression models 
 EU-15 countries (old member states) NMS-10 (new member states) 
Variables Model 1124 Model 2124 Model 2125 Model 4125 
CPI * t1 3.36*** 
(0.73) 
   
CPI * t2 3.15*** 
(0.72) 
 -3.89** 
(1.51) 
 
CPI * t3 2.82*** 
(0.72) 
 -4.18*** 
(1.43) 
 
CPI * t4 2.77*** 
(0.73) 
 -3.44*** 
(1.21) 
 
CPI * t5 2.61*** 
(0.80) 
 -1.76* 
(0.96) 
 
CPI * t6 2.40*** 
(0.90) 
 -1.52 
(1.02) 
 
CPI  2.55*** 
(0.74) 
 -1.63*** 
(0.43) 
T  2.57*** 
(0.76) 
1.04*** 
(0.26) 
-0.55 
(2.00) 
1.55*** 
(0.44) 
N 83 
(15 clusters) 
83 
(15 clusters) 
40 
(8 clusters) 
40 
(8 clusters) 
***  Significant at the 1% confidence level 
    ** Significant at the 5% confidence level 
      *  Significant at the 10% confidence level 
       () Robust standard errors within parentheses 
 
 
 
A.4 Overview of the sources used to determine the transmission unbundling regime 
(see footnote 96) 
Official EU Sources Remarks 
2001 First DG Tren report (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2001)  
• The observation on Luxemburg is missing.  
• Does not contain data on the NMS-10. 
                                                 
124 For the observations on the EU-15 countries, we used the control variables that showed up significant in 
our main analysis in model 1: GDP_pc and NetImport_Gen. Their coefficients do not differ significantly 
from the results reported in the main analysis in model 1, and therefore we do not report them here. 
125 For the observations on the NMS-10, we used the control variables that showed up significant in our 
main analysis in model 3: GDP_pc, GDP, and NetImport_Gen. The coefficients do not differ significantly 
from the results reported in the main analysis in model 1, and therefore we do not report them here. 
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2002 Second DG Tren report 
(Commission of the European 
Communities, 2002),  
 
•  For the EU-15 countries member states, two 
observations are categorized as a mix of 
functional and legal unbundling and one 
observation as a mix of legal and ownership 
unbundling; these observations are omitted 
from Table 1. We did, however, do various 
robustness tests including these data; they are 
reported in section A1 in the Appendix. 
2003 In the Third DG Tren report (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2004) 
 
•  For the EU-15 countries member states, two 
observations are categorized as a mix of 
functional and legal unbundling and one 
observation as a mix of legal and ownership 
unbundling; these observations are omitted 
from Table 1. We did, however, do various 
robustness tests including these data; they are 
reported in section A1 in the Appendix. 
2004 Report on Progress in Creating the 
Internal Gas and Electricity Market, 
Technical Annex (Commission of the 
European Communities, 05.01.2005).  
 
2005 Report on progress in creating the Internal 
Gas and Electricity Market (Commission 
of the European Communities, 
05.11.2005).  
 
2006 Report on Progress in Creating the 
Internal Gas and Electricity Market. 
(Commission of the European 
Communities, 15.04.2008) 
• Observation on Cyprus 2006 is not reported 
unambiguously. 
Additional sources Remarks 
 Malta Resources Authority (2005), p.3. • Observations on Malta for 2001-2005. 
 Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority 
(2005), p.15. 
• Observations on Cyprus for 2002-2005. 
 The (Latvian) Public Utilities Regulation 
Commission (2005) 
• Used for a robustness check of a possible 
mistake in the official EU data 
 CYPRUS – Internal Market Fact Sheet. 
January 2007  
(http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/ 
• Observation on Cyprus 2006 
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doc/factsheets/market/market_cy_en.pdf) 
 
 
The construction of HHI_med; a proxy of HHI (see footnote 102). This section is will 
be published on our website http://home.cerge-ei.cz/svk/Unbundling&Corruption. 
 
In his section we give a detailed account of how we constructed HHI_med, which we use 
as a proxy for the HHI. We created HHI_med by using data on the market share of the 
largest generator (variable ms1) and of the largest 3 generators (variable ms3). From these 
data we first reconstructed an upper ( _HHI high ) and a lower ( _HHI low ) bound of the 
HHI consistent with the reported values for ms1 and ms3. We then calculated our proxy as 
2
_ _
_
2
HHI high HHI lowHHI med
⎛ ⎞+= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
 
Derivation 
For easier explanation we let the difference between ms1 and ms3 be given by 
-r ms3 ms1= . The HHI is given by the following formula: 
 
2 2 2 2( , , , )i i
i
HHI f a b c d a b c d= = + + +∑ , 
 
with restrictions: 
1. 1a b c d≥ ≥ ≥  and , : i ji j i j d d∀ ∈Ν > ⇒ ≥ , 
2. a ms1=  and a b c ms3+ + = , 
where a, b, c, and di are market shares the largest firms in the industry 
 
The first restriction — without loss of generality — orders the terms in f from larger to 
smaller. The second restriction is given by the data we have on market shares: the first 
element is equal to the measured market share of the largest generator (ms1), and the first 
three elements together are equal to the market share of the three largest generators (ms3). 
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Given values of ms1 and ms3, the lowest possible value that the HHI can take is  
, ,
_ ( , , , )
i
ib c d
HHI low MIN f a b c d=  
2 2 2 2
2 2
1
100lim 2
2 2 2
x
x
r r ms3 rms1 ms1
x→∞
−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + + = +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ . 
The share -r ms3 ms1=  is divided equally between the second largest and the third largest 
generator, which minimizes the addition to the HHI. The remaining share e is spread over 
an infinite number of firms, thus adding zero to the HHI. 
 
Given values of ms1 and ms3, the highest possible value that the HHI could take is  
2 2 2 2
, , , ,
_ ( , , , )
i i
i ib c d b c d i
HHI high MAX f a b c d MAX a b c d= = + + +∑ . 
with restrictions: 
1. 1a b c d≥ ≥ ≥  and , : i ji j i j d d∀ ∈Ν > ⇒ ≥ , 
2. a ms1=  and a b c ms3+ + = . 
 
To simplify the maximization problem, we define a function ( )g ⋅  with 
2
2 2 2 2100 100( , , ) ( ) ( )ms3 ms3g a b c a b c INT c DEC c
c c
− −⎛ ⎞= + + + + ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
The function ( )g ⋅ is equal to the function ( )f ⋅  with additional constraints, thus 
( ) ( )MAX g MAX f⋅ ≤ ⋅ . Also, we now shown that under restrictions 1 and 2, 
( , , ) ( , , , )g a b c f a b c d≥ . If the market share of the third largest generator, c, is equal to 
zero, then — because of restriction 1 — : 0ii d∀ ∈Ν =  and thus ( ) ( )g f⋅ = ⋅ . If c is larger 
than zero, then the HHI is maximized by having the fourth generator have a market share 
as large as possible without violating restriction 1, hence 1d c= . For the same reason we 
would assign the market share c to generator number five, six, and so on. The exact 
number of generators that, in addition to the third largest generator) can have a market 
share equal to c is given by the integer part of the remaining market share, 100 ms3− , 
divided by the size of the market share c. The above formula captures this with the 
expression 100( )ms3INT
c
− . The HHI is maximized by giving one firm the remaining 
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market share. The remaining market share is given by c times the decimal part of the 
remaining market share, e, divided by the market share c. The above formula captures this 
with the last expression, 
2100( )ms3DEC c
c
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (note that 
100( ) 1ms3DEC c c c
c
− ⋅ < ⋅ = , 
thus respecting restriction 1). As ( ) ( )g f⋅ ≥ ⋅  it follows that ( ) ( )MAX g MAX f⋅ ≥ ⋅ , and as 
also ( ) ( )MAX g MAX f⋅ ≤ ⋅ , this establishes that ( ) ( )MAX g MAX f⋅ = ⋅ . To find the 
maximum of f, it is sufficient to find the maximum of g. 
 
To maximize ( , , )g a b c  we first substitute for a and b in g from the second constraint and 
then differentiate g twice. We find that ( )
2
2
( , ( ), ) 4d g ms1 b c c
dc
= ; hence g has a global 
minimum. A constrained maximum can thus be found as a corner solution; either with c 
assuming the lowest possible value 0c = , and thus b r=  or the highest possible value 
1
2c b r= = . 
 
Hence the maximum is reached at one of the following two points: 
2 2 2_ 0HHI high1 ms1 r= + +  or 
2
2 2 2
2 100 100_
2 2 2 2
2 2
r r ms3 r ms3 rHHI high2 ms1 INT DEC
r r
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= + + + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
. 
 
We calculate the upper bound on the HHI as 
_ ( _ , _ )HHI high MAX HHI high1 HHI high2= . 
 
In our data the average HHI_high is only 2.3% higher than the average HHI_low, and the 
correlation between HHI_high and HHI_low is 0.997. Indeed Figure A1 gives a plot of 
HHI_high against HHI_low for all observations in our data and shows that these numbers 
are remarkably close. Rerunning our main regressions we indeed find virtually no 
difference using either HHI_high or HHI_low. 
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Figure A1: HHI_high against HHI_low 
 
0
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
10
00
0
H
H
I_
hi
gh
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
HHI_low
 
 
 
We construct our proxy HHI_med as a generalized average of the upper and lower bound 
on the HHI: 
2
_ _
_
2
HHI high HHI lowHHI med
⎛ ⎞+= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
We believe this is a good proxy for the true HHI. Firstly, the upper and lower bounds on 
the HHI are very close. Secondly, a linear regression of HHI_med on the market share of 
the largest and the three largest generators and a constant explains 97% of all variation. 
Thirdly, running our main regressions with either HHI_med, HHI_high or HHI_low 
basically makes no difference.  
 
An example 
The average market share of the largest generator is equal to ms1= 62 (rounded) and the 
average market share of the largest three generators is equal to ms3=71 (rounded). Thus 
-r ms3 ms1=71-62=9= , and 100 ms3=100-71=29−  
Then the lower bound on the HHI is given by:  
2 2 2_ 62 4.5 4.5 4136.5HHI low = + + = . 
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The possible upper bounds on the HHI are given by:  
2 2_ 1 62 9 4177HHI high = + =  
( ) ( )2 2 2 2 229 294.5 4.5_ 2 62 4.5 4.5 4.5 ( 4.5)HHI high INT DEC= + + + ⋅ + ⋅  
2 2 2 2 24
962 4.5 4.5 6 4.5 ( 4.5) 4262= + + + ⋅ + ⋅ = . 
 
And thus _ (4177, 4262) 4262HHI high MAX= = . 
We see that high numbers for ms1 and ms3 put strong restrictions on the possible upper 
and lower bounds of the true HHI; _ 4262 1.03
_ 4136.5
HHI high
HHI low
= =  
 
The value of the proxy is: 
2
_ _
_
2
HHI high HHI lowHHI med
⎛ ⎞+= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
2
4262 4136.5 4199
2
⎛ ⎞+= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
 
A list of all the variables 
Variable (Constructed from) Date of extraction 
CPI http://www.transparency.org - 
GDP_fixed1995 Eurostat 
GDP and main components - Constant prices, b1gm Gross 
domestic product at market prices, mio_eur_kp95 Millions of 
euro (at 1995 prices and exchange rates) 
Date of extraction: 
Mon, 17 Sep 07 
02:17:19 
GDP_pc_fixed1995 Eurostat 
GDP and main components - Constant prices, b1gm Gross 
domestic product at market prices, eur_hab_kp95 Euro per 
inhabitant (at 1995 prices and exchange rates) 
Date of extraction: 
Mon, 17 Sep 07 
02:17:19 
GDP_pc_pps Eurostat: 
Gross domestic product at market prices – At current prices 
PPS per inhabitant 
Date of extraction: 
15.05.2008 
GDP_pps Eurostat: 
Gross domestic product at market prices - At current prices 
Millions of PPS 
Date of extraction: 
15.05.2008 
GEG Eurostat: 
Total gross electricity generation  
107000 Total gross electricity generation 
gwh Gigawatt hour 
6000 Electrical Energy 
Date of extraction: 
Sun, 30 Mar 08 
09:12:53 
 
MS3LG DG Tren Reports 
Market share of the largest 3 generator  
- 
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MSLG Eurostat 
Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market  
 
Date of extraction: 
Fri, 4 Apr 08 
05:47:28 
Netimport/net 
generation 
Eurostat 
Net imports (Eurostat code: 100600)  
Date of extraction: 
Tue, 13 May 08 
09:47:42 
 Eurostat 
total net electricity generation (Eurostat code:107100) 
Date of extraction: 
Tue, 13 May 08 
09:47:42 
PIndHous 
(Industrial prices/ 
household prices) 
Eurostat 
Electricity prices - industrial users 
Date of extraction: 
Mon, 19 May 08  
 Eurostat 
Electricity prices - households 
Date of extraction: 
Mon, 19 May 08 
Tunbund See the “Overview of the sources used to determine the 
transmission unbundling regime” 
- 
WDLpT Eurostat 
Working days lost per 1000 workers by economic activity 
(NACE) - available country results 
Date of extraction: 
Fri, 4 Apr 08 
05:44:30 
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Glossary 
     
Account unbundling See unbundling, Account. 
Auction A formal and organized procedure to sell a good to several 
buyers. In a standard auction the highest bidder wins the 
auction. 
 Common value Each buyer has an identical value for the good on auction. 
(only paper 1) 
 First-price The highest bidder wins the auction and pays his bid. 
 Imperfect information The value the good on auction has for a buyer is known only 
to himself, and not to anyone else. 
 Perfect information The value the good on auction has for a buyer is common 
knowledge to all participating buyers. (only paper 1) 
 Private value Each buyer has an independent valuation of the good on 
auction. 
 Second-price The highest bidder wins the auction and pays the second 
highest bid. 
Cost weight The manager receives a financial remuneration that is equal to 
the revenue minus a proportion of the cost. I refer to this 
proportion of the cost as the cost weight. (only paper 2) 
Compensation scheme The manager receives a financial remuneration that is equal to 
an affine combination of revenues and profits. This can be 
shown to be equal to the profit minus a proportion of the cost. 
(only paper 2) 
Distribution The transport of electricity over short distance, usually by low 
voltage lines. 
Generation The production of electricity. 
Holding company Here used for a VIU that is legally unbundled. 
Independent buyer A generator that competes in an auction to buy a good and 
who is independent; not owned by a VIU that owns the seller 
in the same auction. 
Integrated buyer A generator that competes in an auction to buy a good and 
who is owned by a VIU that owns the seller in the same 
auction. 
Integrated seller A seller that sells a good in the auction who is owned by a 
VIU that owns a buyer (the integrated buyer) that bids in the 
same auction. 
Interconnector Cross-border transmission line in the EU. 
Legal unbundling See unbundling, Legal. 
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Management unbundling See unbundling, Management. 
Ownership unbundling See unbundling, Ownership. 
Ownership share γ  The share of the seller that the VIU owns. It is the proportion 
for which the VIU is residual claimant. 
OBK-scheme Own-Bid-Kickback scheme. The compensation scheme that a 
VIU offers to the manager of its legally unbundled generator. 
This scheme gives the manager effectively a discount on his 
bid when he wins. (only paper 2) 
Procurement auction An auction where a buyer in an auction sells, in the form of a 
sales contract, the right to supply him with a good. 
Unbundling, The separation of activities to lower the degree of vertically 
integration of a firm, i.e. a VIU. 
 Account The VIU must have separate accounts for its network and 
generation activities. (only paper 3) 
 Complete legal unbundling The network and generation activities must each be 
incorporated in companies that are legally independent from 
the VIU. (only paper 2) 
 Management The VIU must have separate teams and management for 
operating its network and generation activities. Also called 
functional unbundling. (only paper 3) 
Legal The network activities must be incorporated in a company that 
is legally independent from the VIU. 
 Ownership One company may not have ownership of both network and 
generation companies. 
Toehold auction An auction where a company that wants to take over another 
company (the target) already owns a proportion of the shares 
of the target company. (only paper 1) 
Transmission The transport of electricity over long distance, usually by high 
voltage lines. 
Vertical Integrated Utility An electricity company that owns generation and network 
activities (distribution or transmission). 
VIU See Vertical Integrated Utility. 
 
 
